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STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION:
BEYOND "DAMNED LIES"
Kingsley R. Browne*
Abstract Evidence that an employer's work force contains fewer minorities or women
than would be expected if selection were random with respect to race and sex has been
taken as powerful-and often sufficient-evidence of systematic intentional discrimina-
tion. In relying on this kind of statistical evidence, courts have made two fundamental
errors. The first error is assuming that statistical analysis can reveal the probability that
observed work-force disparities were produced by chance. This error leads courts to
exclude chance as a cause when such a conclusion is unwarranted. The second error is
assuming that, except for random deviations, the work force of a nondiscriminating
employer would mirror the racial and sexual composition of the relevant labor force. This
assumption has led courts inappropriately to shift the burden of proof to employers in
pattern-or-practice cases once a statistical disparity is shown. Recognition of these two
errors suggests that the role of statistical evidence in discrimination cases should be greatly
reduced.
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been said'-and frequently repeated 2 -that "[i]n the problem
of... discrimination, statistics often tell much, and Courts listen."3
As in the parlor game "Gossip," however, the message ultimately
received is usually not the message transmitted. The method of prov-
ing discrimination through statistical proof is based upon faulty statis-
tical and factual assumptions, and because of misconceived
interpretations of the meaning of statistical evidence, courts have
developed evidentiary doctrines that have the effect of improperly
shifting the burden of proof to defendants in discrimination cases. It is
the thesis of this Article that statistical evidence of intentional discrim-
ination should be abandoned as a primary method of proof and should
become, at most, merely an adjunct to evidence that specific persons
have been subjected to discrimination.
As Laurence Tribe has observed, "the costs of abusing a technique
must be reckoned among the costs of using it at all to the extent that
* Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School; B.A., George
Washington University (1975); M.A., University of Colorado (1976); J.D., University of Denver
(1982). The author would like to thank Joseph Grano, Michael McIntyre, Stephen Schulman,
and Robert Sedler for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 371 U.S. 37 (1962).
2. See, e.g., Lams v. General Waterworks Corp., 766 F.2d 386, 391 (8th Cir. 1985); Bryant v.
International Sch. Servs., Inc., 675 F.2d 562, 573 (3d Cir. 1982); Blake v. City of Los Angeles,
595 F.2d 1367, 1375 n.4 (9th Cir. 1979), cerL denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980).
3. Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d at 586.
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the latter creates risks of the former."' 4 The costs of using statistics to
prove discrimination are significant because statistics are systemati-
cally misinterpreted and their meaning exaggerated; the associated
costs are all the more disturbing, since the utility of statistics, if used
properly in such cases, is insignificant. One might expect that as the
shortcomings of statistical evidence became more obvious enthusiasm
for such evidence would wane. Unfortunately, that has not been the
case. Instead, limitations on the utility of statistical evidence have
been relied upon not to limit the use of such evidence, but rather to
modify evidentiary rules in ways that tend to obscure its lack of useful-
ness, and in the process to shift the burden of proof, albeit surrepti-
tiously, to defendants in employment discrimination cases.
There are two basic theories of discrimination under Title VII-the
"disparate impact" theory and the "disparate treatment" theory-
both of which may involve statistical proof.5 Under disparate-impact
theory, the plaintiff challenges a facially neutral employment practice
on the ground that it produces an adverse-if only ir.advertent-effect
on a protected group.6 Under disparate-treatment theory, the plaintiff
alleges that the employer has intentionally treated o:ae or more mem-
bers of a protected category differently from members of other groups.
A disparate-treatment claim may be brought as an individual action-
where the plaintiff complains about his own specific treatment---or it
may be brought as a class action or pattern-or-practice -ase---in
which case the plaintiffs (either individuals or the Equal Employment
4. Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84
HARV. L. REv. 1329, 1331 (1971).
5. These modes of analysis have also been used in claims brought under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), although the Supreme Court has never endorsed
the use of disparate-impact theory under the ADEA. See Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945, 948
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (denying certiorari); Metz v. Transit NMix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202,
1220 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
6. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
7. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
8. See, eg., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). The term
"pattern or practice" comes from § 707(a) of Title VII, which provides:
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of
persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the
rights secured by this subehapter, and that the pattern or practice is of such a nature and is
intended to deny the full exercise of the rights herein described, the Attorney General may
bring a civil action ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1988). Although the term "pattern or practice" in the statute refers to
actions brought by the government, the term has been extended so that it often refers to a class
action brought by private plaintiffs. The standards of proof for claims of systematic disparate
treatment are the same whether the action is brought by the government or by private parties.
Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 876 n.9 (1984).
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Opportunity Commission (EEOC)) must demonstrate that discrimina-
tion is the employer's standard operating procedure.
Statistical evidence has a role to play in each of the three forms of
discrimination action described above-disparate impact, individual
disparate treatment, and systematic disparate treatment. Statistical
evidence is indispensable to a claim of disparate impact because the
claim is that the challenged practice has an adverse effect on a group,
not merely on an individual; that effect can be shown only by demon-
strating statistically that the effects of the practice differ from group to
group.' Statistical evidence is useful, though not essential, in claims of
individual disparate treatment, because the plaintiff's claim of adverse
treatment based on race or sex may be buttressed by a showing that
the employer routinely treats people of different groups differently.
Conversely, the plaintiff's claim may be weakened by the employer's
presentation of favorable statistics to diminish, but not eliminate, the
probability that the plaintiff had been subjected to invidious discrimi-
nation."0 Finally, statistical evidence plays a central role in demon-
strating that an employer has engaged in a pattern or practice of
intentional discrimination, although, depending upon the particular
court, such evidence may be neither necessary nor sufficient for a
plaintiff to prevail.11 It is primarily the use of statistical evidence of
systematic intentional discrimination that is the focus of this Article,
although much of the discussion is relevant to statistical proof in the
other kinds of cases.
The centerpiece of a plaintiff's proof in the typical pattern-or-prac-
tice case is a demonstration that the observed representation of women
or minorities in the employer's work force is lower than the represen-
tation that would be "expected" if employment decisions were made
randomly with respect to race or sex; that demonstration is, in turn,
coupled with an inference that underrepresentations are a consequence
of intentional discrimination. 2 For example, if an employer has a
9. See WALTER B. CONNOLLY, JR. ET AL., USE OF STATISTICS IN EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTuNrrY LITGATION § 2.01[l] (1992) ("Disparate impact is, by definition, established by
statistics since impact is described by quantitative patterns.").
10. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80 (1978); McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 805.
11. See Pitre v. Western Elec. Co., 843 F.2d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 1988) ("Although statistics
may be useful to show differences in treatment and to establish a pattern and practice, they are
clearly not required, especially when the sample size is too small to produce meaningful
results.").
12. A finding of the existence of a pattern or practice of discrimination has the significant
consequence of establishing a presumption that each individual class member was a victim of
discrimination. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 772 (1976).
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work force of 200 entry-level unskilled employees and blacks consti-
tute 20 percent of the local labor force, the statisticed "expectation" is
that the nondiscriminating employer would have 40 black employees.
Of course, because of random variations, one would not have any con-
fidence that a nondiscriminating employer would have precisely 40
black employees, no more and no less. That is, no one would seriously
suggest that the fact that the employer had 39 or 41 blacks demon-
strates discrimination either for or against blacks, 13 Eny more than one
would conclude that failure to flip exactly 50 heads out of 100 coin
tosses demonstrates a flaw in the coin. But what if the employer has
30 blacks instead of the expected 40? What if it has 28?
In order to distinguish those statistical disparities that are explaina-
ble on the basis of chance from those that are not, courts apply
probability theory to test for the likelihood that a distribution as
extreme as that observed would occur by chance if whites and blacks
had a probability of being selected that was proportional to their rep-
resentation in the applicant pool. 14 In the example given above, most
courts would use the normal approximation of the binomial distribu-
tion to assess the probability of so large a deviation. 15 Applying this
method to the employer with 30 blacks, it turns out that the standard
deviation is 5.66,16 and 30 blacks corresponds to a z-score of 1.77,17
13. See Arthur B. Smith, Jr. & Thomas G. Abram, Quantitative Analysis and Proof of
Employment Discrimination, 1981 U. ILL. L. REv. 33, 39 ("Labor eeanomists... would not
expect even a nondiscriminatory employer to at all times hire minorities and nonminorities at a
rate exactly equal to their representation in the labor market.").
14. Eg., Barnes v. GenCorp, 896 F.2d 1457 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 211 (1990);
Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d 84,91 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Maddox v. Claytor, 764 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir.
1985).
15. See MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 120-22
(1990). The standard deviation is calculated using a formula
V)np(1-p)
where n is the number of trials, and p is the probability of obtaining the result on a given trial.
16. Thus, in this case the standard deviation is obtained
V(200 X.20)X (1 -. 20)
or
V'/ X.80= v = 5.66
17. The z-score is the number of standard deviations above or below the mean. Louis J.
Braun, Statistics and the Law: Hypothesis Testing and Its Application to Title VII Cases, 32
HASTINGS L.J. 59, 73 n.73 (1980). Here, the calculation is as follows:
observed-expected
s.d.
30-40
z=-= -- 1.775.66
480
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which in turn corresponds to a probability of about 8 percent. That is,
over the course of a large number of trials, if 200 employees were
selected at random from a large pool of potential employees that was
20 percent black, a deviation this great would be obtained approxi-
mately 8 percent of the time. Because courts generally do not consider
probabilities of more than 5 percent "statistically significant," most
courts would hold that in this example the statistical evidence stand-
ing alone does not constitute a prima facie case of discrimination."8
A court might reach the opposite result if the employer had only 28
blacks. Twenty-eight blacks would correspond to 2.12 standard devia-
tions below the expected value, with an associated probability of less
than 3.5 percent. Using a 5-percent significance level, a court might
find that this disparity is sufficiently unlikely to occur by chance that
chance can be eliminated as an explanation for the disparity. Many
courts recognize that to exclude chance as a factor is not the same as
finding that impermissible discrimination has occurred; 19 other courts
are not so careful.20 Whether or not they recognize this distinction,
however, courts will often find such a showing sufficient to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination, at which point the employer will
18. BARBARA SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 325 (2d
ed. Supp. 1983-1985) (stating that most courts find that disparities of less than two standard
deviations are not statistically significant); see also infra note 35.
19. See, eg., Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1468-69:
When a plaintiff demonstrates a significant statistical disparity in the discharge rate, he or
she has provided strong evidence that chance alone is not the cause of the discharge pattern.
... [but t]he statistics do not and cannot determine whether the more likely cause is the
defendant's bias or a legitimate selection criterion.
See also Palmer, 815 F.2d at 91 ("Nor can statistics determine, if chance is an unlikely explana-
tion, whether the more probable cause was intentional discrimination or a legitimate nondiscrim-
inatory factor in the selection process."); Maddox, 764 F.2d at 1552 ("It is important to stress
that a disparity translating into a large number of standard deviations does not automatically
point to discrimination as the cause."); Gay v. Waiters' and Dairy Lunchmen's Union, Local 30,
694 F.2d 531, 553 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[S]tatisties demonstrating that chance is not the more likely
explanation are not by themselves sufficient to demonstrate that race is the more likely explana-
tion for an employer's conduct.").
20. See Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff, Inc., 711 F.2d 647, 651-52 (5th Cir. 1983) (employing
standard-deviation analysis to compute the "probability of unbiased hiring"), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 927 (1984); Payne v. Travenol Lab., Inc., 673 F.2d 798, 820 n.32 (5th Cir.) ("Absent
explanation, standard deviations of greater than three generally signal discrimination .... ),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982); Rivera v. City of Wichita Falls, 665 F.2d 531, 545 (5th Cir.
1982) ("Standard deviation analysis quantifies the likelihood of a benign explanation for an
observed discrepancy. .. ."); Ivy v. Meridian Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 641 F. Supp. 157, 165
(S.D. Miss. 1986) ("A fluctuation of two or three standard deviations indicates that the result is
caused by discriminatory intent rather than chance."); see also John M. Dawson, Are Statisticians
Being Fair to Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs?, 21 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 8 (1980) (noting that
a significance level of .05 "means tolerating a 5 percent chance ... of a false inculpation of an
employer in a Title VII case").
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bear the burden of either attacking the prima facie case or demonstrat-
ing a nondiscriminatory explanation for the disparity.
The leap from statistical disparity to a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation is based on two powerful, necessary, but in correct, assump-
tions--one logical and the other factual. The logical assumption,
referred to here as the "Statistical Fallacy," is that, in the example
above, the probability of drawing 28 or fewer blacks at random-
which we have already seen is approximately 3.5 percent-is the same
as the probability that an observed work force having 28 or fewer
blacks resulted from chance. The first probability is the probability of
the observed disparity given random selection; the second is the
probability of random selection given the observed disparity. As will
be discussed below, there is no direct relationship between these two
probabilities,21 yet courts uniformly interpret the first probability-
which is the only one they have-as if it were eviderce of the second,
which is the one they need. Although in theory this logical flaw can
inure to the benefit of defendants as well as plaintiffs-since it may
lead courts to conclude that there is no discrimination when the dis-
parity is not statistically significant 2 -in practice this misunderstand-
ing leads disproportionately to erroneous conclusions in favor of
plaintiffs because of the disproportionate weight given to statistically
significant results.
The factual assumption upon which the prima facie case of discrimi-
nation is founded, referred to here as the "Central Assumption," is
that in the absence of discrimination one would expect that the work
force of each employer would-with only chance variations-mirror
21. See generally David H. Kaye, Statistical Significance and the Burden of Persuasion, LAw
& CONTEMP. PRoBs., Autumn 1983, at 13.
22. Compare Ottaviani v. State Univ., 875 F.2d 365, 371 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Before a deviation
from a predicted outcome can be considered probative, the deviation must be 'statistically
significant.' "), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1021 (1990) with Catlett v. Missoiri Highway & Transp.
Comm'n, 828 F.2d 1260, 1265 (8th Cir. 1987) ("The inadequacy of the class' statistics by
themselves to establish discrimination does not foreclose recovery .... ), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
1021 (1988) and Maddox, 764 F.2d at 1552 ("Just as a standard deviation of two or three does
not necessarily exclude legitimate causes other than chance, so a Z-valus below that range does
not necessarily exclude discrimination as the cause.").
Courts have shown themselves quite willing to find discrimination even in the absence of
statistically significant statistical evidence if other, nonstatistical evidence, is available. Their
recognition of the fact that an absence of statistically significant disparities does not by itself
prove the absence of discrimination is in some contrast to their apparent obliviousness in
disparate-impact cases to the fact that, when it comes to considering the defendant's "business
necessity" defense, the lack of a statistically significant relationship between a challenged practice
and job performance does not necessarily mean that no relationship exists. See, eg., Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425-36 (1975) (discussing job relatedness).
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the racial and sexual composition of the relevant labor force.23 Put
another way, courts assume that blacks, whites, males, and females are
all equally likely to be qualified and available for-and interested in-
each job. Although courts take some qualification differentials into
account by comparing only people having the minimum qualifications
for the job -if such minimum qualifications exist and if relevant data
are available-and, in some instances take interest differentials into
account by basing the statistical comparisons on applicant-flow
data24 -thereby limiting the comparison to those potential employees
who have indicated an interest in the job-the measures they use are
so crude as to be virtually useless. For example, the Supreme Court in
Hazelwood School District v. United States25 found appropriate a sta-
tistical comparison between the proportion of black school teachers in
a school district in the suburbs of St. Louis and the proportion of black
school teachers in the entire St. Louis area.26 The assumption under-
lying such a comparison is that within the class of certified teachers
the average qualifications of blacks and whites are equal and that
blacks and whites would be equally interested in obtaining a job in the
school district at issue. The difficulty with this sort of assumption in
general is that not only is it almost always unproved, it is often both
demonstrably false as a matter of fact and inconsistent with other
important assumptions of discrimination law.
23. This assumption is traceable in large part to the Supreme Court's opinion in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 n.20 (1977), in which it stated:
Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative in a case such as this one only
because such imbalance is often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination; absent
explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in
time result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition
of the population in the community from which employees are hired.
See also Marcy M. Hallock, The Numbers Game-The Use and Misuse of Statistics in Civil
Rights Litigation, 23 VILL. L. REv. 5, 12 (1977-78) ("If the employer has not discriminated on
the basis of age, the proportion of covered individuals who applied for jobs will be similar to the
proportion of covered individuals who were hired.").
24. See EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 337 (8th Cir.) ("[A]pplicant flow data is
often the best indicator of the extent of an employer's discrimination .... "), cert denied, 479
U.S. 910 (1986); Bazemore v. Friday, 751 F.2d 662, 687 (4th Cir. 1984) (indicating preference for
applicant-flow data), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 478 U.S. 385 (1986); United States v. County
of Fairfax, 629 F.2d 932, 940 (4th Cir. 1980) (indicating preference for applicant-flow data), cert
denied, 449 U.S. 1078 (1981); Green v. United States Steel Corp., 570 F. Supp. 254, 275 (E.D.
Pa. 1983) (noting that "actual applicant flow data is the preferred yardstick"), aff'd in part,
vacated in part sub nom. Green v. USX Corp., 843 F.2d 1511 (3d Cir. 1988), vacated, 490 U.S.
1103 (1989). See generally CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 9, § 4.03.
25. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
26. The Court remanded for consideration of whether, because of its strong affirmative action
efforts, the City of St. Louis itself should be excluded from the comparison. Id. at 312-13.
483
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The power of these twin assumptions has led courts to answer two
questions inappropriately. The first question is whether an observed
disparity is caused by chance or nonchance factors. The Statistical
Fallacy-with its equating of the significance level and the probability
of chance being the cause of the disparity-has caused courts to rule
out chance as a cause in circumstances where such a conclusion is
unwarranted. The second question is whether a disparity that is
believed to have been caused by nonchance factors was caused by sys-
tematic illegal discrimination or instead some other systematic, but
benign, cause. The Central Assumption that race- ;nd sex-blind hir-
ing would lead to proportional representation has led courts to con-
clude that differences in qualifications and interest are probably not
the cause of a disparity and therefore to place upon employers the
burden of proving that the groups at issue are not equally qualified or
interested. As a result, it has fallen upon the defendant to demonstrate
that the variables contained in a plaintiff's statistical analysis are
wrong, rather than on the plaintiff to demonstrate that they are right.
However, if "discrimination" under Title VII means treating similarly
situated persons differently, proving that persons are similarly situated
is rightfully part of the plaintiff's case.
The remainder of this Article will attempt to refute the Statistical
Fallacy and the Central Assumption and show how they have improp-
erly skewed proof requirements in Title VII pattern-or-practice cases,
followed by suggestions for how such cases should be litigated in the
future.
II. THE STATISTICAL FALLACY
The core of the Statistical Fallacy is the belief that the probability
that a given event occurred by chance is the same as the prior
probability of observing the event in a random draw. Suppose, for
example, that there is only a one in 100 chance that a husband and
wife of a given height would have a biological child who grows up to
be over six-feet tall. The Statistical Fallacy would cause us to con-
clude that when we observe that phenomenon there is a 99-percent
chance that the child is not the biological offspring of both parents. If
we know that the woman is the biological mother (for example, we
were present at the birth), we should be quite certain that artificial
insemination or adultery is responsible for this rare event.
Appreciation of the defect in statistical reasoning requires no exper-
tise in statistical methods; it requires only common sense, as can be
demonstrated by using a simple coin-tossing example. We know that
the probability of obtaining heads on a given toss is 0.5 if the coin is
484
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fair; thus, the expected number of heads out of 100 tosses is 50. How-
ever, we also know that most series of tosses will not produce exactly
50 heads.27 If we want to determine whether the coin is fair, we might
toss the coin 100 times to see what we get. If we obtain 100 heads we
can be quite confident that the coin is not fair; if we obtain 60 heads
we would be substantially less confident in concluding lack of fairness;
and if we obtained 55 heads, even less so. If we obtained exactly 50
heads, we would conclude that the observed distribution provides no
support for a conclusion that the coin is not fair, although it would be
improper to conclude that the distribution proves that the coin is
fair.28
A statistician would use the technique of hypothesis testing to make
probabilistic statements about the fairness of a coin.29 The "null
hypothesis" would be that the coin is fair; that is, the real probability
of obtaining heads with this particular coin is exactly 0.5. 30 The
"alternative hypothesis" would be that the coin is not fair; that is, the
real probability of heads is not 0.5, although there may be no notion of
what the true probability actually is." The goal of hypothesis testing
is to reject the null hypothesis, since it is the alternative hypothesis
that is the real subject of the inquiry, i.e., that the coin is not fair (or,
in discrimination cases, that the employer does not select employees
without regard to race or sex).32
27. In fact, if we routinely obtained an exact 50/50 split, we would suspect that the results
had been doctored. See CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 9, § 11.12 (Observed data are suspicious
if they "look too much like the ideal model.").
A famous example of data that are "too good" is Gregor Mendel's data concerning inheritance
of traits in garden peas. R.A. Fisher's statistical analysis of these data caused him to conclude
that a bias in favor of Mendel's expectation "seems to pervade the whole of the data." R.A.
Fisher, Has Mendel's Work Been Rediscovered?, 1 ANNALS SCi. 115, 131 (1936). In fact, for a
series of experiments, the likelihood of data conforming so closely to Mendel's theoretical
predictions was only .00007, leading Fisher to conclude that the data may have been "falsified so
as to agree closely with Mendel's expectations." Id. at 131, 132; see also Walter W. Piegorsch,
Fisher's Contributions to Genetics and Heredity, with Special Emphasis on the Gregor Mendel
Controversy, 46 BIOMETRICS 915 (1990).
28. For example, even if the coin is unbalanced in a way that will lead to a 60/40 head-tail
split over a large number of tosses, it is still possible in a particular series to obtain a 50/50
distribution by chance.
29. See Mikel Aickin, Issues and Methods in Employment Discrimination Statistics, 26
JURIMETRICS J. 347, 352-55 (1986).
30. See Braun, supra note 17, at 68 ("A null hypothesis postulates equality rather than
inequality, presuming that whatever statistically demonstrated inequality does exist is due to
chance factors.").
31. The alternative hypothesis postulates a difference between groups. Id
32. However, it is important to note that hypothesis testing does not allow one to "prove" the
null hypothesis; even if the experimenter obtained an exact 50/50 split in one series of tosses, he
could not state with any assurance that the true probability was exactly 0.5.
485
Washington Law Review Vol. 68:477, 1993
Prior to the experiment, the statistician would set a "significance
level," which is the probability level at which he is w-lling to reject the
null hypothesis.3 3 A commonly used significance level is .05, which
means that the null hypothesis will be rejected if the distribution
observed in the experiment is one that would be expected to occur less
than 5 percent of the time if the null hypothesis is true. Having estab-
lished the ground rules, the statistician now tosses the coin and obtains
60 heads and 40 tails. What can he say about the coin? Applying the
normal approximation of the binomial distribution he finds that 60
heads is exactly two standard deviations above the expected value of
50. Two standard deviations is equivalent to a probability just under 5
percent.34 Therefore, the experimenter is prepared to reject the null
hypothesis that the coin is fair using a 5-percent significance level.
Where the courts have gone wrong in employment discrimination
cases is in reasoning backward. They assume that if an employer's
work force reflects disparities of two standard deviations there is only
a 5-percent chance that the disparity is due to chance35 and, concomi-
tantly, a 95-percent chance that it is due to nonchance factors, 36 fac-
33. See David H. Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical Significance Relevant?, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1333,
1342-45 (1986).
34. The probabilities used throughout are "two-tailed" probabilities. That is, the alternative
hypothesis is that there is some difference between the two groups (e.g. blacks are not hired at
the same rate as whites), although the difference could run in either direction. See Richard
Goldstein, Two Types of Statistical Errors in Employment Discrimination Cases, 26 JURIMETRICS
J. 32, 45-47 (1985). Under a one-tailed test, the alternative hypothesis is that the difference runs
in a particular direction (e.g., blacks are hired at a lower rate than whites). Equivalent deviations
are more statistically significant under a one-tailed test than they are under a two-tailed test. Id
at 47. Courts to date have tended to favor the use of two-tailed tests. But see Little v. Master-
Bilt Prods., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 319, 333 (N.D. Miss. 1980).
35. Not all courts have used the 5-percent significance level as the benchmark, but it is the
most commonly used level. See Dailey v. Michigan Blue Cross/Blue Shield, Inc., 612 F. Supp.
1444, 1451 n.18 (E.D. Mich. 1985) ("Most courts and commentators have accepted the .05 level"
as the measure of statistical significance.). But see Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S.
977, 995 n.3 (1988) ("We have emphasized the useful role that statistical methods can have in
Title VII cases, but we have not suggested that any particular number of 'standard deviations'
can determine whether a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case in the complex area of
employment discrimination."); Ottaviani v. State Univ., 875 F.2d 365, 372 (2d Cir. 1989)
("While appellants' argument that a finding of two standard deviations should be equated with a
prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII is not without initial appeal, we are
constrained to reject such a formal 'litmus' test for assessing the legitimacy of Title VII claims."),
cerL denied, 493 U.S. 1021 (1990).
36. There are a number of ways that chance can operate to produce an imbalanced work
force. First, simply by chance, the mix of actual applicants before the employer at the time of
hiring may be nonrandom. For example, the group of white applicants may, by chance, happen
to have better qualifications than the group of black applicants, even if the larger populations
from which those applicants come have equal qualifications. Recognizing this fact, courts and
commentators have expressed a general preference for applicant-flow statistics over labor-force
statistics, except in those cases where applicant-flow statistics are either unavailable or deemed
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tors that they believe the employer should be called upon to
demonstrate. This conclusion is equivalent to a conclusion in the coin-
tossing example above that there is only a 5-percent chance that the
coin tossed by the statistician is fair. This is demonstrably false, as the
illustration below will demonstrate.
Suppose each of 100 persons in a room flips a coin 100 times, and
five of them obtain a split of 60/40 or greater, which is the statistically
expected number. The reasoning employed by the courts in discrimi-
nation cases would yield a conclusion that for any one of those five
persons there is only a 5-percent probability that the result was a ran-
dom deviation from the expected, and, conversely, that there is a 95-
percent chance that the observed distribution was caused by non-
random factors.37 But suppose we add another fact unknown to the
statistician: prior to the coin toss, each of the coins was carefully mea-
sured and calibrated, and it was secretly determined that each coin
was fair. Now, what is the probability that those tossers who obtained
60/40 splits used an unfair coin? Because of the additional informa-
tion, we now know that the probability is zero, barring errors in cali-
bration. However, because the kind of analysis that courts engage in
does not take into account the prior probability that the coin is fair,
which it would have to do in order to assign a probability to the
observed disparities, the court's conclusion would still be that because
the disparity equalled two standard deviations, the deviation is statisti-
unreliable. A comparison of actual hires to applicants in cases where chance has operated to
skew the applicant pools would show no statistical disparity if applicant-flow data are used.
Alternatively, even if qualifications of the two groups in the pool of actual applicants are
equivalent, chance differences may exist in whether applications of one group tended
disproportionately to be submitted at a time when no vacancy existed. Finally, even if individual
white and black applicants are equally qualified and the employer hires in a race-blind way, it
still may hire a disproportionate number from one race. If, for example, 5 pairs of equally
qualified black and white applicants apply sequentially for five individual openings, if the
employer hires in a race-blind fashion, there is a I in 32 chance that all five will be white (and an
equal chance that all five will be black) and an almost 1 in 5 chance that either 4 or 5 will be
white. In a given work force, chance may be operating in one or all of the above-described ways
to produce a skewed work force.
37. One could prove even more: if the probability of a given individual obtaining a split
greater than or equal to 60/40 is .05, the probability of all five getting such a split is
(.05)5
or less than one chance in three million.
The absurdity of the conclusion can be even more powerfully demonstrated by considering
events with higher probabilities. The probability of obtaining heads on one toss is 0.5; therefore,
when it is observed that heads resulted from the toss, the conclusion should be that there is a 50-
percent chance that the coin is not fair.
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cally significant and therefore highly probative of tihe existence of a
nonrandom cause.38
In the discrimination context, the probability that an employer's
work-force disparities are a consequence of chance is completely
dependent upon a statistic which the courts never have: the likelihood
of discrimination prior to making the employment decision. 9
Although one might attempt some estimate of the percentage of
employers who engage in systematic discrimination, the estimate
could be no more than the crudest approximation. Moreover, even if
that statistic existed, its use would be improper, since the consequence
would be to hold an employer liable simply on the ground that a cer-
tain percentage of employers are believed to discrimiate on a system-
atic basis.' Presumably no one would employ such logic to argue that
38. The same reasoning applied by the courts would lead one to convct all lottery winners of
fraud. If the probability that any given ticket is a jackpot winner is one in one million, then we
ought to say that there is only a one in one million chance that the person turning up at the
lottery office with the winning ticket has a genuine ticket.
39. For this reason, there has been substantial debate in the literature over whether an
explicitly Bayesian approach to statistical evidence should be adopted, primarily in the area of
identification evidence. See, eg., Michael 0. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, A Bayesian
Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HIIARv. L. REv. 489 (1970); David Kaye, The Laws of
Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 34 (1979); Laurence H. Tribe, A
Further Critique of Mathematical Proof 84 HARV. L. REV. 1810 (1971); Tribe, supra note 4, at
1361-62.
The subject of Bayesian theory is a controversial one in legal/statistical circles and beyond the
scope of this Article. See Lea Brilmayer & Lewis Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative Methods and
LegalDecisions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 116, 135 n.68 (1978). However, the essence of the technique
is to assign a "prior probability" based upon nonstatistical evidence and then to compute a
"posterior probability" based upon the combined statistical and nonstatistical evidence. See
Michael 0. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, A Comment on "Trial by Mathematics," 84 HARV.
L. REv. 1801, 1802 (1971). Thus, it is a way to calculate the probabilistic effect of additional
pieces of information. See Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra, at 135 n.68. Such an approach does
not hold substantial promise in the typical pattern-or-practice case where statistical evidence
predominates, since the posterior probability is based almost entirely on the statistical evidence.
See DAVID C. BALDUS & JAMES W.L. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF ]DISCRIMINATION § 9.21
(1980) ("[A]t the current state of the art, Bayesian statistics do not, in our opinion, provide
judicially acceptable methods for meeting critical presuppositions of the method."); David H.
Kaye, The Numbers Game: Statistical Inference in Discrimination Cases, 80 MICH. L. REV. 833,
854 n.67, 854-55 (1982) (book review) [hereinafter Kaye, Numbers Game] (describing the
"difficulty of institutionalizing Bayesian inference in the law," even in relatively straightforward
cases like Hazelwood and concluding that "it would not provide that much additional guidance
to the fact-finder"); Richard Lempert, Statistics in the Courtroom: Building on Rubinfeld, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1098, 1101 (1985) ("[T]he Bayesian perspective is unlikely to transform the
way statistical data is evaluated for litigation purposes at any time in the foreseeable future.").
40. See Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 39:
If a plaintiff tries to prove discrimination in a property owner's refusal to rent him a house,
he should not be allowed to introduce data from the market as a whole that shows
discriminatory patterns in the neighborhood. The individual owner simply cannot be held
accountable for the activities of others, just as he should likewise be unable to refute through
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a simple showing by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) that 51 per-
cent of taxpayers cheat on their income taxes would justify the imposi-
tion of civil penalties against a taxpayer.
The standard statistical analysis in discrimination cases is one that
would support findings of liability against thousands of nondis-
criminating employers.41 Assuming for illustrative purposes that
there is no discrimination in the workplaces under consideration and
that the employer hires randomly-and even assuming that all
employees and applicants are fungible-one in twenty statistical com-
parisons will result in a conclusion that the observed disparity was
caused by nonchance factors, and every one of those conclusions will
be wrong. More than 5 percent of employers are at risk, however,
because for any given employer there can be statistical comparisons
for each job, for each department, for the various racial, ethnic, and
sex groupings, and for different time periods.42 All employers of sig-
nificant size would likely have substantial numbers of jobs for which a
statistical disparity could be demonstrated. 43 Yet the true probability
general market statistics a showing of discrimination. Even if a utilitarian overview of the
situation shows that it would result in greater overall accuracy to grant the would-be tenant
a remedy, we would consider the evidence irrelevant to the particular case.
Id. at 150 n.129 (citation omitted).
41. Many of the cases that will be discussed involve multiple regression analysis, which, in
essence, does the same sort of thing as identifying the relevant labor market. Regression analysis
attempts to weigh the various factors that influence selection and determine whether there are
effects related to a protected status. See Thomas J. Campbell, Regression Analysis in Title VII
Cases: Minimum Standards, Comparable Worth, and Other Issues Where Law and Statistics
Meet, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1299, 1305-08 (1984); Franklin M. Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal
Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 702, 705-20 (1980); Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in
Employment Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARV. L. REv. 387, 397-98
(1975) ("Multiple regression... determines not merely whether a particular factor influences the
observed characteristic, for example, wage, but assigns a number approximating how much the
value of any given factor is weighted in a formula estimating the actual wage of an individual.")
42. See Pegues v. Mississippi State Employment Serv., 699 F.2d 760 (5th Cir.) (finding a
pattern or practice for one six month period out of the six- to seven-year period encompassed by
the lawsuit), cert denied, 464 U.S. 991 (1983).
43. A plaintiff is thus in a position to "mine" the data for statistical disparities and allege
discrimination in selected job groups. The defendant cannot necessarily avoid liability by
demonstrating that there were no significant disparities in comparable job classifications. See,
e-g., Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d 84, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ('[I]f plaintiffs in a Title VII case claim
discrimination in [assignments to a particular 'high visibility' position], it is no defense that the
government did not discriminate against women ... in assignments to five other 'high visibility'
positions.").
As Mikel Aickin has pointed out, modern computer programs applied to a sufficiently rich
data set will yield some statistically significant results even if the data set was derived from a
random number table. Aickin, supra note 29, at 359. Therefore, he advocates questioning
experts about statistical runs that they performed that did not yield significant results and that do
not serve as the basis of their testimony. See id. at 358-59; see also CONNOLLY ET AL., supra
note 9, § 11.09, at 11-24 ("A sufficiently comprehensive investigation nearly always results in the
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that the observed disparities were obtained by something other than
chance is, by hypothesis, zero.
The objection to the hypothesis-testing approach is not that it yields
only approximate results or even that it occasionally yields incorrect
results. Even our system of criminal justice with its "'beyond a reason-
able doubt standard" does not require infallibility; our civil standard
of "a preponderance of the evidence" requires much less. Rather, the
objection to hypothesis testing is that it yields meaningless results. A
court's conclusion that a difference between the employer's actual
work force and the statistically predicted work force demonstrates
that the employer's work force probably (but not certainly) is the
product of nonrandom factors is logically flawed. This error in analy-
sis has dramatic consequences, for it causes a court faced with a statis-
tically significant disparity to reason, "I'm faced with a disparity that
is very unlikely to have occurred by chance; this rexe result is suspi-
cious, and the employer ought to explain it," when it should be think-
ing, "The plaintiff has described statistics that would be true for
thousands of nondiscriminating employers; if the plaintiff wants me to
suspect discrimination, he'd better give me a lot more than that."
This concern about the judicial misconception of the meaning of
statistical evidence is quite real. The approach of mcst courts has been
that a statistically significant disparity establishes & prima facie case
unless the plaintiff's statistical comparison is so flawed that the
assumption of fungibility of employees or applicants cannot be
accepted.' When courts label a plaintiff's evidence: "statistically sig-
nificant," they generally mean that chance has been effectively ruled
out as the cause and that they must look elsewhere for an explanation.
At that point, the argument that the disparity was caused by chance is
no longer open to the defendant, who then must attempt to show
either that there is in fact no disparity or that the existing disparity did
discovery of some imbalance even among employees treated absolutely equitably."); Robert
Follett & Finis Welch, Testing for Discrimination in Employment Practices, LAW & CoNTEMiP.
PROBS., Autumn 1983 at 171, 183 ("[A]nalysis of an individual practice in isolation can lead to a
mistaken inference of discrimination if the practice that is scrutinized is chosen because it
presents the statistics that are least favorable to an employer.").
The difficulty for defendants in attempting to raise a "data mining" defense is that even though
it is a logically sound argument, it may appear as an attempt to argue that the employer should
not be liable for discrimination in the position at issue because it did not discriminate in other
positions. This is precisely how the defense was misinterpreted in Palner.
44. See, eg., Palmer, 815 F.2d at 108 (holding that the inference of discrimination raised by
significant disparities compels a judgment for the plaintiff in the absence of evidence in rebuttal);
see infra notes 177-83 and accompanying text (discussing Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S 385
(1986)).
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not result from illegal discrimination.4" Yet, as we have seen, the mere
fact that a disparity is "statistically significant" does not show that it
was probably not a consequence of chance.
The flaw in the statistical reasoning employed by courts
and by the expert statisticians upon whom they rely is both
fundamental and irrefutable. It is a mistake made by appellate
courts of most, if not all, of the circuits,46 numerous district
45. Although courts often talk about these as being separate methods of rebuttal, in most
cases they are the same. If, for example, the employer argues in a hiring case that the plaintiff
misdefined the relevant comparative labor force because the plaintiff did not take into account a
particular qualification, the defendant is saying both that if the proper comparative populations
were used, there would be no disparity, and that the disparity identified by the plaintiff is due to
the difference in qualifications between the two groups and not due to invidious discrimination.
46. Barnes v. GenCorp, Inc. 896 F.2d 1457 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 211 (1990);
Rendon v. AT&T Technologies, 883 F.2d 388, 398 (5th Cir. 1989) (upholding finding of
discrimination based upon statistical expert testimony "that there was less than a five percent
chance that the difference between the promotion times of minority installers and white installers
could occur by chance"); Ottaviani v. State Univ., 875 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1021 (1990):
A finding of two standard deviations corresponds approximately to a one in twenty, or five
percent, chance that a disparity is merely a random deviation from the norm .... When the
results of a statistical analysis yield levels of statistical significance at or below the 0.05 level,
chance explanations for a disparity become suspect, and most statisticians will begin to
question the assumptions underlying their predictions.
Id. at 371; Palmer, 815 F.2d at 91 ("A statistical analysis of a disparity in selection rates can
reveal the probability that the disparity is merely a random deviation from perfectly equal selec-
tion rates."); id. at 92 ("[T]he .05 level... indicates that the odds are one in 20 that the result
could have occurred by chance.") (quoting Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984));
Maddox v. Claytor, 764 F.2d 1539, 1552 n.13 (lth Cir. 1985) ("IF]rom a Z-value of -1.96, it
would be concluded that there was a one-in-twenty chance that the raw disparity resulted solely
through random distribution."); Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 537 n.13 (7th Cir.
1985) (stating that a p-value below .05 indicates "there is less than a 5% probability that the
disparity was due to chance"); Craik v. Minnesota State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1984):
Statistical significance is a measure of the probability that an observed disparity is not due to
chance. A finding that a disparity is statistically significant at the 0.05 or 0.01 level means
that there is a 5 per cent. or I per cent. probability, respectively, that the disparity is due to
chance.
Id. at 475 n.13 (citations omitted); Lilly v. Harris-Teeter Supermarket, 720 F.2d 326, 336 (4th
Cir. 1983) (stating that disparities of more than two or three standard deviations "conclusively
ruled out chance as the cause of the disparity in the termination rates"), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
951 (1984); Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 706 F.2d 608, 624 (5th Cir. 1983)
("Standard deviation analysis is a quantification... applied to statistical disparities to eliminate
chance as a likely explanation for the revealed difference between an expected outcome and the
observed outcome .. "); Pegues, 699 F.2d at 768 n.9 ("[T]he standard deviation quantifies the
probability that chance is responsible for any difference between an expected outcome and the
observed outcome .. "); Payne v. Travenol Lab., Inc., 673 F.2d 798, 821 n.32 (5th Cir.) ("The
'standard deviation' is a way to calculate the likelihood that chance is responsible for the differ-
ence between a predicted result and an actual result."), cer. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982); Rivera
v. City of Wichita Falls, 665 F.2d 531, 545 n.22 (5th Cir. 1982) ("A variation of two standard
deviations would indicate that the probability of the observed outcome occurring purely by
chance would be approximately five out of 100; that is, it could be said with a 95% certainty that
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courts,4 7 statistical expert witnesses,4" and both legal and statistical
the outcome was not merely a fluke.") (citation omitted); EEOC v. American Nat'l Bank, 652
F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 923 (1982):
[S]tandard deviations can be expressed in terms of the mathematical probability that chance
is the cause of the disparities .... Just short of two standard deviations-specifically at
1.96-the probability of chance is only 5 in 100; at just over two and one half, it is only 1 in
100; by three it is less than 1 in 100.
Id. at 1191-92 (citation omitted); Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1273 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1981) ("[A] .05 level of statistical significance means that the disparate results of a pre-
employment screening device would be the product of chance only one time in twenty."), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982); Taylor v. Teletype Corp., 648 F.2d 1129, 1133 n.8 (8th Cir.) (stat-
ing that a disparity of 2.28 standard deviations "indicates statistically a likelihood of only one or
two percent that pure chance was responsible for the demonstrated racial disparity"), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 969 (1981).
47. See, eg., United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. 785, 809 (E.D. Pa. 1989)
("As a general rule, a standard deviation of greater than two or three excludes chance as an
explanation for the underrepresentation of blacks."), aff'd, 894 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1990); EEOC v.
Andrew Corp., 51 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 39,364 at 59,540 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 1989) (stating
that three standard deviations "is merely a shorthand for indicatirg the probability that
Andrew's hiring pattern with regard to black clericals happened by chance"); Harrell v.
University of Montevallo, 673 F. Supp. 430, 433 (N.D. Ala. 1987) ("The probability that the
above described racial disparities in the statistics resulted from chance is extremely small-only
one out of 100 times."), aff'd, 861 F.2d 725 (1lth Cir. 1988); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
628 F. Supp. 1264, 1286 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988) ("A standard
deviation of 2 indicates that there is a .045 probability (that is, almost a 5% probability), that the
results observed occurred due to chance."); Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 1120,
1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[A] t-statistic of approximately two indicates that the chances are less
than one in 20 that the gender coefficient is the product of chance factors and the true coefficient
of gender is zero."); Woodard v. Lehman, 530 F. Supp. 139, 145 (D.S.C. 1982) ("The plaintiff
[can] demonstrate that a particular racial composition could not have occurred by chance...
only where the difference between the expected black representation and the actual result exceeds
two or three standard deviations."), aff'd, 717 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1983); Chisholm v. United
States Postal Serv., 516 F. Supp. 810, 826 (W.D.N.C. 1980) ("[The& result could not have
occurred by chance more than one time in a thousand. It is probable almost to the point of
certainty that something other than the ability the test is supposed to measure is responsible for
the racially differential results."), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 665 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1981); Gay
v. Waiters' & Dairy Lunchmen's Union, Local No. 30, 489 F. Supp. 282, 308-09 n.33 (N.D. Cal.
1980) ("By reference to tables based on the normal distribution curve, the Z statistic can be used
to determine the probability that the observed value is the product of random selection or
occurrence."), aff'd, 694 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1982).
Judge Higginbotham's epic opinion in Vuyanich v. Republic National Bank, 505 F. Supp. 224
(N.D. Tex. 1980), vacated, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 US. 1073 (1984), noted in
passing that "[a] test of statistical significance does not determine the probability that any
particular result in fact occurred by chance," but there is no indication in his opinion that this
observation played any role in his analysis of the statistical evidence. Id. at 348 (citing BALDUS
& COLE, supra note 39). Indeed, he refers to disparities significant at the 5-percent level as
"apparently discriminatory results," without any discussion of why they would appear so if the
5-percent level is not the probability of chance occurrence. Id. at 347.
48. Mister v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 832 F.2d 1427, 1429 (7th Cir. 1987) ("The plaintiffs'
expert witness testified that there was less than one chance in a million that this disparity was
consistent with race-neutral hiring."), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1035 (1988); Blum v. Witco Chem.
Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 371 (3d Cir. 1987) ("[P]laintiffs produced a statistical expert who testified
that the probability that the disparate retention rate was due to some random factor unrelated to
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commentators. 4 9  Although a few commentators have powerfully
age was .0084."); Moore v. McGraw Edison Co., 804 F.2d 1026, 1031 (8th Cir. 1986) (plaintiffs'
expert "testified that the chances were two in one thousand that age was not a factor in the
terminations"); Lewis v. Bloomsburg Mills, Inc., 773 F.2d 561, 569 (4th Cir. 1985)
("Unchallenged expert opinion testimony established that [a disparity in the range of 5-8
standard deviations] was statistically significant in the sense that the probability that it might be
explained by chance alone was no better than one in a thousand."); Association Against
Discrimination in Employment, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 647 F.2d 256, 264 n.7 (2d Cir. 1981)
("Plaintiffs' expert testified that the likelihood that such a difference would be attributable to
chance would be less than five chances in one thousand."), cert denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982);
Chance v. Board of Examiners, 330 F. Supp. 203, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d
Cir. 1972) (expert testified that "the probability of the difference being a chance result not related
to the factor of race is determined as less than one in one billion").
49. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 18, at 1370-71 (2d ed. 1983):
Since chance can never be totally ruled out as a cause of any statistical disparity, the
question becomes what risk is the court willing to assume that the disparity was caused by
chance rather than an alternate explanation such as discrimination....
The question then becomes what test of statistical significance will be used.
See id. at 1372 ("The .05 level of statistical significance means that the probability of the statisti-
cal disparity occurring by chance is 5 percent, which is to say one chance out of 20."); CHARLES
A. SULLIVAN ET AL., FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 1.8, at
74 (1980) (A disparity greater than 1.96 standard deviations "could be consistent with the [null]
hypothesis less than 5% of the time. Rejecting the null hypothesis means that it is much more
likely than not (though not certain) that the null hypothesis is not true."); Anthony E. Boardman
& Aidan R. Vining, The Role of Probative Statistics in Employment Discrimination Cases, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1983, at 189, 205-06 ('To say that a relationship is statistically
significant at the 95% level of confidence means that there is a 5% or lower probability of con-
cluding that there is a relationship when, in fact, there is none."); Braun, supra note 17, at 87
("When led to a rejection of the null hypothesis at a level of significance of 0.05, a court can be at
least 95% confident that a disparity of treatment of the relevant groups exists."); Campbell,
supra note 41, at 1306-09 (assuming that where the statistical model accurately reflects the
employment process, the significance level reflects the likelihood that a finding of liability would
be erroneous); Dawson, supra note 20, at 1-2 ("As applied in employment discrimination dis-
putes, this 5 percent test standard represents a sanctioned risk of false inculpation of a defendant-
employer, and is the burden of persuasion that must be met by a plaintiff who asserts that the
rates differ because of unlawful discrimination."); id, at 8 ("If we reject the null hypothesis in a
test at alpha level A, our 'confidence' that this decision is right is 100 percent-A (e.g., 95 per-
cent when alpha is 5 percent)."); Goldstein, supra note 34, at 40 ("[Wihen there is no difference
in the population and we set [the significance level at] .05.... there is a five percent chance that
we will incorrectly say that there is a difference between the two groups."); Hallock, supra note
23, at 13 ("[Ihe use of the .05 level of significance in employment discrimination cases seems
appropriate [because] most people consider the one-out-of-twenty chance that a conclusion is
wrong to be an acceptable degree of risk .. "); Howard C. Hay, The Use of Statistics to Disprove
Employment Discrimination, 29 LAB. L.J. 430, 433 (1978) ("[E]fforts to define 'substantial dis-
parity' are in fact simply efforts to determine whether the statistical disparity in question is
attributable to 'chance' or 'not to chance.' "); Jan W. Henkel & Patrick G. McKeown, Unlawful
Discrimination and Statistical Proof- An Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 34 (1981):
Usually, if the probability of an outcome occurring is less than some predetermined level,
say 0.05, and that outcome does occur, then the occurrence is said to be statistically signifi-
cant. This does not mean that the outcome won't occur, but it does imply that its occur-
rence cannot be explained by random variation.
Id. at 37; Barbara A. Norris, Multiple Regression Analysis in Title VII Cases: A Structural
Approach to Attacks of "Missing Factors" and "Pre-Act Discrimination," LAW & CONTEMP.
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pointed out the defect in logic,50 courts have largely ignored their
efforts, and in some cases it appears that some of these commentators
themselves do not fully understand the significance of their observa-
tions.5' This lapse in logic is difficult to explain on the basis of bias in
PROBS., Autumn 1986, at 63, 65-66 (explaining that results significant at the five percent level
means that "the likelihood that they occurred by chance is no more than one in twenty"); Elaine
W. Shoben, In Defense of Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title Vi: A Reply to Dr. Cohn, 55
IND. L.J. 515 (1980):
The level of 'statistical significance' refers essentially to how certain an investigator wants
to be that a difference found in a sample might not have occurred by chance alone even if
there is no difference in the unknown population. Social scientists often adopt a five percent
level of significance, meaning that there is no more than one chance in twenty that the
difference appearing in the sample could have happened by chance alone even if there is no
difference in the population.
Id. at 523 n.38; Smith & Abram, supra note 13, at 41 n.31 ("A hire rate disparity is deemed to be
'significant' if the probability that the observed disparity was due to chnce is lower than a cer-
tain percentage level.").
50. Eg., Kaye, supra note 21:
The court's assumption, however, that when the "probability of [statis.ical] error is less than
5%," the "scientific fact is at least 95% certain" exemplifies a common misunderstanding of
the role of statistical tests in scientific inference....
The difficulty is that this interpretation of the result of the hypothesis test is wrong. The
test was structured so as to retain the null hypothesis unless the chance of getting the
evidence under this hypothesis fell below 5%. The test focused exclusively on the
probability of the evidence given the null hypothesis. Nothing was said about the
probability of the hypothesis in the light of the experimental evidence. It may be tempting
to call the probability of 0.055 the chance of a coincidence, and to say that the probability of
something other than a coincidence - of foul play-must be what is left over, namely 0.945.
But this only shows that one can "prove" anything with words.
Id. at 21-22; see also Paul Meier et al., What Happened in Hazelwood: Statistics, Employment
Discrimination and the 80% Rule, 1984 Am. B. FoUND. REs. J. 139, 14:3 (pointing out that "[i]t
is a serious but very frequent error" to confuse the probability of random selection with the p-
value). Follett and Welch have made the same point:
It is important to recognize that the 0.05 rule does not say that when a difference as large
as two standard deviations occurs the probability that the two groups are treated equally is
5% or less, nor does it say that the probability of unequal treatment is 95% or more. It only
says that if the two groups are treated equally, one would expect a difference as large as the
one observed 5% of the time.
Follett & Welch, supra note 43, at 174.
51. A leading treatise on statistical proof of discrimination, for example, points out:
[E]ven if such a result would happen only 1 out of 100 times in a purely random system, a
statistical test cannot measure the likelihood that a particular outcome was or was not a
chance result. The test of significance states the likelihood of seeing evidence of the type
observed over the long run, if the system were effectively blind to [an) form of bias such as]
color or sex. It simply does not follow that the chances are 99 out of 100 that the result in
the instant case was not a chance result, let alone intentionally caused.
BALDUS & COLE, supra note 39, § 9.42. Although recognizing this essmtial point, the authors
also opine:
[The statistical test can say nothing about causation. The [statistical] test... provide[s]
relevant evidence on which an inference about causation can properly be based. For, if the
observed result would occur by chance only 1 time out of 100 in a random system, the
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favor of plaintiffs, since it infects both defense experts and courts that
ultimately rule in favor of defendants.52
In light of the fundamentally faulty statistical inferences this mode
of analysis induces, it is remarkable that several commentators have
argued not that using hypothesis testing with a 5-percent significance
level is too easy on plaintiffs, but rather that it is too hard. Thus, a
number of commentators have suggested that a 5-percent significance
level requires plaintiffs to prove their case to a 95-percent certainty,
occurrence of the result observed in the case before the court would have to be considered a
rare event (unless the system were not random), thereby suggesting chance was not the
cause. And if bias is the only other plausible explanation for the result, one's belief that the
defendant intentionally discriminated will be strengthened.
Id. § 9.42. However, as the prior discussion reveals, to say that the observed result would occur
by chance only one time out of one-hundred merely tells one that the statistical pattern is not
inconsistent with systematic discrimination; it in no sense suggests it. Baldus and Cole further
advance the Statistical Fallacy by asserting that "[tihe risk of an erroneous rejection of the
hypothesis that the disparity was caused by chance is considered a 'Type I' error, i.e., rejecting
the null hypothesis when it should have been accepted," thus equating the probability of a ran-
dom cause with the significance level. Id. § 9.0 n.5.
Even David Kaye, who has pointed out the Statistical Fallacy most forcefully, slips into lan-
guage that in effect incorporates it. For example, he describes the significance level as the chance
of a "false alarm," that is, the probability of falsely finding that a disparity was caused by
nonchance factors when in fact it was caused by chance. Kaye, Numbers Game, supra note 39, at
844 n.41. He states:
In always rejecting the null hypothesis of no discrimination at a significance level of a=.05,
the Court will erroneously reject this hypothesis five percent of the time, since five percent of
the cases... will occur due to chance alone, and the null hypothesis asserts the existence of
such chance results.
Id. Kaye's statement is true only if employers are sued randomly with respect to the statistical
profile of their work forces-i.e., if employers with a statistical overrepresentation of the relevant
group and those with a statistically "expected" representation are as likely to be sued for system-
atic discrimination as employers with a statistical underrepresentation. If most employers com-
ing before a court were selected because of their statistical disparities, the probability of error is
much higher than-and not directly related to-the probability suggested by the significance
level.
52. In the criminal context, courts and commentators have been quick to recognize the
Statistical Fallacy. In the notorious case of People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968), the
California Supreme Court reversed criminal convictions that were based upon the logic of the
Statistical Fallacy. In that case, witnesses testified that they had seen a blond woman with a
ponytail and a black man with a beard and mustache drive away in a yellow car immediately
following a bank robbery. The defendants met that description. The prosecution introduced an
expert witness to testify that the probability that a randomly chosen couple would match this
description was one in twelve million, and the defendants were convicted. The court found
several flaws in the statistical presentation, but the one of interest here is that it recognized that
the probability that a random couple would match the description is entirely different from the
probability that a couple matching the description is innocent. Id. at 40-41. Numerous scholars
have commented, virtually all favorably, on the court's reversal and its statistical analysis. See
Neil B. Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect
Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 385, 390 n.33 (1985) (citing 25 articles inspired by "the abuse of
probability theory in Collins").
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rather than by a mere preponderance of the evidence, which is
assumed to be 51 percent. 3 However, as David Kaye has pointed out,
there is no simple relationship between the significance level and the
burden of persuasion.54 If there were, a 5-percent significance level
would probably come close to satisfying the criminal standard of
proof, or at least the "clear and convincing" standard.
Recognition of the lack of clear relationship between the signifi-
cance level and the probability that observed disparities in a given
employer's work force were obtained by chance means that a plaintiff
who demonstrates a disparity of two or three standard deviations has
shown very little, since such showings could be made against most
employers for some job categories unless the employer is systemati-
cally employing quotas. Since the prima facie case should exclude the
most likely causes of a statistical disparity, such a weak statistical
showing should not be taken as establishing a prima facie case.
One's immediate reaction might be that results t:6at are significant
at the 5-percent level, even if not determinative, are sufficiently rare
that they are at least probative of discrimination. s However, contrary
53. See, e.g., Braun, supra note 17:
[The courts appear more reluctant to blame an employer who is actually not guilty of
discrimination (rejecting a true null hypothesis and making a Type T error with respect to
the innocence of the employer defendant) than to exculpate a defendant who did
discriminate unjustly.
Thus, the plaintiff must establish that there is at least a 95% chance that the
defendant's actions were discriminatory before the court will hold that a prima facie case
has been established by a preponderance of the evidence.
Id. at 69-70; Dawson, supra note 20, at 2 (The five-percent significance level "may be unduly
onerous, since a very low risk of false inculpation (as the 5 percent standard is) may be associated
with a high risk of false exculpation."); Henkel & McKeown, supra note 49, at 44-46; Marcel C.
Garaud, Comment, Legal Standards and Statistical Proof in Title VII Litigation: In Search of a
Coherent Disparate Impact Model, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 455 (1990):
The 95% confidence coefficient cut-off that courts have adopted is a stringent criterion
developed to test scientific conclusions reached on the basis of imperfect or incomplete data,
... [which requires plaintiffs] to assemble an analysis in which the risk of falsely inculpating
a defendant, that is, Type I risk, is no more than 5%.
Id. at 468; see also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976):
Typically, a scientist will not so certify evidence unless the probability of error, by standard
statistical measurement, is less than 5%. That is, scientific fact is at least 95% certain.
Such certainty has never characterized the judicial or administrative process. It may be
that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of criminal law demands 95% certainty....
But the standard of ordinary civil litigation, a preponderance of the evidence, demands only
51% certainty.
Id. at 28 n.58.
54. See Kaye, supra note 33, at 1339 n.31. See generally Kaye, supra note 21, at 23.
55. See BALDUS & COLE, supra note 39, § 9.42.
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to the view of some courts, rarity does not imply an unlawful cause."
Moreover, the fallacious nature of the initial assumption becomes
more obvious when it is recognized that lawsuits alleging class-wide
discrimination are not brought at random; instead, they are selectively
targeted against employers whose work force is "out of balance." Not
surprisingly, therefore, there are very few reported pattern-or-practice
cases, whether they find for or against the defendant, where there are
not statistical disparities that either are "statistically significant" or at
least approach statistical significance. If defendants in pattern-or-
practice cases are selected because of their statistical disparities, the
assumption that randomly caused disparities will be rare is without
foundation. 7 To pursue the coin-tossing example employed above, if
there were a Department of Fair Coins charged with monitoring coin
tosses, it would certainly concentrate its energies on the coin tossers
who obtained statistically significant results, but, depending upon the
prevalence of unfair coins, it may in most cases be wrongly accusing
the tosser of using an unfair coin. 8
Richard Lempert, although acknowledging that employment dis-
crimination lawsuits are not brought at random, asserts that non-ran-
domness tends to increase the proportion of valid claims.59 In
responding to Daniel L. Rubinfeld, ° who had made the point that one
would expect plaintiffs disproportionately to sue companies having
significant disparities rather than companies with more balanced work
forces, Lempert argues that "[e]ven if companies hire independently,
investigations into discrimination are not started, and are certainly not
56. A number of courts in tort cases, for example, have made the error of assuming that if an
outcome is rare, it is likely due to negligence. See, eg., McGonigal v. Gearhart Indus., Inc., 788
F.2d 321, 327 (5th Cir. 1986) ("If a man with thirty years experience in the munitions field had
not previously heard of a grenade with a missing delay column, then it also seems reasonable to
conclude that such an error will occur only when the inspector is negligent.").
57. See supra note 50.
58. Analogies to statistical proof in discrimination cases arise in statistical identification cases.
Suppose a criminal defendant is charged with rape and a blood sample is taken from him that
shows a match with a forensic specimen recovered from the victim. The prosecution puts on an
expert who testifies that the likelihood of a random match is one in 1,000. Whether this is strong
evidence for the prosecution depends on how the defendant was selected as a suspect. If the
defendant had met the victim's description, been arrested near the scene of the crime, and then
been picked out of a line-up by the victim, the statistical evidence would be strong confirmation
indeed. On the other hand, if the police had a data bank including blood data on the entire
population and selected the defendant simply because of the forensic match, the statistical
evidence would be quite weak, since there may be hundreds or thousands of people in that
particular city whose blood would match that taken from the victim.
59. Lempert, supra note 39, at 1114.
60. Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the Courtroom, 85 COLUM. L. Rv. 1048, 1064
(1985).
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pursued to the point of a trial, at random. ' ' 6 1 That is true enough.
However, he fails to appreciate that the nonrandcmness skews the
cases against defendants. On the contrary, he argues that "I expect
that before a case reaches the point of a substantial investment in a
careful statistical analysis (often at the expense of the plaintiff's attor-
ney), it appears to someone that there is a high prior probability that
the defendant company has been discriminating. 62
Lempert's argument is, on close examination, tautological. To the
extent that the appearance of a "high prior probability" of discrimina-
tion is based upon the statistical disparities, those disparities are, in
effect, being double counted. That is, a plaintiff may be denied a job
and, because of the statistical imbalance in the employer's work force,
assume that it was because of discrimination. Alternatively, the
imbalance itself, rather than any individual adverse employment deci-
sion, may have prompted the lawsuit.63 What causes plaintiffs' law-
yers to make a "substantial investment in a careful statistical analysis"
is not the lawyer's estimated high prior probability that the defendant
is discriminating; instead, it is the estimated high probability of pre-
vailing in a lawsuit, with its associated high probability of recovering
statutory attorneys fees. Sometimes the two probabilities are related,
but to the extent that the estimated probability of prevailing is inflated
by a misunderstanding of the meaning of the statistics, a plaintiff's
lawyer's belief that a case is a good investment cannot be taken as an
indication that the employer is discriminating.
Assuming for now that observed disparities are due either to chance
or to discrimination, rather than to differences in qualifications or
interest, it is very difficult to determine in a given case whether an
observed disparity is due to chance or to discrimination. As demon-
strated above, courts have erred in assuming that the significance level
reveals the probability that chance was responsible, an error that has
caused them to assume that either a systematic difference in qualifica-
tions or systematic discrimination was responsible for a disparity and
to require the employer to demonstrate a legitimate systematic
cause."4 However, if pure chance is the cause--where solely by chance
61. Lempert, supra note 39, at 1114.
62. Id.
63. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
64. See, eg., Waisome v. Port Auth., 948 F.2d 1370, 1376 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Social scientists
consider a finding of two standard deviations significant, meaning there is about one chance in 20
that the explanation for a deviation could be random and the deviation must be accounted for by
some factor other than chance."); Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen Local 201, 843
F.2d 1395, 1419 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (The possibility that the challenged disparity was due to chance
was "eliminated as part of plaintiffs' prima facie statistical case."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1105
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whites obtained jobs at a disproportionately high rate over equally
qualified blacks 65-a search for a systematic explanation is likely to be
fruitless, since by definition there is no systematic difference between
the two groups and no systematic cause of the disparity.66 If the
courts take account of this fact, the analysis of the respective burdens
of the parties must change.
Treating statistically significant differences as prima facie proof of
discrimination-and thereby calling upon employers to prove a sys-
tematic, but nondiscriminatory, cause under pain of liability-places
an insurmountable burden on many employers in those cases where
the disparities are actually due to chance. Chance disparities that are
significant at the 5-percent level are ubiquitous, but under current law
highly suspect. Nondiscriminatory disparities are therefore very
costly for employers, exacerbating the pressures on them to adopt
either overt or surreptitious quotas.67
Once it is understood that chance disparities are common and that
statistical analysis does not reveal the probability that a disparity was
a consequence of chance, the justification for treating disparities as
prima facie proof of discrimination disappears. There are two primary
reasons for treating statistical disparities as prima facie proof of dis-
(1989); Warren v. Halstead Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 746, 759 n.17 (4th Cir. 1986) ("[A] standard
deviation greater than two or three necessarily excludes 'chance' as the cause of under
representation."); Craik v. Minnesota State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 475-76 n.13 (8th Cir. 1984)
("Normally, courts and social scientists, when confronted with such low probabilities, conclude
that something other than chance is causing the disparity. The courts must decide whether that
'something' is illegal discrimination or some other, nondiscriminatory influence."); Lilly v.
Harris-Teeter Supermarket, 720 F.2d 326, 337 n.22 (4th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he standard deviation
analysis demonstrates that the significant disparity between the termination rates was not due to
chance, but instead to some other cause. That cause is presumed to be unlawful discrimination
until the defendant shows otherwise .... "), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984); EEOC v.
American Nat'l Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1192 (4th Cir. 1981) ("[With standard deviations of more
than three, the analysis may perhaps safely be used absolutely to exclude chance as a hypothesis,
hence absolutely to confirm the legitimacy of an inference of discrimination based upon judicial
appraisals that disparities are, to the legally trained eye, 'gross.' "), cert denied, 459 U.S. 923
(1982).
65. The converse is possible as well (i.e., chance could favor blacks), but a lawsuit is less likely
to result from that.
66. If the disparity is caused by differences in timing, no evidence is likely to exist, because
employers often do not keep records of which applications they have before them at a particular
time.
67. As Judge Higginbotham wrote in Vuyanich v. Republic National Bank, 505 F. Supp. 224
(N.D. Tex. 1980), vacated, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1073 (1984):
We know the mathematical techniques also may be freighted with collateral
consequences, some antithetical to the aims of the legislation being enforced. For example,
we blink at reality when we say that ratios and quotas are not being reinforced when liability
is heavily hinged upon "disparities" and deviations from numerical exemplars.
Id. at 394.
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crimination under a legal regime that expressly eschews a propor-
tional-representation requirement: either the evidence is highly
suggestive of discrimination or the defendant's access to explanatory
evidence is sufficient to require the defendant to come forward with
it.68 As already demonstrated, the first justification does not exist,
since the pervasiveness of random disparities makes it impossible to
say that a disparity, standing alone, is most likely a consequence of
discrimination. The second justification is also inadequate. Where
disparities are in fact a result of chance, the employer is unlikely to
have evidence to support that fact, and in those situations where there
are systematic differences between the relevant populations as a whole,
that evidence is as available to the plaintiff as it is to the defendant.69
If a burden of production is placed on the employer notwithstanding
the fact that the evidence that the employer is required to produce is
unlikely to exist, the procedural device of shifting the burden of pro-
duction is converted into a substantive rule making te employer liable
for chance disparities that exceed a given magnitude-i.e., chance dis-
parities that are "statistically significant." In short, the critical point
is that statistical evidence in these circumstances is simply inconclu-
sive and therefore cannot provide an adequate basis for determining
liability. Once this point is recognized, appropriate rules on burdens
of proof will readily follow.
A rule that has the consequence of rendering the employer liable for
chance disparities seems inconsistent with a legal framework under
which "[s]tatistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative
.. only because [they are] often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimi-
nation .... " 7 0 Nonetheless, a system under which employers would
expressly be liable for random disparities has its defenders. For exam-
ple, Richard Lempert provides three reasons for holding employers
liable for such disparities.71 First, he argues that simply showing that
randomness may be the cause is not the same as showing that it proba-
bly was the cause.72 Although this may be true, it assumes that the
burden of proof on the issue ought to rest on the defendant. However,
unless we can say-which we cannot-that disperities are usually
caused by discrimination rather than by chance, placement of the bur-
68. See, eg., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359 n.45 (1977).
69. Employers as a group have no special knowledge of general sociological tendencies, such
as the aversion or attraction of various groups to certain kinds of jobs or of the relative
frequencies of various qualifications within groups.
70. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339 n.20.
71. Lempert, supra note 39, at 1115-16.
72. Id. at 1115.
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den on the defendant is unwarranted, and there is no reason to depart
from ordinary rules of evidence that require the plaintiff to establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has violated the
law.
Lempert's next argument is that whether disparities are caused by
intent or by chance, we may wish to outlaw them to advance the inter-
ests of a group that has been subject to historic discrimination and
therefore require that the company hire "disfavored" groups in pro-
portion to their representation in the applicant pool.73 This argument
calls for a change in substantive law-i.e., a proportional-hiring rule-
in the guise of tinkering with the rules of evidence.
Finally, and perhaps most troubling, Lempert suggests a fundamen-
tally lawless approach, arguing that we may want to make an example
out of even non-discriminating employers both to demonstrate how
much we loathe discrimination and to punish discriminating employ-
ers who would not be held liable under a regime that required evi-
dence.74 Lempert suggests that this "value conflict" between imposing
or not imposing liability for random disparities might be resolved
either way.75 However, the values that conflict are not commensurate.
The value of requiring evidence before holding a defendant liable and
the value of not holding employers liable for random statistical dispar-
ities are values that emanate from our basic legal traditions and from
Title VII, respectively.76 The values furthered by imposing liability
simply to make the points suggested by Lempert are Lempert's own
values, values that a court ought not consider in resolving the issue.
Lempert's suggestions illustrate an unfortunate tendency to disre-
gard ordinary notions of fairness when issues of equality are impli-
73. Id.
74. L at 1115-16. Lempert writes:
Third, for purposes of deterrence we may not want to allow a company with a
disproportionately small number of women employees to appear untouched by the legal
process. Other companies with a propensity to discriminate may thereby be emboldened to
do so. Moreover, to allow the defense of randomness may mean that companies that are in
fact discriminating escape by using it, thus doing injustice in particular cases and lowering
specific as well as general deterrence.
Id.
75. Id at 1116.
76. In light of the incompatibility of Lempert's suggestions with applicable law, it is
somewhat surprising that he prefaced his discussion of random effects as follows:
If there is any general theme to my comments it is Lex Regis: when econometrics or any
other statistical specialty enters the courtroom, the law is king. The law's norms and values
ultimately determine what models are appropriate, what questions should be asked of data,
how burdens should be allocated, and what various statistical results imply.
Id. at 1113. That is a caution that everyone should heed.
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cated. As Richard Epstein has pointed out, although we abhor
murder-indeed, we deem it the greatest moral transgression that can
occur-we do not respond to that abhorrence by relaxing the eviden-
tiary rules governing murder trials despite the possibility that ordinary
rules of proof may cause some murderers to go free.77 In the discrimi-
nation context, however, we constantly hear arguments that eviden-
tiary requirements or substantive rules should be eased in order to
avoid the possibility that some clever defendants are discriminating
and covering their tracks.78 Unless we are willing squarely, and pub-
licly, to embrace a policy preference for quota hiring-a course that
seems politically unlikely7 9-we should not covertly impose such a
requirement under the pretense of formulating evidentiary rules.
In sum, contrary to the common assumption of courts to the con-
trary, statistical evidence of discrimination is inherently weak.
Hypothesis testing is fundamentally incapable of doing that for which
it is generally used-assessing the likelihood that disparities in an
employer's work force were produced by nonchance factors. Accept-
ance by the courts of the Statistical Fallacy has caused them to assume
away what in many cases will be the actual explanation for a statistical
disparity-the operation of chance. Employers are thus left in the
unenviable position of having to demonstrate a systematic nondiscrim-
77. As Richard Epstein has commented: "Why should the (assumed) importance of the
antidiscrimination laws require us to slight the errors of overenforcement? The consensus that
murder is a grave wrong, punishable under the criminal laws, has never been regarded as a
reason to make life easy for prosecutors ...." RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS:
THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 225 (I99).
78. The distinction between treatment of potentially vindicated murder defendants and
discrimination defendants is not simply a difference in philosophy between civil and criminal
standards of proof. In the context of rape we hear arguments similar to those advanced in the
discrimination context-that elements of the crime should be presumed or modified because
convictions are otherwise too difficult to obtain and that evidentiary rules should be altered to the
detriment of the defendant. Cf Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1037, 1104 (1986) (arguing
for a standard under which a woman's "no means no," with no further inquiry into the isssue of
consent permissible); State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1279 (N.J. 1992) (going beyond Estrich
by holding, in effect, that absence of affirmative consent means "no": "the law places no burden
on the alleged victim to have expressed nonconsent or to have denied permission, and no inquiry
is made into what he or she thought or desired or why he or she did not resist or protest"); Frank
Tuerkheimer, A Reassessment and Redefinition of Rape Shield Laws, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1245-54
(1989) (arguing that many rape shield laws exclude relevant evidence). Thus, rather than being a
distinction between civil and criminal rules, the critical issue for those who would modify the
substantive and procedural rules appears to be whether their conception of equality is offended
by the specter of falsely exculpated defendants.
79. See Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A "Quota Bill, " a Codification of
Griggs, a Partial Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 287
(1992).
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inatory reason for work-force disparities when no systematic explana-
tion exists.
III. THE CENTRAL ASSUMPTION
In the prior section, we were largely concerned with disparities in
the roughly two to three standard deviation range-with associated
probabilities of roughly 5 percent to less than 1 percent-which are
present in a very large number of discrimination cases.80 Random dis-
parities of this magnitude are pervasive in the workplace and are not
suggestive of a nonrandom cause, let alone an illegal one. However, in
many cases work-force disparities are much greater, perhaps in the
one in one million range.81 Although this Article's central thesis still
holds-i.e., the statistical showing does not demonstrate that when a
disparity of this size is observed there is only a one in a million chance
that it occurred by chance-nonetheless one might reasonably con-
clude that chance is an unlikely explanation even if a precise
probability cannot be assigned to a nonrandom cause. Although
chance cannot be ruled out completely as the cause, a systematic
explanation may be more plausible. It is in cases such as this that the
second fundamental assumption of statistical proof becomes so
critical.
The factual assumption that a non-discriminating employer's work
force would (except for chance variations) mirror the race, ethnic, sex,
and age profile of the "qualified" population-what I call the Central
Assumption-is :an essential foundation of a theory that allows an
inference of discrimination to be drawn from statistical disparities. 82
Tests of statistical significance are deemed to exclude chance as a
cause of the disparities, and the assumption that populations are
equally qualified and interested in each job excludes differential qualifi-
80. See, ag., Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 940 F.2d 1036, 1043 (7th
Cir. 1991) (promotion statistics reveal a 2.13 standard deviation disparity), cert denied 113 S.
Ct. 207 (1992); Rendon v. AT&T Technologies, 883 F.2d 388, 397 (5th Cir. 1989) (rejecting
argument that there is a strict benchmark of 3 standard deviations). In several discrimination
cases, the statistical significance has been so low that the courts were forced to decide whether a
one-tailed or two-tailed test of significance was appropriate. See, eg., Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d
84, 95 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (opting for a two-tailed test).
81. For example, in EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 323 n.20 (7th Cir. 1988),
the z-values for nationwide comparisons ranged from 11.9 to 45.1.
82. See BALDUS & COLE, supra note 39, § 9.02 ("[l]n order to assess the likelihood that
chance was the causal factor in a disparate treatment case, it is necessary to assume that all
applicants were similarly situated on all relevant qualifications.").
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cations and interest as explanations for the disparities. Courts are
then left with discrimination as the only possible explanation. s3
In cases where the statistical probability of a given result is in the 1-
to-5-percent range, the statistical evidence is so weal: that the errone-
ous factual assumption is virtually irrelevant. Put another way, if I
am right about the Statistical Fallacy but wrong in my criticism of the
Central Assumption, disparities of two to three standard deviations
are very weak evidence of discrimination, too weak to constitute a
prima facie case. In the "megadisparity" cases, however, the fact that
one cannot establish a precise probability that a disparity was caused
by nonrandom factors may not substantially diminish the inference
that the observed disparity was caused by something other than
chance. To take an extreme example, if the probability of a result
given random selection is one in one billion, it is quite likely that we
would not observe the result in our lifetime if selection is purely ran-
dom. In light of what we know of the prevalence nonrandom causes-
such as differential qualifications, differential interest, and discrimina-
tion-we may subjectively, and correctly, believe that a nonrandom
explanation is more likely than a random one. The effect of the Cen-
tral Assumption, however, is to presume that once chance is excluded
as an explanation, the nonrandom cause is an illegal one, thereby, in
effect, imposing the burden on the employer to disprove
discrimination.
As a threshold matter, it should be noted that the Central Assump-
tion of fungibility of workers is directly at odds with other assump-
tions of discrimination law, specifically those dealing with affirmative
action and the disparate-impact theory of discrimination. This incon-
sistency does not, of course, demonstrate that the assumption is
wrong, but it might cause one to wonder why different employment
discrimination doctrines have developed based upon inconsistent fac-
tual assumptions. The core problem with the Central Assumption,
however, is that it is demonstrably wrong. Members of various racial,
ethnic, sex, and age classifications are not equally qualified and inter-
83. It is important to emphasize that as soon as the argument turns from whether a disparity
was caused by chance to what nonchance factor was responsible-i.e., a discriminatory or
nondiscriminatory factor-the level of statistical significance is no longer particularly important.
That is, if the plaintiff argues that a given disparity was caused by discrimination and the
defendant argues that it was caused by differential interest, whether the disparity is three
standard deviations or thirty does not affect the likelihood that either the plaintiff or defendant is
correct. Both parties agree that the disparity is not caused by chance; that is, they agree that
there really is a difference between the two groups.
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ested in each job.84 Especially at a time when we are constantly told of
the virtues of "diversity"-i.e., that persons of different groups have
different perspectives and attitudes--one would think that it would be
similarly recognized that they may have different interests and abilities
as well. At the least, it should be recognized that there is no reason a
priori to structure our legal system with the presumption that they are
identical.
A. The Central Assumption and Other Title VII Doctrine
The Central Assumption is fundamentally inconsistent with
assumptions underlying other Title VII doctrine. For example, advo-
cates of affirmative action have long argued that simple compliance
with the nondiscrimination mandate of Title VII will not achieve full
integration of women and minorities into the work force in the foresee-
able future.8 5  Because historically disfavored groups-especially
blacks-are so disadvantaged by deficits in education and employ-
ment, the argument goes, without affirmative action full integration
will take generations. Thus, the rationale underlying affirmative
action is exactly contrary to the rationale supporting statistical infer-
ences of discrimination. The former posits that proportional represen-
tation is not, at least in the near term, the expected consequence of
nondiscrimination; the latter posits that it is.
The Central Assumption is also contrary to the rationale of the dis-
parate-impact theory of discrimination. Under disparate-impact the-
ory, a plaintiff may challenge practices having a disproportionate effect
on a particular group even if the practices were not adopted for the
purpose of discrimination. 6 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 7 the
Supreme Court stated that employment qualifications such as satisfac-
tory scores on standardized tests and possession of a high school
diploma may "operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups."88
A central tenet of Title VII doctrine, as it has been developed by the
courts, is that qualifications adopted without an intent to exclude may
nonetheless have the effect of excluding minorities and women. As a
result, employers may not adopt qualifications causing a disparate
84. See Smith & Abram, supra note 13, at 38 ("Many of the observed shortfalls in minority
and female earnings have been found to be attributable to differences in supply side
characteristics among minorities, women, and white males ... [and] result from forces beyond
the control of an individual employer.").
85. See generally Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust" A Comment on the Affirmative
Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1327 (1986).
86. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
87. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
88. Id. at 432.
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impact unless the qualifications are justified by business necessity.
Yet, if the Central Assumption were correct, there would be no need
for disparate-impact theory, since qualifications, even unnecessary
ones, would be evenly distributed throughout all groups, and the only
disparate impacts would be random ones, as likely to favor blacks as
whites. However, no one believes that the effects are random. Numer-
ous disparate-impact cases have been brought alleging that qualifica-
tions adopted by employers without discriminatory intent have
resulted in disproportionate exclusion. In some cases, employers are
able to defend on the ground of business necessity; :mn others they are
not. The relevant point, however, is that many job qualifications
adopted without discriminatory intent will have a disparate impact on
certain groups. Thus, the disparate-impact rationale is also directly
contrary to the Central Assumption, with the former positing that
good-faith reliance on qualifications will tend to result in a dispropor-
tionately low rate of selection of women and minorities, and the latter
positing that it will not.
B. The Factual Basis for the Central Assumption
The Central Assumption of equivalence in its rawest form has few
adherents. That is, no one believes that a minority plucked from the
ghetto of the inner city is as likely as a white from the affluent suburbs
to be qualified for a position as a lawyer. For that reason, except in
cases involving jobs requiring no skills (or requiring only readily
obtainable skills), raw comparisons between an employer's work force
and the general population are generally recognized to be inappropri-
ate.89 On this gross level, then, no one really believes the Teamsters
statement that "nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result
in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic
composition of the population in the community from which employ-
ees are hired," unless one gives extraordinary weight to the phrases
"in time" and "more or less." Instead, at least in the absence of appli-
cant-flow data, courts will generally require comparisons between the
89. Courts that have relieved plaintiffs of the obligation to prove qualifications in
circumstances where job skills are readily obtainable have not adequately explained why the fact
that skills are readily obtainable justifies declining to control for them. See, eg., Gay v. Waiters'
& Dairy Lunchmen's Union, Local No. 30,489 F. Supp. 282, 307 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (holding that
because the necessary skills of a waiter "can be acquired on the job in a matter of days or weeks
... general population and civilian work force data are the proper frame of reference"), aff'd,
694 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1982). The fact that employers require employees to have the skills for
the job, rather than providing on-the-job training, surely is not suggestive of intentional
discrimination.
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employer's work force and the "qualified labor force."'  The statisti-
cal analysis of intentional discrimination then assumes that within this
"qualified labor force" qualifications and interest are randomly distrib-
uted with respect to race and sex. Limiting the statistical comparison
to this qualified labor force is thought to control for differences in
qualifications between groups.
The assumption that qualifications are randomly distributed by race
and sex within the qualified labor force has no more empirical basis
than the same assumption with respect to the general population. The
qualifications that define the qualified labor force are so generalized as
to belie any claim that there is serious control for qualifications. For
example, if the employer requires a law degree for a position, then the
qualified labor force would be those persons having such a degree, the
ostensible assumption being that qualifications are now controlled
for." Yet, how many of the law professors who argue for holding
employers liable on the basis of such statistics think that all law school
graduates are equally qualified to be hired on their faculties? How
many believe that the qualifications of a randomly selected graduate of
the "worst" law school are likely to be equal to those of a randomly
selected graduate of the "best" law school? How many believe that
the person who graduates at the top of his class from a given law
school is no better than the person who graduates at the bottom of the
same class? How many believe-notwithstanding discrimination in
education, differences in attitudes toward education, and any other
reasons that may cause racial differences in educational achievement-
that blacks and whites on average will have equal law school creden-
tials? The tendency of law schools to hire highly credentialed appli-
cants and to hire "affirmative-action candidates" with lesser
90. In EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1991), the district
court had found that the defendant's applicant flow had to be ignored because it was "not
remotely representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the civilian work force." Id. at
300. Of course, whenever it is argued, by either plaintiff or defendant, that applicant-flow data
rather than census data should be employed, it will be precisely because the applicant flow differs
from the census data.
Issues concerning the appropriate geographic scope of the relevant labor market are beyond
the scope of this Article, but definition of that market is often outcome determinative. Id at
299-300; see also Braun, supra note 17, at 63-67 (questioning utility of EEOC's use of the
"Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area" as the proper geographic area to be considered); Smith
& Abram, supra note 13, at 59 ("Egregious displays of gerrymandering characterize litigation
and compliance proceedings.").
91. See, eg., Valentino v. United States Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 56, 71 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(stating that plaintiff need control only for "threshold qualifications," which are "those
prerequisite to consideration for a position (eg., a law degree), not attributes of relative
advantage or disadvantage (ag., reputation of law school attended, service on a law journal)").
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credentials suggests that most faculty members believe that credentials
are important and not uniformly distributed throughout the popula-
tion. Yet the core principle of the Central Assumption is that those
with the minimum qualifications are essentially fungible and that reli-
ance on higher qualifications is likely to have a race- and sex-neutral
result.
Some would acknowledge that law school graduates are not fungible
but assume that applicants for other positions are92 -- an attitude that
allows them to impose requirements on others that they correctly per-
ceive would be inappropriate for themselves. However, the notion
that variations in qualifications for "lower level" jobs are not impor-
tant is born of ignorance and elitism-an attitude that "they" can live
under rules that would be inappropriate for "us," because we are more
important and because there are differences in our group that do not
exist among the "drones." However, there are good janitors and bad
janitors, just as there are good lawyers and bad lawyers. An
employer's interest in choosing between good and bad janitors is as
legitimate as its interest in choosing between good and bad lawyers. 93
The assumption that race and ethnicity are unrelated to productiv-
ity is so demonstrably false as to require little refutation.94 For exam-
ple, we are constantly told that blacks attend inferior schools, tend to
get less education, do less well on standardized achievement tests and,
one suspects, although data are not as readily available, do less well in
schools even when they finish.9" The last conclusion would not be
surprising given that blacks are often admitted to institutions of higher
education with lower grades and test scores, whether or not the insti-
92. See Elaine W. Shoben, Probing the Discriminatory Effects of Employee Selection
Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title VII, 56 TEX. L. REv. 1, 33 (1977)
(suggesting that "[p]olice officers, fire fighters, many factory workers, and bank tellers" have jobs
requiring "skills commonly possessed or easily attained by many people").
93. It is true, of course, that for more complex jobs, an appropria-e statistical comparison
would contain more variables than an analysis of less complex jobs. See Coser v. Moore, 739
F.2d 746, 750 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[A] university's 'treatment of minorities cannot be evaluated in
the same manner as that of, say, a trucking company or factory that can hire many people with
less differentiated qualifications.' ") (quoting the district court opinion, 587 F. Supp. 572, 584
(E.D.N.Y. 1983)). That is not the same as saying that applicants for the lower level jobs are
fungible.
94. See DANIEL S. HAMERMESH & ALBERT REES, THE ECONOM"CS OF WORK AND PAY
360-71 (1988) (discussing differences in productivity of workers in different racial, ethnic, and
sex groups); THOMAS SOWELL, THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RACE: AN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 248-50 (1983).
95. See generally ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE
HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992); James P. Smith & Finis R. Welch, Black Economic Progress After
Myrdal, 27 J. ECON. LIrERATURE 519 (1989).
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tutions are willing to admit it.96 With respect to job experience, we
hear often of the high level of unemployment and underemployment of
blacks, which has a substantial impact upon their predicted productiv-
ity to a prospective employer.97
In addition to differences in productivity-related qualifications,
there is reason to think that there may also be racial and ethnic differ-
ences in interest in various jobs; at least there is no basis to erect a
legal presumption that such differences do not exist. For example, in
light of the often-commented-upon suspicion that blacks have of
police, one would not necessarily expect equal levels of interest in join-
ing the police force. Conversely, given the strong tradition of police
service in many Irish communities,9 8 the fact that they are represented
at a rate substantially higher than their rate of participation in the
general labor force should raise no suspicion. Similarly, Jews are
found in high numbers in law teaching,9 9 a fact that does not lead
most to suspect discrimination against gentiles.
Just as with race, productivity-related differences exist between the
sexes."°° There are differences in education; for example, men earn the
great majority of Ph.D.'s in engineering, physics and mathematics,101
and in the absence of affirmative action in graduate admissions the sex
96. See, ag., Michel Marriott, Unresolved Role of Race in Law Class Admissions, N.Y.
TImEs, April 28, 1991, § 4, at 5 (reporting statement by the dean of Georgetown Law School that
race is not among the factors considered for admission). See generally Lino A. Graglia, Race
Norming in Law School Admissions, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 97 (1992).
97. In Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1985), the question was whether
statistics showing a disproportionately high rate of disciplinary sanctions imposed on blacks
suggested discrimination. However, it is not clear that we should suspect discrimination in
workplace discipline simply because more blacks are disciplined than whites. Most people do not
generally assume-although some would argue to the contrary-that the criminal justice system
is infected with racism merely because blacks are disproportionately represented in the ranks of
convicted violent criminals; the more likely explanation is that blacks are disproportionately
represented in the ranks of all violent criminals. If a group that contributes disproportionately
to violent crime is also found to be punished disproportionately for workplace misconduct, it is
not immediately obvious that discrimination by the disciplining employer is the most likely
explanation. Yet, the statistical method of testing for discrimination assumes that it is.
98. GEORGE E. REEDY, FROM THE WARD TO THE WHITE HOUSE: THE IRISH IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 28 (1991).
99. ROBERT A. BURT, Two JEWISH JUSTICES: OUTCASTS IN THE PROMISED LAND 64
(1988) (noting that in 1970, 25% of law teachers nationwide were Jews and that at "elite" law
schools the figure was 38%).
100. June O'Neill, The Trend in the Male-Female Wage Gap in the United States, J. LAB.
ECON., Jan. 1985 Supp., at S91, S92 (1985) (arguing that the wage gap between men and women
"did not narrow between 1955 and 1982 because the average sex differential in productivity-
related characteristics did not, on balance, narrow").
101. In 1989, for example, women received 18.1% of the Ph.D.'s in mathematics, 18.9% in
physical sciences, and 8.2% in engineering. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
597 (1991).
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imbalance would be even greater. There are also differences in
employment experience; for example, the disproportionate responsibil-
ity of women for household work and child care causes many women
to devote less effort to market work than men and to evaluate certain
job characteristics differently, which, in turn, has an impact on their
occupational distributions and their earnings.1 2
The assumption of equal interest in all jobs between men and
women also has no basis in fact and is counter to everyday experi-
ence.103 One need only look around the contemporary workplace to
observe a substantial degree of occupational segregation, most of
which cannot be attributed to employer discrimination. As Deborah
Rhode has pointed out, by early adolescence boys and girls have
acquired different career expectations."m Sex differences in tempera-
ment, abilities, and worldview are well documented105 and are com-
monly invoked by feminists in support of their social analyses."
102. O'Neill, supra note 101, at S1l0-11; see also HAMERMESH & REES, supra note 94, at
368 ("The interruption of careers by child rearing means that at any given age married women
are likely to have had less labor-force experience than men, and hence to have made smaller
investments in on-the-job training.").
103. See generally Randall K. Filer, Sexual Differences in Earnings The Role of Individual
Personalities and Tastes, 18 J. HuM. RESOURCES 82 (1983).
104. DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW
166 (1989). She states: "In general, women have expressed lower expectations for occupational
success than men and have attached greater priority to the relational aspects of employment
(such as opportunities for helping or working with others) than to opportunities for recognition
(money, status, and power)." Id
105. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY
AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982) [hereinafter IN A DIFFERENT VOICE]; Kingsley R.
Browne, Biology, Equality, and the Law: The Legal Significance of Biological Sex Differences, 38
Sw. L.J. 617 (1984).
106. For example, Carol Gilligan's work, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE, supra note 105, is
commonly cited in the legal literature for the proposition that men and women have different
values and modes of thought. See, eg., Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1 (1988):
[According to "cultural feminists,"] women have a "sense" of existential "connection" to
other human life which men do not. That sense of connection in turn entails a way of
learning, a path of moral development, an aesthetic sense, and a view of the world and of
one's place within it which sharply contrasts with men's.
Id. at 15; Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE L.J.
913 (1983):
Another component of a new sex discrimination jurisprudence must be an awareness that
assimilation into existing predominantly male social structures is an inadequate definition of
equality between the sexes and one that robs equality of much of its transformative poten-
tial. The principle that only women whose life patterns, skills, and experiences are virtually
identical to those typical of men will be accorded high status and rewards will, as a practical
matter, doom most women to continued subordination. Moreover, the common practice of
focusing primarily on fair access to previously male positions and privileges is based in large
part on androcentric value systems that maintain the hierarchy of male over female activi-
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Although we are repeatedly told that women are differently social-
ized, 07 differently educated, and even that they think differently, the
statistical analysis employed in discrimination cases erects a strong
presumption that without discrimination by employers, women's
career paths would be identical to those of men. Yet if these differ-
ences are real, it should hardly be surprising if the career choices of
men and women are not entirely congruent; 08 indeed, it would be sur-
prising if they were. The point here is not, as Vicki Schultz has deri-
sively characterized it," that "because girls are conditioned to
conform to 'feminine' sex roles, adult women will automatically aspire
to 'feminine' work." Neither women nor men "automatically aspire"
to anything. The point is considerably more modest; it is that recogni-
tion of these differences should cause one to be skeptical of a legal
presumption that women will "automatically aspire" to the same work
as men." 0 Whether these differences in preferences result from innate
predisposition' 1 ' or from "cultural stereotypes, family and peer pres-
sure, and the absence of alternative role models,""I2 there is nothing in
ties. Since women's value systems are often quite different from those of men, the full par-
ticipation of women in the process of change may both depend on and encourage a re-
ordering of social priorities.
IM at 967.
107. See RHODE, supra note 104, at 165-66 ("At early ages, children begin absorbing cues
about appropriate sex-role traits and occupations .... ").
108. Id at 164 ("To assume that under conditions of full equality women will make precisely
the same occupational choices as men is to adopt an assimilationist perspective that many
feminists renounce.").
109. Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work- Judicial Interpretations of Sex
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103
HARV. L. REv. 1749, 1810 (1990).
110. Schultz has also argued that courts have erroneously attributed women's work
aspirations to their early socialization and have failed to understand that women's work
aspirations are shaped in large part by later experiences in the labor market. Id. at 1799. That
fact, if it is one, is largely irrelevant to her point. Even if women have less interest in a particular
kind of job because of their labor market experience, differential interest should not be ignored in
a statistical analysis of a particular employer's work force, where the question is not whether
women have faced discriminatory attitudes in the labor market but whether they have faced
discrimination from this employer. Ignoring differential interest because of "sexist societal
attitudes" is another way of modifying the substantive reach of Title VII under the guise of
creating evidentiary rules. Under formal Title VII doctrine, employers are liable for their own
discrimination, not for that of others. Yet excluding differential interest from a statistical
analysis has the effect of holding employers liable for actions of others. Schultz acknowledges
that part of her goal in urging courts to reject defenses based upon differential interest is to
pressure employers to recruit women into nontraditional jobs. However, Title VII was intended
to allow women to choose nontraditional jobs, not to require them to do so or to require
employers to attempt to manipulate women's choices.
I 11. See generally Browne, supra note 79.
112. RHODE, supra note 104, at 166.
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the language or history of Title VII suggesting that employers should
be held responsible for these differences.
Courts have employed the presumption of equal interest in circum-
stances where it is clearly contrary to reality. For example, in Catlett
v. Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission, 113 the Eighth
Circuit held that the relevant comparative pool against which to com-
pare Missouri's hiring for highway maintenance workers was the gen-
eral labor force. As a result, the fact that less than ten percent of the
state's maintenance hires were women, compared wit:h forty-eight per-
cent of the labor force, was held to suggest discrimination.I 4 Yet, the
notion that in the absence of discrimination women would flock to
such jobs in proportion to their representation in the total labor force
is nonsensical.' 15
Productivity-related differences also exist for persons at different
ages. Decline in certain kinds of productivity with age is well docu-
mented.116 As a result, it should not be surprising that when employ-
ers make reduction-in-force decisions based upon performance, often a
fairly significant number of older workers are targeted for layoff.
Moreover, for any given job containing workers of varying ages, some
of the employees will have peaked in that particular job, while others
("the rising stars") will just be passing through on their way to better
things. A sixty-year-old worker who has been in a middle-manage-
ment position for fifteen years is likely to be a less valuable employee
than the thirty-year-old who was recently promoted into that position
113. 828 F.2d 1260, 1266 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1021 (1988).
114. Id.
115. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 668 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("It is absurd to think that the nationwide failure of road maintenance crews... to achieve the
Agency's ambition of 36.4% female representation is attributable primarily, if even substantially,
to systematic exclusion of women eager to shoulder pick and shovel."): Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 348 (1977) (White, J., dissenting) ("I am unwilling to believe that the percentage of
women applying or interested in applying for jobs as prison guards in Alabama approximates the
percentage of women either in the national or state population.").
The district court in Davis v. City of Dallas, 483 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Tex. 1979), used a more
realistic approach than the Catlett court by relying on applicant-flow data, rather than labor
force statistics, in reviewing a claim of sex discrimination in the Dalla,,. Police Department:
The most plausible explanation for the disparity, an explanation borne out by the evidence
discussed, is that women were not during the relevant period interested in police work in the
same proportion as were men....
These job preferences of females may be born of attitudes conditioned by societal sexist
values. But frustration with the realization that equality of opportunity untouched by
gender remains a social goal and not an achieved reality, must rot be visited on this
employer in the form of liability.
Id. at 61.
116. MARY JABLONSKI ET AL., PRODUCTIVITY, AGE, AND LABOR COMPOSITION CHANGES
IN THE U.S., 111 Monthly Lab. Rev. No. 9, at 34 (1988).
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and who may be perceived as having the potential to rise much higher
in the organization. 1 7 Nonetheless, with the kind of crude statistical
comparisons involved in pattern-or-practice cases, these two employ-
ees are likely to be considered equal,118 or, even worse, the older
employee may be viewed as more qualified if seniority or experience is
considered a positive qualification.
In sum, the Central Assumption of equal interest and qualifications
between different race, sex, and age groupings is contrary to both
empirical evidence and intuition. Yet it is enshrined in our case law
and serves as the basis for inappropriately transferring to employers
the burden of proving its falsity in individual cases.
C. The Central Assumption and Improper Shifting of the Burdens
of Proof
Permitting plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case based upon
incomplete statistics in effect shifts the burden of proof to the defend-
ant to disprove matters that should be part of the plaintiffs' case in
chief.119 In a case of individual disparate treatment under McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 20 a plaintiff, in order to establish a prima
facie case, is generally obligated to show that he was qualified for the
job, that he applied for it, and that he was denied it under circum-
stances that raise an inference of discrimination, this last step gener-
ally entailing a showing that the plaintiff was at least as qualified as the
person who obtained the job (typically a white or a male). 12 1 It is not
117. See CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 9, § 10.05[1], at 10-37 ("[T]o the extent that age and
seniority are correlated, it is ... not unreasonable to expect that within a job level, the older
employees will tend to be the less able performers."); see also Davidson v. Board of Governors,
920 F.2d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Employees who stay longest are, on the average though of
course not in every case, those who have the fewest offers to go elsewhere.").
118. See Barnes v. GenCorp, Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1466 (6th Cir.) ("Since it is reasonable to
presume at [the prima facie case] stage of the case that skill is distributed randomly over any
given age group and since the plaintiffs have shown that the results depart significantly from
those that chance alone would predict, we believe that the statistics, on their face, establish a
prima facie case of discrimination."), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 211 (1990).
119. See Campbell, supra note 41, at 1309 ("To shift the burden of persuasion to the
defendant.., on the strength of a poorly fitted regression violates the burden of proof standards
enunciated in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine and Furnco [Constr. Co. v.
Waters], even if the defendant has offered no better fitting equation.").
120. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
121. The precise contours of the plaintiff's prima facie case differ depending upon the nature
of the hiring decision. Under the facts of McDonnell Douglas itself, the Court held that to
establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must show:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
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enough for the plaintiff merely to demonstrate that he is a minority,
that he met the minimum qualifications, and that he did not get the
job. Yet, that is exactly what courts permit when they allow the typi-
cal statistical showing to satisfy the prima facie standard.122
The oft-repeated assertion that the plaintiffs' burden in a pattern-or-
practice case is greater than the plaintiff's burden in an individual
case 12-an assertion generally made for the purpose of imposing a
Id. at 802.
In circumstances where the employer reviews applications all at one time and selects from the
applications, the mere rejection of a minimally qualified minority should not be enough to estab-
lish a prima facie case, since rejection of one qualified applicant in favor of another raises no
inference of discrimination. In such circumstances, courts often require as part of the plaintiff's
showing that the plaintiff either demonstrate that he was at least as qualified as the nonminority
selected or provide other circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Se , eg., Hill v. Seaboard
Coast Line R.R. Co., 885 F.2d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that plaintiff must show that
he is at least as qualified as the nonminority selected); Mason v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank, 704
F.2d 361, 365 (7th Cir. 1983) (suggesting in dictum that "there is some question whether the
[McDonnell Douglas] format is appropriate.., in a case involving appointment or promotion to
a position for which there are several candidates"); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir.
1979):
[I]f a qualified black were turned down for a job for which there were 100 applicants for
every opening and the practice, rather than being to hire the first qualified applicant who
appeared, was to choose on the basis of qualifications, recommendations and subjective
impressions gleaned from an interview, it would hardly seem 'more likely than not' that the
applicant was rejected because of race.
Id. at 1017 n.18; Bracey v. Helene Curtis, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 568, 571 (N.D. Ill. 1992) ("An
inference of racial discrimination cannot arise from the mere fact that a white person was hired
instead of [plaintiff] from among a pool of applicants."); Shidaker v. Bolger, 593 F. Supp. 823,
838 (N.D. Ill. 1984) ("[O]utside the factory setting the first qualified applicant need not be
selected where a choice is made 'on the basis of qualifications, recommendations and subjective
impressions.' ") (quoting Mason, 704 F.2d at 365), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom.
Shidaker v. Carlin, 782 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1986), vacated sub nor. Tisch v. Shidaker, 481 U.S.
1001 (1987)). Butsee Garner v. Boorstin, 690 F.2d 1034, 1036 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (In a promo-
tion case, a black plaintiff established a prima facie case by showing that he was at least mini-
mally qualified and that "the available positions were filled by individuals with comparable
qualifications who were not members of the classes protected by the relevant statutes."); Davis v.
Weidner, 596 F.2d 726, 730 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that even where the employer's decision
involves a "simultaneous choice between prospective employees on the basis of relative qualifica-
tions," rejection of woman establishes a prima facie case).
122. See Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d 84, 91 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[A]s long as a plaintiff's
statistical analysis has properly defined the pool of eligible candidates, by accounting for
'minimum objective qualifications,' the burden then shifts to the defendant to introduce evidence
of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation if the analysis reveals z statistically significant
disparity.").
123. See, e.g., Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("The initial proof
demanded of plaintiffs in a pattern and practice case typically goes far beyond the minimal
showing that is required for an individual to establish a prima facie case under McDonnell
Douglas."), cert. denied sub non. Meese v. Segar, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985). In Craik v. Minnesota
State University Board, 731 F.2d 465, 471 n.9 (8th Cir. 1984), the court stated that "[t]he prima
facie case established by a finding that an employer is guilty of a pattern or practice of
discrimination goes far beyond the prima facie case contemplated by McDonnell Douglas and
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heightened burden of rebuttal on defendants' 24 --is simply not true; in
fact, in many ways the truth is just the opposite. The pattern-or-prac-
tice prima facie case assumes most of the elements of the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case, and it assumes them on a grand scale. When
a plaintiff compares the employer's work force to "qualified labor mar-
ket" statistics, the analysis in effect eliminates the need to show that
the plaintiffs applied for the job; instead it is presumed that members
of all groups applied at the same rate. 125 Second, the structure of the
prima facie case eliminates the need to show that the plaintiffs were as,
or more, qualified than those who obtained the jobs; instead, the analy-
sis presumes that black applicants and white applicants are equally
qualified, even though at best the analysis has controlled only for mini-
mum qualifications or, even worse, for proxies for minimum
qualifications.
126
Burdine." The court suggested that the Supreme Court in International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), had recognized the strength of the plaintiffs' prima facie case:
"[a] finding of a discriminatory pattern or practice creates 'a greater likelihood that any single
decision was a component of the overall pattern,' and changes 'the position of the employer to
that of a proved wrongdoer' .... " Craik, 731 F.2d at 471 n.9 (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at
359--60 n.45).
The Craik court misunderstood the difference between a Teamsters prima facie case and the
ultimate finding of a pattern or practice of discrimination. The Supreme Court in Teamsters had
said thatproof that discrimination is the employer's standard operating procedure makes it likely
that each decision of the employer is a product of that procedure; therefore, at the remedy phase
of a pattern-or-practice case, each class member is presumed entitled to a remedy, with the
employer bearing the burden of persuasion to demonstrate nondiscrimination in a given decision.
Teamsters did not suggest, as the Craik court implies, that the establishment of a prima facie case
converts the status of the employer "to that of a proved wrongdoer."
124. See Segar, 738 F.2d at 1269 ("The bare articulation of a nondiscriminatory explanation,
while sufficient to rebut an individual plaintiff's low-threshold McDonnell-Douglas showing,
generally will not suffice as a rebuttal to a typical class-wide showing of pervasive
discrimination" because the class "will typically have presented statistical evidence showing
pervasive disparities and eliminating most, if not all, potential nondiscriminatory explanations
for the observed disparities.").
125. Elaine W. Shoben, In Defense of Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title V1I: A Reply to
Dr. Cohn, 55 IND. L.J. 515, 519 (1980).
126. See Segar, 738 F.2d at 1299 ("[P]laintiffs need not control for specific minimum job
qualifications, as long as their data include a reasonable proxy for these qualifications."); see also
Taylor v. Teletype Corp., 648 F.2d 1129, 1133 (8th Cir.) (using "layoff" as a proxy for
"demotion"), cert denied, 454 U.S. 969 (1981); Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 505 F. Supp.
224, 314-17 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (using "age" as a proxy for "prior work experience"), vacated,
723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1073 (1984).
One of the crndest form of proxies is reliance on census categories for determining the
availability of qualified applicants. See EEOC v. DuPont, 445 F. Supp. 223 (D. Del. 1977):
The Government suggests that those which the census classifies as "professional, technical,
and kindred workers" represent the segment of the labor force qualified to perform
[defendant's] professional jobs. . . . [This category] includes dozens of groups whose
background bears no relationship to the skills required by [defendant's] professional
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Notwithstanding the elimination of the elements that make a
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case at least weakly probative, belief in
the power of statistical evidence has led many courts to impose a sub-
stantial burden of rebuttal on defendants in class cases. In a McDon-
nell Douglas case, the defendant faced with a prima facie case need
only "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee's rejection."127 The defendant has no obligation to persuade
the trier of fact that the articulated reason was the real reason; it is
enough if its rebuttal "raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it
discriminated against the plaintiff." 2 ' In order to prevail, the plaintiff
must then prove that the articulated reason is merely a pretext for
discrimination. 2 9 The burden of persuasion remains on the plaintiff
at all times. In contrast, many courts impose a substantially higher
burden on defendants to rebut the prima facie case in a pattern-or-
practice case. For example, because of its view that the prima facie
case "show[s] pervasive disparities and eliminat[es] most, if not all,
potential nondiscriminatory explanations for the observed disparities,"
the D.C. Circuit has held that "[t]he bare articulation of a nondiscrim-
inatory explanation, while sufficient to rebut an individual plaintiff's
low-threshold McDonnell Douglas showing, generally will not suffice
as a rebuttal to a typical class-wide showing of pervasive discrimina-
tion." °  Instead, the defendant must either "refate the plaintiffs'
claim that a disparity exists" or explain that the "disparity has not
resulted from illegal discrimination." 131
Even the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is only weakly proba-
tive of discrimination, but it is at least more probative than the statisti-
cal prima facie case. Although the McDonnell Douglas prima facie
case is said to "rais[e] an inference of discrimination only because we
presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not
positions... . The data on professional, technical and kindred workers is, accordingly,
inappropriate for use in evaluating [defendant's] record with respect tc professional workers.
Id. at 246.
127. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
128. Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981).
129. Id. at 255-56.
130. Segar, 738 F.2d at 1269; see also Williams v. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n, 673 F.2d 742, 750
n.14 (5th Cir. 1982) (Defendant's rebuttal burden in a pattern-or-practice case "is more onerous
than the rebuttal burden required of defendants in individual Title VII claims under [Burdine]."),
cerL denied, 460 U.S. 1038 (1983).
131. Segar, 738 F.2d at 1267-68. The Segar court acknowledged that "[t]he nature of the
burden that the defendant bears on such a defense is not entirely free of doubt." Id. The same
court in MacKenzie v. Sawyer, 684 F.2d 62, 71 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1982), noted that "it remains
debatable whether the Burdine holding that the burden of persuasion remnains with an individual
plaintiff should be applied to a class action suit alleging disparate treatment."
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based on the consideration of impermissible factors, '1 32 no intelligent
person could believe that the employer's failure to hire the first person
through the door with the minimum qualifications is most likely a con-
sequence of discrimination. Nonetheless, the fiction embodied in the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is a useful and reasonably inex-
pensive one, because the employer's burden in rebuttal is relatively
light; it is rare that the employer cannot even articulate a reason for its
actions.1 33 The fiction becomes much more expensive, however, when
it results in an obligation on the employer's part to justify a statistical
disparity involving perhaps hundreds or thousands of employees that
may be a consequence of social forces unknown to the employer. 134
The employer cannot satisfy that burden simply by testifying that it
has a practice of selecting the best applicant for the job,135 and many
courts will not allow employers to rebut the prima facie case merely by
pointing to flaws in the plaintiffs' statistics.
Because productivity-related variables are often not distributed ran-
domly with respect to race, sex, and age, the fewer such variables that
are controlled for, the more likely it is that the statistical investigation
will falsely yield positive results. 136 That is why qualified-labor-pool
statistics are better than general-labor-force statistics, which in turn
are better than general-population statistics. 137 However, as discussed
below, even qualified-labor-pool statistics are virtually meaningless
132. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
133. In an individual case, once the defendant rebuts the prima facie case by articulating a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the action, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the defendant's justification is a "pretext." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973). It is on the pretext issue that most cases turn.
134. See Smith & Abram, supra note 13, at 47 ("This remarkable presumption-that evidence
of work force imbalance is caused by unlawful discrimination, and is illegal unless justified-is at
odds with our basic traditions.").
135. See, eg., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342-43 n.24
(1977); Pegues v. Mississippi State Employment Serv., 699 F.2d 760, 766 (5th Cir.)
("Affirmations of good faith selection of the most qualified applicant will not satisfy [the
employer's] burden."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 991 (1983).
136. Failure to control for a variable that is correlated with protected status will falsely
exaggerate the statistical disparity. See Fisher, supra note 41, at 708-09; James T. McKeown,
Statistics for Wage Discrimination Cases: Why the Statistical Models Used Cannot Prove or
Disprove Sex Discrimination, 67 IND. L.J. 633, 654 (1992); Norris, supra note 49, at 71 ("If the
missing variable is differentially associated with a particular race or sex, its omission may
incorrectly lead to a conclusion that discrimination exists."); see also EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1286 (N.D. Ili. 1986), aff'd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he
assumptions made by a statistician in formulating a model can be far more important than the
numerical complexities and results of the analysis."); Aickin, supra note 29, at 361 ("What is not
contained in a regression equation can be very important-sometimes more important than the
regression itself."). Conversely, however, controlling for too many variables can make it
virtually impossible to achieve statistical significance unless the sample size is very large.
137. See CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 9, § 4.02[l].
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because they fail to take into account the myriad of legitimate produc-
tivity-related variables and tend to focus instead on minimum qualifi-
cations. Many courts have been singularly inattentive to the
consequences of permitting plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case
based upon crude statistical showings and requiring the defendant to
refine the showing. The remainder of this section wl deal with ways
in which courts have effectively shifted the burden of proof to employ-
ers and relieved plaintiffs of the obligation to introduce evidence that is
rightfully a part of their own case.
L The Focus on Minimum Qualifications
The most common formulation of the variables a plaintiff's analysis
must consider is that the analysis must control for the "minimum
objective qualifications for the positions at issue," 138 a rule that goes far
toward relieving the plaintiff of the obligation to introduce statistical
analyses that can in any sense be said to be probative of discrimina-
tion. The justification for this rule, as described by the D.C. Circuit in
Segar v. Smith, 139 is that control for minimum objective qualifications
"ensure[s] that a plaintiff's methodology has eliminated the common
nondiscriminatory explanation of a lack of qualifications." 1" While
that rule may eliminate "the common nondiscriminatory explanation
of a lack of qualifications," it does not eliminate the at least equally
common nondiscriminatory explanation of a lack of relative
qualifications.1 4 1
138. Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cerL denied sub nom. Meese v.
Segar, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985).
139. 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert denied sub norm. Meese v. Segar, 471 U.S. 1115
(1985).
140. Id. at 1274; see also Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d 84, 91 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting
Segar).
141. The D.C. Circuit has dispensed with the need even to control for minimum
qualifications in some cases. For circumstances where data concerning proxies are lacking, the
court has erected "a rebuttable presumption of an equal distribution of qualifications between
minority and majority group applicants." De Medina v. Reinhardt, 685 F.2d 997, 1008-09 n.7
(D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Trout v. Lehman, 702 F.2d 1094, 1102 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("If data
on a particular minimum objective qualification are simply unavailable, Valentino's requirement
[that plaintiff control for 'minimum objective qualifications'] may be eased, for '[e]xactness is not
required at the prima faeie stage.' ") (quoting De Medina, 686 F.2d at 1008-09 n.6), vacated, 465
U.S. 1056 (1984).
The Third Circuit, in the age discrimination case of Bruno v. W.B. Saunders Co., 882 F.2d 760
(3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1062 (1990), also was willing to forgive an absence of
control for minimum qualifications. The plaintiff introduced statistical studies demonstrating
that employees over forty did not receive promotions at a rate proportionate to their
representation in the work force. Id. The defendant argued that these studies were irrelevant
because they did not take into account the minimum qualifications for the jobs. Relying on
Bazemore, the court held that the studies were not inadmissible simply because they did not take
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Under the Segar analysis, once the plaintiff controls for the mini-
mum objective qualifications, the defendant bears the burden of pro-
viding evidence of other variables that should have been considered,
unless the court concludes that the missing variable is so critical as to
undermine the plaintiff's case completely. That mode of analysis
would make sense only if employers hire or promote at random from a
pool of applicants having the minimum qualifications for the job, but
no one suggests that employers actually do, or even should, make deci-
sions in that way.
The difficulty faced by even non-discriminating employers is exem-
plified by the analysis in Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv.
Co., "' a case involving, among other things, claims for racial discrimi-
nation in promotions to the position of "leadman." Plaintiffs had
presented statistics demonstrating a modestly significant (2.13 stan-
dard deviations) disparity between promotions of blacks and whites
from the hourly work force. 143 The defendant challenged the plain-
tiffs' analysis on the ground that it did not control for three variables
that it contended were important to the promotion decision: (1) sen-
iority; (2) membership in the craft of the open leadman position; and
(3) first-class rank within that craft.1" The defendant argued that
once these qualifications were considered, the statistical disparities
were reduced or eliminated. The trial court was thus faced with the
question of whether the appropriate comparison for promotions to
leadman was to the hourly work force as a whole or whether the com-
parison must be adjusted to take into account the above-described fac-
tors. The court rejected the defendant's attempt to limit the
comparison, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.145
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit relied upon the Supreme Court's
decision in Bazemore v. Friday146 suggesting that plaintiffs need not
minimum qualifications into account. IdM at 766-67. The court thought it relevant that the case
was not a pattern-or-practice case, but rather an individual disparate-treatment case in which the
plaintiff was attempting to buttress her claim of discrimination with statistical evidence. Id at
767. That distinction makes no difference, however, because in either event the statistical
evidence is introduced to prove the same thing: that the employer has a general practice of
discrimination. Evidence that does not demonstrate a pattern of discrimination in a pattern-or-
practice case demonstrates no more merely because it is introduced in a different kind of case.
As Judge Greenberg stated in dissent, "[t]he door is now open in this circuit to the admission of
plainly irrelevant statistical evidence in individual disparate treatment cases." Id. at 776
(Greenberg, J., dissenting).
142. 940 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 207 (1992).
143. Id. at 1042-43.
144. Id at 1045.
145. Id. at 1046.
146. 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
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take into account "all measurable variables" and that "failure to
include variables will affect the analysis' probativeness, not its admissi-
bility."147 The court of appeals affirmed the district court's refusal to
require the variables to be included, stating that "the use of hindsight
to construct 'qualifications' for a position must be Viewed with some
suspicion" and that "[t]he trial judge was correctly dubious of the
seductive logic of post-hoc explanation." 148 The court's statements
reflect a failure to understand the nature of the employer's defense in a
case like this. When an employer argues that a vwriable should be
taken into consideration, the employer is not necessarily saying that
the trait is essential to the job; instead, the employer is merely saying
that it is relevant.149 If the trait is relevant, promotion decisions are
not independent of it, and, if it is not found with the same frequency in
different groups, failure to control for the trait will iacorrectly ascribe
statistical differences to discrimination.15 0
The Mozee court failed to understand the difference between qualifi-
cations-which are attributes that are relevant to the job-and mini-
mum qualifications-which are absolute requirements. ' For
147. Id. at 400.
148. Mozee, 940 F.2d at 1045.
149. When an employer requires a minimum score of 50 on a written test and one applicant
scores a 60 and the other scores a 70, the employer is likely to select the employee who scored a
70 because of that score; nonetheless, the employer's identification of the score of 70 might be
deemed "post hoc." See Smith & Abram, supra note 13:
In selecting explanatory variables for inclusion in a regression analysis, the list of factors
should not be limited to qualifications established by an employer as job requirements, and
proved to be job related to the satisfaction of the legal standard of proof. A profit-
maximizing employer, attempting to extract a return based on a person's estimated
productivity, will consider not only those qualifications identified as job prerequisites, but all
factors influencing an individual's productivity.
Id. at 66-67 (footnote omitted); see also James Gwartney et al., Statistics, the Law and Title VIP
An Economist's View, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 633 (1979):
Regardless of whether or not the firm has a formal wage structure that rewards [certain]
variables, if, for example, years of craft experience (or schooling) and earnings are consist-
ently linked, independent of race, the statistics support the contention that the skills of
employees with more craft experience or schooling are important determinants of job suc-
cess for this firm.
Id. at 658.
150. See Smith & Abram, supra note 13, at 69-70: "When minorities (or females) have lower
qualifications on the average than nonrinorities (or males), regression analysis based on
productivity variables will produce systematically biased and inflated race/sex coefficients
suggesting the presence of discrimination when none exists."
151. Similarly, in James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 332 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978), the court disallowed use of a "years of schooling"
variable in a salary regression because "education is not a job requirement" and because "white
employees at Stockham have more education than blacks." The former reason is similar to the
court's reasoning in Mozee in its confusion of minimum qualifications and productivity-related
variables. As to the second reason, if white employees did not have more education than blacks,
520
Statistical Proof of Discrimination
example, the defendant argued that most foremen took into account a
candidate's ability to read a blueprint in making leadman decisions.
The district court, however, disbelieved this assertion because one of
defendant's witnesses "testified that such a skill was not a leadman
requirement." ' 2 Similarly, the district court rejected the defendant's
contention that the most important factor in the promotion decision
was "experience as a first-class employee in the particular craft in
which the vacancy occurred," ' 3 a consideration that is highly plausi-
ble on its face in promoting a person to a position entailing supervisory
responsibilities. The court rejected this factor because nearly ten per-
cent of those selected for promotion did not have such experience. 54
Rather than diminishing the defendant's argument, however, this fact
would seem to enhance it. After all, the defendant had presented
strong evidence that this facially plausible factor was relevant to its
decision by demonstrating that the qualification was present in over
ninety percent of promotions. 55
Finally, the district court rejected the defendant's attempt to control
for seniority. In affirming that rejection, the Seventh Circuit relied on
the fact that seniority was not a "requirement" of the job and that the
most senior employee did not always get the promotion.1 56 Again,
because the employer did not use strict seniority as the basis for pro-
motions, the court deemed seniority irrelevant to the decision. How-
ever, the mere fact that an employer rejects a strict seniority approach
to promotions does not mean that the amount of experience that an
employee has is unrelated to his chances of success under a nondis-
criminatory system of promotion; instead, it simply means that the
the issue would never have come up because inclusion of the variable of education would not
have reduced the apparent race disparity. The only variables that are important in a regression
to prove discrimination are precisely those that are correlated with race, sex, or other prohibited
classifications.
152. Mozee, 940 F.2d at 1045.
153. Id. at 1046 (quoting the Appellant's Brief at 26).
154. Id.
155. The Seventh Circuit, in a puzzling footnote, seemed to suggest that if the selection
system is a subjective one, the employer's ability to rely on objective criteria is diminished. IA at
1048 n. II ("The alleged prerequisites to promotion--certain skills, rank, and seniority-would
not constitute common nondiscriminatory reasons for denying a promotion in a system
employing purely subjective methods.").
156. The court stated:
Jeftboat also offered employee seniority as a qualification a foreman would consider in
selecting a new or temporary leadman.... Like blueprint reading, this "requirement" was
disavowed by defendant's own witness. More significantly, African-American employees
were senior to the white employees actually promoted in eight of the forty-three promotions
to permanent leadman.
Id. at 1046 (emphasis added; citations to record omitted).
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most senior employee will not be promoted automatically.1 17 Further-
more, failing to control for seniority will systematically prejudice
many employers; because there is in many work forces a relationship
between seniority and race, 58 seniority effects will be interpreted erro-
neously to be race effects.
Once a court recognizes the necessity of accounting for minimum
qualifications, as most courts have done, it should follow that it is sim-
ilarly necessary to account for all the major variations in productivity
that may affect the likelihood of a person's being selected for a job. It
seems inconsistent to insist, on the one hand, that general population
statistics are inappropriate because skills are not randomly distributed
throughout the population with respect to race, se)., and age, but to
presume, on the other hand, that once minimum qualifications are
accounted for the remaining productivity-related variables are ran-
domly distributed. In fact, one would expect just the opposite - that
the same sorts of systematic differences that we see i minimum quali-
fications exist with respect to other qualifications as. well, whether or
not they are measurable. 59 In short, so long as the courts fail to fol-
low their reasoning to its logical conclusion, discrimination frequently
will be found where none exists.
2. Exclusion of Subjective or Otherwise Unquantifiable Factors
Closely linked to the preference of courts for minimum qualifica-
tions in statistical analyses is their focus on "objective" qualifications.
For example, in Segar v. Smith, the court held that the plaintiffs need
not factor in the qualification of "specialized experience" for promo-
tion because plaintiffs "were not realistically able to account for the
157. One would not expect there to be a linear relationship between seniority and promotion
even if there is a substantial relationship between the two. An employee with six months
experience is unlikely to be as qualified for promotion to leadman as an employee with six years
experience. On the other hand, an employee with thirty years experience is likely to be less
qualified for promotion than an employee with ten years experience, since if the employee has not
been promoted to leadman in three decades, it is unlikely that he is leadman material.
158. Minorities as a group will commonly have less seniority than nonminorities as a group
for a number of reasons, including: (1) the pool of qualified minority employees is increasing; (2)
employers are engaging in more vigorous affirmative action efforts than _n the past; (3) minorities
tend to be younger than whites; and (4) the employer may have discriminated in the past but
stopped. When it comes to providing layoff protection for minorities under a last-hired first-fired
system, the fact that minorities will have lower than average seniority is not controversial. See
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
159. See BALDUS & COLE, supra note 39, § 9.02 ("[lIt cannot be assumed as a matter of fact
that other unknown but potentially influential qualifications are uniformly distributed between
the minority and majority group applicants."). But see De Medina v. Reinhardt, 686 F.2d 997,
1003 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (establishing a rebuttable presumption of an equal distribution of relevant
skills).
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application of so amorphous a criterion." 1" According to the court,
"[t]he appropriate degree of refinement of the plaintiffs' statistical
analysis... may depend on the quality and control of the available
data."16 ' Under the circumstances of that case, plaintiffs could not
have quantified the qualification "in a manner that would have made
the requirement amenable to statistical analysis." '62 Because the crite-
rion was not quantifiable, if the defendant wanted to control for it in
its own statistical rebuttal, it was obligated to distill "objective prox-
ies" that were quantifiable. 63 According to the court, "[b]oth the pol-
icies underlying Title VII and general principles of evidence suggest
that the burden of production of such evidence must rest with the
defendant." '64
The Segar court's imposition of the burden of production on the
defendant was inappropriate in a regime that places the persuasion
burden on the plaintiff. By definition, imposing a burden of persuasion
on a party means that that party bears the risk if evidence on a point is
lacking. In Segar, the court held that lack of evidence on the point
(i.e., the inability to quantify the qualification) was sufficient justifica-
tion for shifting the burden of production to the employer.1 65 In real-
ity, however, shifting the burden of production to a party because
evidence is lacking constitutes a shift not only in the burden of produc-
tion, but in that of persuasion as well.1 66  Because the Segar court had
already determined that the qualification could not be quantified, shift-
ing the burden of production to the defendant to quantify the unquan-
tifiable was equivalent to shifting the burden of persuasion to the
defendant to disprove equality of qualifications, a burden that, by defi-
nition, could not be carried.
160. Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Meese v.
Segar, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985).
161. Id. (quoting Trout v. Lehman, 702 F.2d 1094, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See also De Medina v. Reinhardt, 686 F.2d 997, 1008-09 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (imposing
burden on employer to disprove equality of qualifications "when data are unavailable").
166. The burden of persuasion is important in two somewhat different circumstances. The
first is where there is evidence on both sides of an issue and the trier of fact judges the evidence to
be in equipoise; only when the weight of the evidence is judged to be exactly 50/50 does the civil
burden of persuasion decide the case, because regardless of who bears the burden of persuasion a
51/49 split either way will result in a favorable decision for the party with the 51 percent. The
second, and more important, class of cases is where evidence on a point is lacking; in these cases,
the party with the burden of persuasion automatically loses. It is in these cases that shifting the
burden of production because evidence is lacking is equivalent to shifting the burden of
persuasion.
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The focus on quantifiable traits has created a Procrustean bed that
distorts both the way cases are litigated and, pe:rhaps even more
importantly, the way employment decisions are made. Courts origi-
nally accepted statistical analysis in discrimination cases because of a
belief that the kind of evidence available in such cases lent itself to
statistical analysis. 67 Statistical analysis, having become accepted, is
now driving the kind of evidence deemed relevant or necessary. How-
ever, if evidence is not amenable to statistical analysis-that is, if sta-
tistical analysis does not further the search for truth in the context of a
particular set of facts-the method of analysis should be altered,
rather than one's judgment about what is true. The fact that statistical
evidence is the only evidence that exists is not a basis for saying that it
is enough. 16
8
Insistence upon quantification puts employers who rely on non-
quantitative factors at significant risk. If they rely upon non-quantita-
tive factors in making decisions (a practice particularly appropriate in
salary and promotion cases, where the employer has had significant
opportunity to evaluate the employee's performance, usually by a pro-
cess that includes a significant subjective component), they run the
risk of not being able mathematically to justify any resultant dispari-
ties. 169  This imposes significant pressure on employers either to
increase reliance on quantitative factors in making employment deci-
sions-even if those factors are less likely to yield the optimal deci-
sion-or to avoid statistical disparities altogether by engaging in quota
hiring.
In one of the early articles on mathematical proof in litigation, Lau-
rence Tribe eloquently warned of one of the significant pitfalls of using
statistical proof-what he calls "the dwarfing of soft variables":
167. See Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 540 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[C]ourts have
sometimes relied on statistical evidence as the best means of showing the cumulative effects of
employment actions."); CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 9, § 1.02 ("Statistical analysis is well
suited to discrimination cases, since it essentially involves making comparisons among classes of
people.").
168. But see Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff, Inc., 711 F.2d 647, 653 (5th Cir. 1983) (reversing
district court and rejecting the defendant's argument that the plaintiffs' statistical comparison
was too crude, stating that "[t]he defendant would require refinements beyond that available in
published statistics"), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 927 (1984); Trout v. Lehman, 702 F.2d 1094, 1101
(D.C. Cir. 1983) ("The appropriate degree of refinement of the plaintiffs' statistical analysis,
moreover, may depend on the quality and control of the available data"), vacated, 465 U.S. 1056
(1984); Cohen, supra note 52, at 387 (pointing out that because employers engage in
discrimination surreptitiously, "[t]he most common (and often the only) evidence in these cases
consists of empirical data about the available labor pool and the work force").
169. For a defense of the use of subjective factors in making employment decisions, see
Browne, supra note 79, at 334-38.
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The syndrome is a familiar one: If you can't count it, it doesn't exist.
Equipped with a mathematically powerful intellectual machine, even the
most sophisticated user is subject to an overwhelming temptation to feed
his pet the food it can most comfortably digest. Readily quantifiable
factors are easier to process-and hence more likely to be recognized
and then reflected in the outcome-than are factors that resist ready
quantification. The result, despite what turns out to be a spurious
appearance of accuracy and completeness, is likely to be significantly
warped and hence highly suspect.17
The syndrome described by Tribe is a pervasive one in discrimina-
tion cases, and it is more distorting in discrimination cases than it is in
criminal cases, which were the primary focus of his article. In crimi-
nal cases, the concern is that the trier of fact, although having all of
the relevant evidence before it, will tend to place undue weight on the
apparently scientific quantitative evidence and discount or disregard
the non-quantitative evidence. In discrimination cases, however, the
concern is not just that the trier of fact will place undue weight on the
quantitative evidence, but that the non-quantitative evidence will not
even be admitted. In Segar, the court did not simply hold that the
quantitative analysis was sufficiently strong as to dwarf the non-quan-
tifiable qualification; it held that absent quantification the qualification
had no explanatory value and was therefore appropriately excluded by
the trial court.
Focus on the easily quantifiable aspects of the labor force obscures
what are often more important variables. For example, no one seri-
ously believes that all persons with a given length of education are
equally educated-that high school graduates, or college graduates, or
law school graduates are all fungible. One year of education is not
necessarily equivalent to another year of education. Schools differ in
what they teach and how well they teach it, and students differ in
terms of how well they learn and in what they learn."' These critical
variations in educational experience, however, are declared irrelevant
to the plaintiff's prima facie case.
170. Tribe, supra note 4, at 1361-62. Brilmayer and Kornhauser, supra note 39, at 149,
suggest that Tribe's arguments against statistical methods "may go too far," since they might
eliminate the use of statistics in Title VII cases. However, the proper measure of whether an
argument goes too far is not how many cases the argument affects, but how many cases the
argument inappropriately affects. If statistics in Title VII cases suffer from the same flaws as
statistics in other kinds of cases, one should properly hesitate to use them.
171. See generally Jere R. Behrman & Nancy Birdsall, The Quality of Schooling: Quantity
Alone is Misleading, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 928 (1983). Justice Stevens relied upon this obvious
fact in his concurring opinion in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 254 (1976), in which he
observed that an employer's use of standardized tests was justified in light of the fact that there is
a substantial disparity between the quality of various schools.
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The focus on quantification creates pressure to quantify variables
for quantification's sake, a pressure resisted by the majority in EEOC
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 172 but not by the dissent. The EEOC had
accused Sears of sex discrimination in hiring commission salespersons,
and Sears defended in part on the ground that men and women were
not equally interested in such positions. Sears presented extensive,
uncontradicted testimony of numerous store managers and personnel
managers concerning their unsuccessful efforts to recruit women into
these positions, and it introduced job-interest surveys and polls that
supported its position that women were substantially less interested in
commission sales than men. The EEOC attempted to deal with this
testimony by incorporating into its statistical analysis an interest-fac-
tor adjustment-under which the proportion of Eaen interested in
commission sales was assumed to be three times as great as the pro-
portion of women so interested. Because the EEOC had not produced
any evidence to establish that a factor of three was of the appropriate
magnitude, the court held that the district court was correct to reject
that analysis. 173
In dissent, however, Judge Cudahy followed an approach similar to
that of the court in Segar, suggesting that the EEOC's interest-factor
adjustment should have been accepted because of the "skepticism that
courts ought to show toward defenses to Title VII actions that rely on
unquantifiable traits ascribed to protected groups."' 7 4 He asserted
that "a critique based on such obviously unquantifiable and peripheral
considerations is inordinately critical of the statistical evidence being
presented" and that because the EEOC had not failed to include any
measurable variables, it should not lose simply because it had not "dis-
prov[ed] the enormous significance that Sears attributes to
unmeasurable variables."'175 Thus, despite the fact that the EEOC had
simply pulled the number "3" out of a hat, Judge Cudahy would have
imposed on the defendant the obligation of proving that the number
was too small. Given his recognition that the variable was not mea-
surable, however, the placement of the burden of proof would be dis-
positive and the defendant's failure to carry its burden would be
foreordained.
172. 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
173. Id. at 335.
174. Id. at 361 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
175. Id. at 363. The Ninth Circuit has announced that it "agreels] with the dissent and
reject[s] the approach taken by the Sears majority which places a very heavy-and possibly
insurmountable-burden on the plaintiff with respect to establishing the probativeness of
proffered statistical data." EEOC v. General Tel. Co. of Northwest, 885 F.2d 575, 581 (9th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 370 (1990).
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Courts should abandon their suspicion of non-quantifiable variables.
Where such variables are relevant, as they often are, courts should
recognize that the non-quantitative nature of the relevant evidence
makes quantitative analysis inappropriate, rather than concluding that
the plaintiffs' decision to rely on quantitative analysis invalidates the
defendant's non-quantitative evidence.176
3. Omission of Variables
In many, if not most, cases where plaintiffs attempt to make a statis-
tical showing of discrimination, the defendant argues that the plaintiff
has not compared the appropriate statistics or has failed to take into
account some important variable-such as a particular qualification or
differential interest-that the defendant maintains would (or might)
make a difference. The important question, as yet not fully resolved, is
what the consequence of that failure is and who bears the burden in
those circumstances. The leading case is Bazemore v. Friday.177 In
Bazemore, the lower court had held the plaintiffs' statistical evidence
inadmissible because of the plaintiffs' failure to control for a particular
variable asserted by the defendant to be an important one. 7 ' The
Supreme Court rejected this conclusion, stating:
While the omission of variables from a regression analysis may render
the analysis less probative than it otherwise might be, it can hardly be
said, absent some other infirmity, that an analysis which accounts for
the major factors "must be considered unacceptable as evidence of dis-
crimination." Normally, failure to include variables will affect the anal-
ysis' probativeness, not its admissibility. 179
Relying on Bazemore, numerous courts have held that omission of a
variable from a regression does not undermine the plaintiff's prima
facie case. Rather, if the defendant wants to impugn the plaintiff's
statistical showing, it must introduce evidence to show that the miss-
176. See Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 39, at 153 ("[S]ince legal problems are subtle
and complex, the unquantifiable variables may well dwarf the quantifiable ones and make
numerical modelling futile."); Campbell, supra note 41, at 1303:
It is entirely acceptable within economics, and other social sciences, to use a model to help
explain observed behavior where no other model works better, even though in an absolute
sense, the model does not describe the data very well at all. But this cannot be the attitude
... for proof of legal propositions.
177. 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
178. In their salary regression, plaintiffs had accounted for race, education, tenure, and job
title, but they had not controlled for county of employment. Id at 398.
179. Id. at 400 (quoting Bazemore v. Friday, 751 F.2d 662, 672 (4th Cir. 1984)). The Court
then went on to acknowledge that some statistical studies are "so incomplete as to be
inadmissible as irrelevant." Id. at 400 n.10.
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ing variable would have made a difference."' 0 Courts employing such
reasoning, however, are misreading Bazemore.
The standard reading of Bazemore seems to be that in order for the
defendant to dispel the prima facie case by pointing to the plaintiff's
failure to control for a relevant variable, the defendant must show that
the plaintiff's statistical model is so flawed as to be inadmissible.
18 1
Otherwise, it is the defendant's obligation to account for the missing
variable and, failing that, the defendant's attempt to rebut the prima
facie case is deemed unsuccessful.18 2  However, that is not what
Bazemore held. Bazemore held only that as long as the "major fac-
180. Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen Local 201, 843 F.,d 1395, 1416 (D.C. Cir.
1988) ("['"]o demonstrate that statistical evidence is invalid, the challenger must present 'credible
evidence that the statistical proof is defective' and 'a plausible explanation of how the asserted
flaw is likely to bias the results against his or her position.' "), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1105 (1989);
Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d 84, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("The logic ofBaze'nore ... dictates that in
most cases a defendant cannot rebut statistical evidence by mere conjectures or assertions,
without introducing evidence to support the contention that the missing factor can explain the
disparities as a product of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory selection criterion."); Trout v.
Lehman, 702 F.2d, 1094, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("[U]nquantified, spe.zulative, and theoretical
objections to the proffered statistics are properly given little weight by the trial court."), vacated,
465 U.S. 1056 (1984).
181. See, ag., Berger, 843 F.2d at 1413 (suggesting that defendants can rebut the prima facie
case by articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation for the disparity, by introducing
alternative statistical evidence, or "by demonstrating that plaintiffs' statistics are so flawed as to
be meaningless").
In Penk v. Oregon State Board of H-igher Education, 816 F.2d 458 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 853 (1987), the Ninth Circuit gave some indication of what it views as sufficient flaws as to
deprive statistics of substantial probative value. In Penk the court held that the district court
did not clearly err when it discounted the plaintiffs' statistical analysis in an action challenging
the salary, promotion, and tenure practices in the Oregon higher education system because the
analysis omitted variables such as teaching quality, community and institutional service, and
quality of research and scholarship. Id. at 465. Similarly, in Sheehart v. Purolator, Inc., 839
F.2d 99, 106 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 891 (1988), the court held that the district court had
not clearly erred in finding plaintiffs' statistical analysis, which had been admitted into evidence,
"flawed" for failing to take into account education, prior work experience, and job level. It is
difficult to understand on what theory such obviously meaningless statistical studies were deemed
sufficiently relevant even to be admitted into evidence.
182. See, eg., EEOC v. General Tel. Co. of Northwest, 885 F.2d 575, 579 (9th Cir. 1989)
("Bazemore requires that the defendant do more than simply point cut possible flaws in the
proponent's statistical analyses in order to rebut the inference of discrimination raised by the
statistical evidence."), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 370 (1990); Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., 839 F.2d 18,
33-34 (2d Cir. 1988), cerL denied, 490 U.S. 1105 (1989) (Even though the district court had
ruled that flaws in plaintiffs' regression analysis affected its weight rather than its admissibility,
the court of appeals chided the district court for failing to understand that Bazemore "require[s]
a defendant challenging the validity of a multiple regression analysis to make a showing that the
factors it contends ought to have been included would weaken the showing of a salary disparity
made by the analysis."); Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d 84, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[I]n most cases a
defendant cannot rebut statistical evidence . . . without introducing evidence to support the
contention that the missing factor can explain the disparities as a product of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory selection criterion.").
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tors" were considered by the analysis, failure to control for other fac-
tors did not render the analysis inadmissible. But to say that evidence
is admissible is not the same as saying that it is strong or, a fortiori,
that it is sufficient to establish a prima facie case. For example, evi-
dence that a person was in the United States when a murder was com-
mitted in Arkansas is relevant and probative and is surely admissible.
No one would argue, however, that it is strongly suggestive that the
person committed the crime. Rather, it is simply background evi-
dence that is consistent-or at least not inconsistent-with guilt.
Bazemore provides no authority for the proposition that any evidence
consistent with discrimination establishes a prima facie case, and there
is no basis in Bazemore or in any other Supreme Court decision for the
proposition that any probative statistical evidence, no matter how
weak, suffices to establish a prima facie case.
Ideally, before courts draw a conclusion based upon a disparity
between an employer's work force and some comparative group, every
possible variable that might be relevant to selection would be con-
trolled for.183 In practice, however, evidence is never perfect, and all
conceivable variables cannot be controlled for. The important practi-
cal question is how far may the evidence deviate from ideal and still be
deemed to retain substantial probative value. Unfortunately, the
answer for too many courts, based upon their misreading of Bazemore,
is "quite a lot."
Courts have been willing to endorse statistical showings based upon
assumptions that are wholly counterintuitive, rejecting defendants'
contrary assertions as mere "speculation." For example, the Eighth
Circuit held in Catlett v. Missouri Highway and Transportation Com-
mission"' that the fact only 10 percent of hires for highway mainte-
nance workers were female, while 48 percent of the local work force
was female, was suggestive of discrimination, despite the fact that the
plaintiffs' statistics failed to take into account the actual interest of
qualified potential employees. The court employed the familiar bur-
den-shifting approach and argued that Missouri bore the burden of
introducing evidence to show that failure to account for interest was
significant, because, according to the court, "[m]ere conjecture or
assertion on [a] defendant's part ... cannot defeat the inference of
discrimination created by [a] plaintiff's statistics." 185  Then, in
response to the defendant's argument that it hired female applicants at
183. See Fisher, supra note 41, at 709 ("Obviously, the assumption that one has controlled for
all the important influences is basic to any attempt to measure those influences correctly.").
184. 828 F.2d 1260 (8th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 485 U.S. 1021 (1988).
185. Id. at 1266 (quoting Palmer 815 F.2d at 101).
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a slightly higher rate than it hired male applicants, the court had the
temerity to state that this fact was irrelevant because "[v]ictims of a
discriminatory policy cannot be told they have not been wronged
because other females have been hired." 186
In rejecting defendants' challenges to plaintiffs:' assumptions as
"speculation" and "conjecture," courts have paid scant attention to
the fact that the assumptions that defendants are challenging are no
less speculative or conjectural.18 In fact, the assumption of equal
qualifications and interest is often contrary to common experience, as
is neatly illustrated by Catlett, in which the court assumed that men
and women were equally interested in highway maintenance jobs. The
statistical comparisons contained in a plaintiff's analysis necessarily
rest on a fundamental and critical assumption of equal interest and
equal qualifications. If that assumption is inaccurate, the statistical
analysis is meaningless.188 Similarly, when a plaintiff uses a proxy for
a productivity variable, the statistical model assumes that the proxy is
an accurate representation of the missing variable itself; yet, courts
often impose on the defendant the burden of proving that a plaintiff's
chosen proxy is unrepresentative.189 Given that plaintiffs bear the bur-
den of proof on the ultimate question of discrimination, it is hard to
understand why the defendant should bear the burden of proof of the
falsity of the plaintiffs' assumptions.
Several potential reasons exist for the placement of the burden on
the defendant to prove the relevance of missing variables. First, the
assumption of equal interest and qualifications could be the efficient
starting assumption. However, the assumption of equal interest and
186. Id.
187. See Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., 839 F.2d 18, 35 (2d Cir. 1988) (Deendant "cannot rely on
assumptions about imperfections inherent in productivity proxies, nor can it simply propose
alternative variables without justifying their inclusion."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1105 (1989).
188. Baldus and Cole assert that "[i]f the law assumes equal eligibilit) ... there is no problem
[with the validity of the statistical analysis]. But when it does not, there are distinct threats to
validity." BALDUS & COLE, supra note 39, § 9.02. They define "validity" as "the property of
measuring what the figures purport to measure and not some other factor." Id. § 2.312.
However, to say that a counterfactual assumption preserves the "validity" of a statistical analysis
is a strange use of the term. It may be that the assumption of equal qualilications, whether or not
it is well founded, makes a statistical comparison legally relevant; that is, one may say that
because equal qualifications are presumed, a significant difference betweei two groups establishes
a prima facie case. It does not mean, however, that the statistical analysis "measur[es] what the
figures purport to measure." The statistical comparison purports to measure, depending upon
the particular court's formulation, either the likelihood that the disparity was caused by chance
or the likelihood that it was caused by discrimination; the accuracy of the answer is not enhanced
by changing the underlying factual assumptions. In other words, the law cannot assume away
threats to validity; it can only make threats to validity legally irrelevant.
189. See Sobel, 839 F.2d at 34-35.
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qualifications is so often wrong that efficiency is not a reason to retain
it. Race, sex, and age differences in interest, qualifications, and ability
are common enough that the party bearing the burden of persuasion
should also bear the burden of production. Even if a production bur-
den were appropriate, the defendant should bear only the obligation of
presenting evidence creating a genuine issue of fact that the assump-
tion of equality is unwarranted, a burden much lighter than that seem-
ingly imposed by most courts. 190 Even the Sears court, for example,
seemed to view the question before it as whether Sears' interest evi-
dence had eliminated the apparent disparities-that is, whether Sears
had satisfied a persuasion burden '-when all it should have required
is that Sears demonstrate that a genuine issue of fact existed concern-
ing the correctness of the equal-interest assumption, which Sears could
have done with substantially less evidence than it provided.
The second reason for placing the burden on the defendant to
demonstrate the falsity of the plaintiff's assumptions is that defendants
have superior access to evidence, a rationale which, at most, would
justify a production burden rather than a persuasion burden. The
assumption of superior access, however, is unfounded for several rea-
sons. First, in many cases, evidence concerning interests and qualifica-
tions of various populations must be generated after the litigation
begins from data not in the possession, or at least not in the exclusive
possession, of the defendant.' 92 Plaintiffs can generate it as well as
defendants, and the fact that defendants may enjoy superior financial
resources is not a basis for shifting evidentiary burdens. Second, after
discovery in the typical class action, the plaintiffs have as much evi-
dence concerning the profile of employees and applicants as the
defendant.'93 Third, the fact that defendants as a class may have supe-
190. In Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d 84, 106-07 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the court rejected the
defendant's argument that the plaintiffs' statistical case was flawed by its failure to control for
differential interest in the jobs at issue where the defendant "presented no evidence at all that
preference would explain the disparities related to sex." The court did not discuss what the
consequence of the defendant's introduction of some evidence of differential interest would be.
191. Sobel, 839 F.2d at 334-35 ("[W]e conclude that the district court did not clearly err in
determining that Sears' interest evidence substantially reduced (and indeed almost eliminated)
the EEOC's alleged promotion disparities.").
192. For example, in De Medina v. Reinhardt, 686 F.2d 997, 1009 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the
court suggested that possible sources of evidence of unequal qualifications were "data on the
qualifications of applicants processed by similarly situated decision makers" and "published
work force or census data." See also BALDUS & COLE, supra note 39, § 6.2, at 195.
193. Richard Lempert has argued that in Melani v. Board of Higher Education, 561 F. Supp.
769 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), a case alleging sex discrimination in salaries at City University of New
York, the defendant should have borne the burden of introducing evidence that the salary
discrepancies were due to the fact that women were found disproportionately in departments that
had low salary scales (such as education), while men were found disproportionately in
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rior access to a kind of evidence may not warrant a presumption that
each individual defendant has such access. If, for example, a particu-
lar form of evidence exists in only 20 percent of cases, but when it does
exist it is usually found in the defendants' employment records, one
could say that in some sense defendants as a class have "superior
access" to it. However, unless the circumstances of a particular case
suggest that the defendant in fact has the evidence, there is no reason
to count the absence of evidence against the defendant in a regime that
places the risk of nonpersuasion on the plaintiff.
The third reason for requiring the defendant to disprove the plain-
tiff's assumption of equal interest and qualifications could be that such
a rule is more consistent with the substantive equality goals of Title
VII than an assumption of unequal interest and qualifications.
194
However, Title VII did not legislate away differences between the
races and the sexes, nor could it; rather, it prohibited discrimination
based upon race and sex. Furthermore, Title VII did not mandate
that employers hire without regard to qualifications and interest; it did
just the opposite. 195 The central tenet of Title VII is not that there are
no differences between men and women or between blacks and whites;
it is that maleness, femaleness, blackness, and whiteness ordinarily are
not to be the basis for employment decisions. Given that premise,
there is no basis for suggesting that Title VII requires that courts pre-
sume that which they know not to be true. 196
departments having higher scales (such as engineering). Lempert, supra note 39, at 1108-09.
Relying on the notion that "failure to respond to an opponent's argument is itself an important
piece of information," he suggests that if the defendant, having raised the possibility that
academic department explains the disparity, "fails to test for it, the defendant's failure is itself
reason to believe that a consideration of this plausible nondiscriminatory explanation would not
exonerate the defendant." Id.
Lempert implies that the information costs of the parties would be markedly different; yet in
order for the plaintiffs to have made their initial prima facie showing, they must have already had
salary information by sex and probably also by department. Whether or not they had
department-by-department information, they surely could have obtained it through discovery.
Lempert does not explain why, if plaintiffs had data concerning a v~riable that admittedly is a
"plausible nondiscriminatory explanation" for the disparity, the plaintiffs' failure to introduce
that evidence should not be held against them.
194. See De Medina, 686 F.2d at 1003-09 n.7 ("Both equitable considerations and, in Title
VII cases, the policy of the statute, support a rebuttable presumption of an equal distribution of
qualifications between minority and majority group applicants when data are unavailable.").
195. As the Supreme Court stated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971):
"Congress has not commanded that the less qualified be preferred over the better qualified simply
because of minority origins. Far from disparaging job qualifications as such, Congress has made
such qualifications the controlling factor, so that race, religion, nationality, and sex become
irrelevant."
196. The court in De Medina, 686 F.2d at 1009 n.7, gave an additional reason for imposing
the burden on the employer: "[I]t was the defendant's selection process that produced the
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4. "Tainted Variables"
Treatment of factors alleged to have been tainted by discrimination
is another way in which some courts have improperly shifted the bur-
den of proof to defendants in pattern-or-practice cases. This issue
arises primarily in salary and promotion cases-cases in which the
employer has had some prior opportunity to engage in discrimination
against the affected employees. Typically either the employer argues
that the plaintiff's regression analysis should be rejected or minimized
because it omits an important variable and the plaintiff in turn asserts
that the omitted variable is tainted by the employer's discrimination,
or the plaintiff argues that a defendant's regression should be rejected
because it has included such a variable.
There are two polar ways to deal with the "tainted variable" issue.
First, omission of the variable could be viewed as weakening the plain-
tiff's statistical analysis unless the plaintiff can prove that the omitted
variable is in fact tainted by discrimination. Second, the plaintiff's
assertion of discrimination in the omitted variable could shift the bur-
den to the defendant to disprove discrimination in the variable.
Courts have differed in their approach to the "tainted variable" issue
but virtually all, to some extent, have been willing improperly to
relieve the plaintiff of the burden of proving something that should be
the plaintiff's obligation to prove.
Some courts have expressly placed on the defendant the burden of
disproving discrimination in the challenged variable. For example,
in Valentino v. United States Postal Service,1 97 the D.C. Circuit
announced that "[a]bsent clear, atfrmative evidence that promotions
were made in accordance with neutral, objective standards consist-
ently applied, there is no assurance that level or rank is an appropriate
explanatory variable, untainted by discrimination." '198 As a result, the
court stated that it did not consider the plaintiff's salary regression
flawed because of its failure to include grade level as an explanatory
variable.19 9 Similarly, in James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., ° a
case involving allegations of wage discrimination, the court considered
a defense regression analysis that took into account "skill level" and
observed disproportionate impact, and it is he who is alleging that it is the product of differential
qualifications among the applicants." The court seemed to lose sight of the fact that the issue is
whether the statistical evidence is sufficiently powerful as to create a prima facie case; it is always
the plaintiff's obligation to put on evidence with that power.
197. 674 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
198. Id. at 73 n.30.
199. Id. at 71 n.26.
200. 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978).
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"merit rating."201 The court rejected the regression because the skill
level could have been tainted by discrimination in job assignments and
the merit rating could have been tainted by discrimination in perform-
ance evaluations.20 2 Not surprisingly, once the defendant was not per-
mitted to defend wage disparities on the basis. of skill and merit, it
could not rebut the prima facie case.
Other courts have taken what at first glance appears an opposite
approach, requiring the plaintiff to prove discrimination in the omitted
variable as a condition of excusing its omission. For example, in Pres-
seisen v. Swarthmore College,2"3 in which plaintiffs raised claims of sex
discrimination in hiring, promotion, and salary, the court rejected
plaintiffs' multiple regression study introduced to prove salary dis-
crimination on the ground that the study failed to take into account
academic rank.2" Plaintiffs had asserted that academic rank had been
excluded because the college had discriminated in promotions.20 5 The
court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate discrimina-
tion in promotions, however, because the difference in time to promo-
tion for men and women was not statistically significant.20 6 As a
result, the court concluded that academic rank was not tainted by dis-
crimination and therefore should have been included, although the
opinion implies that if the difference in time to promotion between
men and women had been statistically significant it would have
inferred discrimination from that fact alone and excluded the
variable.20 7
The Seventh Circuit has taken a compromise: position on the ques-
tion of burdens. In Coates v. Johnson & Johnson. 2 08 the court held that
a plaintiff need not account for a "potentially biased factor" in estab-
201. The "skill level" variable was based on the employee's job class and was primarily a
measure of quality of work experience with the defendant. Id at 332. The "merit rating"
variable was based upon subjective evaluations of employees by their supervisors. Id.
202. Id. ("If there is racial bias in the subjective evaluations of white supervisors, then that
bias will be injected into [defendant's] earnings analysis.").
203. 442 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd mem., 582 F.2d 1275 (3d Cir. 1978).
204. Id. at 614.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 612.
207. Id. at 614; see also Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., 839 F.2d 18, 35 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding
inclusion of academic rank in defense regression in light of the district court's finding that there
was no sex discrimination in promotions), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1105 (1989); Ottaviani v. State
Univ., 875 F.2d 365, 375 (2d Cir. 1989) (upholding district court's inclusion of rank variable
where plaintiffs introduced no statistical evidence of discrimination in rank and defendants
introduced "persuasive objective evidence to demonstrate that taere was no discrimination in
either placement into initial rank or promotion"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1021 (1990).
208. 756 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1985).
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lishing its prima facie case,209 but that if the defendant in rebuttal
offers a statistical analysis using an allegedly biased factor, the plaintiff
bears the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the factor is actu-
ally biased. The court recognized that to impose the ultimate burden
on the employer to prove nondiscrimination in the questioned variable
"would skew the general Title VII framework for allocating burdens
and would be inconsistent with the principle that the plaintiffs in a
Title VII case retain the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of
discrimination."21 According to the court, "[p]laintiffs should not be
able to shift the burden of persuasion by alleging that some factor in
defendant's control has been used by the defendant
discriminatorily.,, 211
The courts in all of these cases were willing to allocate proof bur-
dens improperly. In Segar and Stockham Valves, the courts showed
this willingness in a rather obvious way by requiring the defendants to
disprove discrimination as a condition precedent to incorporating
obviously relevant variables into their analyses. In Presseisen, the flaw
is less obvious because the court required the plaintiff to demonstrate
discrimination in promotion before it would approve exclusion of aca-
demic rank from the regression. To that extent, then, Presseisen is
more consistent with the general rules of Title VII proof burdens than
the prior two cases, although the court's apparent willingness to infer
discrimination from statistically significant differences in time to pro-
motion was unjustified. However, even if there were demonstrable dis-
crimination in promotion in Presseisen, it does not follow that
academic rank should be ignored in the salary regression. Discrimina-
tion in salary is an action distinct from discrimination in promotion;
an employer might engage in one but not the other. The two separate
questions are: (1) did Swarthmore College discriminate in promoting
women to higher ranks?; and (2) did it discriminate against women in
salary once they had achieved the higher rank? If Swarthmore had
discriminated in promotions but not in salary, omission of the aca-
demic rank variable would result in the erroneous conclusion that
there had been discrimination in salary.21 2 On the other hand, if
209. Id. at 544. Apparently, the court meant by "potentially biased factor" a factor for which
there is some evidence of discrimination, even if there has been no finding that discrimination
exists.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Of course, to the extent that the plaintiff is arguing that she was discriminated against in
promotion and that one of the consequences of not receiving the promotion was that she did not
obtain the higher salary that would have gone with the promotion, the salary increment is
recoverable as a remedy for promotion discrimination.
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Swarthmore had discriminated against women in salary, that fact
would show up even if the rank variable were inclurled. That is, the
statistical evidence would show that it took women longer to become
associate or full professors-i.e., that they were discriminated against
in promotion-and that once they achieved those ranks they were paid
less than men-i.e., that they were discriminated against in salary.
Thus, even though the Presseisen court appeared sensitive to ensuring
that the proper parties bore the burden of proof on the various issues,
its implicit willingness to reject the rank variable if discrimination
were found in promotions would have improperly allowed the plain-
tiffs to prevail on claims of discrimination in both promotions and sal-
ary when they had presented evidence supporting only the former.
Michael Finkelstein argues in just the opposite direction, suggesting
that the court in Presseisen let the defendant off too easily.2 13 He
asserts that the court was wrong to conclude that there was no dis-
crimination in promotions merely because there were no statistically
significant differences in time to promotion. 4 Finkelstein is correct
that failing to reject the null hypothesis of no discrimination is not the
same as proving it; hypothesis testing can never prove the null hypoth-
esis.2 '5 In fact, Finkelstein's point would be as correct if there were
no differences in time to promotion between men and women; in the
absence of discrimination perhaps women would be promoted faster
than men rather than at the same rate. However, the question should
not be whether we can say that there is zero chance that the employer
has discriminated in the challenged variable. Even the courts in Segar
and Stockham Valves probably would have accepted a showing by the
defendant that there was no statistically significant difference between
the groups at issue in the challenged variable.216 Ncnetheless, Finkel-
stein argues that rank should be included in such regressions "only
when there is clear evidence of neutral and objective standards that
have consistently been followed in granting rank, so that there is no
chance for discrimination," '217 standards he acknowledges that most
213. Michael 0. Finkelstein, The Judicial Reception of Multiple Regression Studies in Race
and Sex Discrimination Cases, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 737, 742 (1980).
214. See id. ("[Ain absence of statistically significant differences is not equivalent to
affirmative evidence that promotions were made neutrally ....").
215. See Campbell, supra note 41, at 1304; Kaye, Numbers Game, supra note 39, at 839. But
see McKeown, supra note 136, at 659 (suggesting that a statistizal study can disprove
discrimination).
216. Of course, if there were not such a difference, the variable prcbably would not explain
the observed disparity. This demonstrates the problem with inferring discrimination from
statistical disparities; it is most likely to cause exclusion of variables in precisely those cases
where the variables have the most explanatory power.
217. Finkelstein, supra note 211, at 742.
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academic institutions have not developed. However, he does not
explain how a rule that imposes on defendants an obligation to dis-
prove discrimination under a standard apparently comparable to the
criminal "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is derived from a law
that requires plaintiffs to bear the burden of persuasion and requires
proof only by a preponderance of the evidence. In fact, his argument
simply demonstrates how doctrines of statistical proof have been cor-
rupted to justify gross, but covert, deviations from governing substan-
tive and procedural rules.
The Coates court's apparent sensitivity to proof burdens did not pre-
vent it from permitting a plaintiff to omit an admittedly relevant varia-
ble as part of its prima facie case without a finding that it was actually
tainted. Under the Coates rule, an analysis that suffers from major
flaws on its face is enough to support a judgment against the defendant
in the absence of rebuttal. However, if the statistical analysis was
insufficient to establish a prima facie case where no allegation of dis-
crimination in the challenged factor had been made-which the Coates
court apparently would have held-there is no basis for a rule that the
allegation of discrimination (or weak evidence of discrimination)
should have the procedural consequence of shifting the burden of pro-
duction to the defendant, thereby requiring it to conduct its own sta-
tistical analysis by controlling for the important missing variable.
Placing a heavy burden on the defendant to disprove taint is a way
of whipsawing the defendant and makes a defendant's attempt to cope
with statistical evidence like boxing with cotton candy. A factual set-
ting similar to that in Presseisen will illustrate. Assume that a univer-
sity that does not discriminate in promotion or in salary has a work
force where the most productive scholars are men and that it has a
merit system for both promotion and salary.218 One would expect
that, on average, men would be promoted faster and be paid higher
salaries than women, and a regression analysis would show positive,
and statistically significant, coefficients for sex both in salary and in
time to promotion. Female faculty bring an action for discrimination
in both salary and promotion. In defending against the salary discrim-
ination claim, the university attempts to control for rank; after all, the
stars who get the fast promotions are the same ones who get the high
salaries, and higher rank brings higher salary. The plaintiffs assert
that the defendant cannot use the rank variable because there is a sta-
tistically significant difference in promotion statistics for men and
218. Because of the requirement of "objective" variables, issues of quality of publications as
opposed to quantity would probably be beyond the scope of the regression.
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women; therefore, according to the plaintiffs, the variable is tainted.
Unless the defendant can affirmatively prove absence of discrimination
in promotions-not merely rebut the prima facie case-it loses the sal-
ary discrimination case. Then, the plaintiffs, having demonstrated sal-
ary discrimination, are most of the way towx.ad demonstrating
discrimination in promotion, since courts will infer discrimination in
one kind of decision based upon proof of discrimination in another.2 19
The non-discriminating employer loses even though it is not discrimi-
nating in either salary or promotions and even though the plaintiff has
no good evidence that it is.
The "tainted variable" issue should seldom arise. The fact that it
does is a testament to the sloppiness of thought that is encouraged by
current attitudes toward statistical proof. If plaintiffs bring a salary
discrimination case and the central issue is whether the variable of
performance evaluations can be excluded as tainted, in all likelihood
the case should not be a salary discrimination case at all, but rather, if
anything, a discriminatory evaluation case. Both sides likely agree
that if performance evaluations are controlled for, the salary dispari-
ties are eliminated or at least reduced, otherwise they would not be
arguing about the variable in the first place. If those with equivalent
performance evaluations receive equivalent wages, whether or not
there is discrimination in performance evaluations there is no evidence
of discrimination in wages. However, treating the case as one for sal-
ary discrimination provides plaintiffs the kind of procedural advan-
tages described above if a court is willing to say that the results of
performance evaluations cannot be used unless the defendant proves
that they are not tainted by discrimination. If the plaintiff character-
ized the case as what it really is-a discriminatory evaluation case-
everyone would agree that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving
discrimination in evaluations. Characterizing it as a salary discrimina-
tion case allows the court to shift the burden of proving nondiscrimi-
nation in evaluations to the defendant.2
20
219. Cf. Cook v. Boorstin, 763 F.2d 1462, 1468-69 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("It strikes us as
altogether obvious that statistical (or anecdotal) evidence that the Library discriminated against
its black librarians would be relevant to whether the Library discrirainated against its black
attorneys."); Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 505 F. Supp. 224, 338-42 (N.D. Tex. 1980)
(holding that discrimination in promotions can be inferred from statistical evidence of
discrimination in hiring and salary), vacated, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1073 (1984).
220. In a recent article, the central thrust of which is the sensible proposition that courts
should require that statistical models be consistent with economic theory and legal doctrine,
James McKeown unfortunately demonstrated the seductiveness of the siren call of tainted
variables. McKeown, supra note 136, at 654-55 n.86. He suggested that in a sex discrimination
action against a university the variable of "publications" in a salary regression would be
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5. The Inexorable Zero
Another way in which courts have improperly employed statistical
proof is in their treatment of circumstances in which the observed
number of protected class members is, or approaches, zero.22 In
Teamsters, the Court rejected the defendant's criticisms of the govern-
ment's statistical case, stating that "fine tuning of the statistics could
not have obscured the glaring absence of minority line drivers" and
that the defendant's "inability to rebut the inference of discrimination
came not from a misuse of statistics but from 'the inexorable
zero.' "222 Some courts have seized on the "inexorable zero" language
to give special treatment to disparities in those cases where there are
no women or minorities in a particular job.223 For example, in Capaci
v. Katz & Besthoff, Inc., 224 the defendant argued that the fact that
there were no women in a particular position raised no inference of
discrimination because the disparities, if segregated by year, were not
statistically significant.225 The court rejected the defendant's argu-
"tainted"-and therefore should be excluded-if it is more difficult for women to have articles
accepted for publication than it is for men. The difficulty with this reasoning is that exclusion in
these circumstances would have the effect of holding an innocent employer liable for the acts of
the actual discriminator (the discriminatory publications). Thus, unlike a situation where a
plaintiff converts what should be a promotion discrimination case against his employer into a
salary discrimination case against the same defendant, McKeown's approach would allow what
should be a discrimination in publication case to be converted into a salary discrimination case
against a completely different defendant. See Coser v. Moore, 739 F.2d 746, 750 (2d Cir. 1984):
We also recognize the possibility that the sex characteristics of a particular availability pool
may differ from those of the general population because of prior discrimination by entities
other than [this defendant, but] where a statistical disparity between men and women may
be explained by taking job-related criteria such as prior work experience or prior academic
rank into account, evidence of the disparity does not prove unlawful discrimination.
221. See Boardman & Vining, supra note 49, at 203 ("Total exclusion is sufficient to shift the
burden of proof, but such an obvious degree of discrimination is not always necessary.").
222. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342 n.23 (1977).
223. See EEOC v. Andrew Corp., 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 804, 815 (N.D. Il. 1989)
("Since [Teamsters], the courts, when confronted with Title VII defendants who have employed
or promoted zero or near zero minorities or women, have avoided permitting labor market and
statistical analyses to obscure the discrimination inherent in the 'inexorable zero.' "); Bentley v.
City of Thomaston, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1476, 1479 (M.D. Ga. 1983) ("Fine
distinctions about whether two or three standard deviations is sufficient to imply discriminatory
motive is uncalled for since this court faces the 'inexorable zero'...."). Cf EEOC v. National
Broadcasting Co., 753 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd mem., 940 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1991):
Although the fact that no women were hired as Sports Director gives rise to an inference of
discrimination-"the inexorable zero" as described in [Teasters]-that inference is weak
in light of the very limited number of openings for Sports Director positions. Without a
showing that at least one qualified woman applied for a Director position and was denied,
EEOC cannot establish a prima facie case.
Id. at 466-67.
224. 711 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 927 (1984).
225. Id. at 654.
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ment that "zero is just a number," stating that "it carries special sig-
nificance in discerning firm policies and attitudes," especially in light
of the fact that the disparities were highly significant when individual
years were aggregated. 226 However, the defendant was right; a statisti-
cally insignificant disparity is no more significant simply because the
number is zero.227 As to revealing something about "firm policies and
attitudes," the most that can be said is that it may reveal a firm policy
against engaging in affirmative action to avoid "inaexorable zeros."
Given the absence of any legal requirement to engage in affirmative
action, however, that revelation is not a basis for imposing liability.
The district court in EEOC v. O&G Spring & Wire Forms Specialty
Co.221 similarly misunderstood the meaning of the number zero. In
that case, the EEOC sued the defendant for race and age discrimina-
tion. The defendant was a small company owned by a Polish immi-
grant that hired large numbers of Poles and Hispanics but for the
years 1979-1985 had hired no blacks. Defendant's expert testified that
the relevant labor market for the defendant was composed dispropor-
tionately of recent immigrants who did not speak English, because the
defendant needed employees with some skills who were willing to
work for low pay. Although the court credited the defendant's testi-
mony, it concluded that "no explanation is sufficient to overcome the
226. Id. at 662; see also Carroll v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 708 F.2d 183, 193 (5th Cir. 1983)
(suggesting that the "inexorable zero" adds special weight to the statistical showing); Valentino
v. United States Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 56, 73 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("The 'inexorable zero'... can
raise an inference of discrimination even if the subgroup analyzed is relatively small.") (citations
omitted); Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
940 (1981):
Despite evidence of some weaknesses in the statistics, where they disclose a glaring absence
of minority representation in the jobs at issue, the burden on the employer increases since
"fine tuning" of the statistics will not rebut an inference of discrimination derived "not from
a misuse of statistics but from 'the inexorable zero.'"
Id. at 1015 (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 342 n.23); Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654
F.2d 388, 410 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Our innate capacity in [statistical] matters extends to 'the inexo-
rable zero' and perhaps, unevenly, somewhat beyond; but the day is long past-past at least since
the Supreme Court's sophisticated analysis in Castaneda v. Partida.. .- when we proceed with
any confidence toward broad conclusions from crude and incomplete statistics."), vacated, 459
U.S. 809 (1982).
227. See Kaye, supra note 33, at 1345 n.59 ("Even the 'inexorable zero,' which the courts
took to be dramatic evidence of discrimination in the days before hypothesis testing in court, may
not be sufficient to warrant rejection of the null hypothesis at the .05 level."). But see Elaine W.
Shoben, The Use of Statistics to Prove Intentional Employment Discrimination, LAW &
CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1983, at 221, 238 ("The reason that the inexorable zero is so
compelling is that such a result is so unlikely to happen without the impermissible influence in
the decisionmaking.").
228. 705 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
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'inexorable zero' employment of blacks at 0 & G from 1979 through
1985. ' '229
Courts' treatment of the "inexorable zero" is simply an act of statis-
tical legerdemain-a way of holding defendants liable on the basis of
statistical evidence even when such findings are inappropriate under
the prevailing rules governing such evidence. In other words, it is a
way to hold defendants liable on the basis of evidence that otherwise
would not warrant a finding of discrimination. Even if statistically
significant disparities were strongly probative of discrimination, statis-
tically insignificant disparities are not, even if the representation is
zero.
IV. PRESCRIPTION
Acknowledgment of the Statistical Fallacy compels a recognition
that statistical evidence, standing alone, is only weakly probative on
the question of whether an observed disparity is due to chance or
nonchance factors. Moreover, even when one may confidently con-
clude that a disparity is so large that it must have been caused by
nonchance factors, statistical inference provides no insight at all into
whether the nonchance factor was an impermissible one, especially
where the statistical analysis contains only rudimentary control for
relevant variables. Consequently, courts should be substantially more
demanding in the sophistication required of plaintiffs' statistical show-
ings and extremely wary of concluding that discrimination has
occurred on the basis of a largely statistical case. Further, in evaluat-
ing the statistical evidence, courts should not shift the burden of proof
to defendants under the guise of evidentiary rules.
A. The Need for Strong Anecdotal Evidence
Because statistically significant disparities by themselves are at best
only weakly probative of discrimination, a plaintiff should be obliged
to demonstrate substantially more than a statistical disparity in order
229. Id. at 406; see also EEOC v. Andrew Corp., 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 804, 816
(N.D. Ill. 1989) ("The data in this case respecting Black office and clerical workers is dominated
by the 'inexorable zero' and cannot be 'explained away.' ").
The employer in O&G Spring had no applications for the years prior to 1984, and the court
found that the earlier applications had been "legally destroyed." O&G Spring, 705 F. Supp. at
402-03. For the years 1984 and 1985, the company had received four applications from blacks
out of a total of 58. IdM at 403. The court also had before it testimony that the racial composition
of the neighborhood was rapidly changing; it had been 10-15 percent black in 1984 and
approximately 50 percent black in 1986. Id. at 405. This suggests that extrapolating backward
from the black representation of the applicant pool from 1984-85 to reconstruct the applicant
flow from 1979 to 1983 would be highly questionable.
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to establish by a preponderance of the evidence thai: discrimination is
the employer's standard operating procedure. If the employer has in
fact routinely engaged in discrimination, then by definition individual
victims abound, and the plaintiff ought in fairness to bear the burden
of providing evidence of a substantial number of individual cases of
discrimination. Many courts already expect to see some "anecdotal"
evidence of discrimination-that is, testimony concerning individual
instances of discrimination.230 However, a number of courts have held
that anecdotal evidence of discrimination is not required, especially if
the statistical evidence is deemed strong.23 Where the statistical evi-
dence is weak, courts have tended to demand stronger anecdotal evi-
dence232 but have stopped far short of requiring a quantity of evidence
sufficient to buttress a case grounded on weak statistical proof.
230. See, eg., Sheehan v. Purolator Courier Corp., 839 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir.) (holding that
the district court "was not clearly erroneous in concluding... that submitting an affidavit from
only one aggrieved employee, other than the named plaintiffs, was insufficient to establish a class
of aggrieved individuals"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 891 (1988); Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc.,
798 F.2d 590, 604 (2d Cir. 1986) ("In evaluating all of the evidence in a discrimination case, a
district court may properly consider the quality of any anecdotal evidence or the absence of such
evidence."); Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 532 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The plaintiffs'
prima facie case will thus usually consist of statistical evidence demonstrating substantial
disparities in the application of employment actions as to minorities and the unprotected group,
buttressed by evidence of general policies or specific instances of dis,.rimination."); Coser v.
Moore, 739 F.2d 746, 752 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the "failure to locate and identify a
meaningful number of concrete examples of discrimination" constitutes major weakness in
employment discrimination case); Goff v. Continental Oil Co., 678 F.2d 593, 597 (5th Cir. 1982)
("[E]ven if all three witnesses' accounts of racial discrimination were true, this evidence would
not have been enough to prove a pattern or practice of company-wide discrimination by
Conoco."); Ste. Marie v. Eastern R.R. Ass'n, 650 F.2d 395, 405-07 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that
where relevant statistical evidence was lacking, seven individual incidents of discrimination were
insufficient to demonstrate pattern or practice of discrimination).
231. In Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977), the Court stated
that "[w]here gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone may in a proper case
constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination." rd. at 307-08. Similarly,
in Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir 1984), cert denied sub nom. Meese v. Segar, 471 U.S.
1115 (1985), the court held: "when a plaintiff's statistical methodology focuses on the
appropriate labor pool and generates evidence of discrimination at a statistically significant level,
no sound policy reason exists for subjecting the plaintiff to the additional requirement of either
providing anecdotal evidence or showing gross disparities." Id. at 1278; see also Catlett v.
Missouri Highway Transp. Comm'n, 828 F.2d 1260, 1265 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that either
statistical evidence or anecdotal evidence alone may be sufficient to establish a pattern or practice
of discrimination), cert denied, 485 U.S. 1021 (1988); Coates, 756 F.2d at 533 ("Neither
statistical nor anecdotal evidence is automatically entitled to reverence to the exclusion of the
other.").
232. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 311 (7th Cir. 1988)
("[E]xamples of individual discrimination are not always required, but we think that the lack of
such proof reinforces the doubt arising from the questions about validity of the statistical
evidence.") (quoting Griffin v. Board of Regents of Regency Univs., 795 F.2d 1281, 1292 (7th
Cir. 1986)); Woodbury v. New York City Transit Auth., 832 F.2d 764, 771 (2d Cir. 1987)
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The philosophy behind allowing plaintiffs to prevail on largely sta-
tistical evidence is that employers can surreptitiously discriminate
with substantial impunity and that statistical evidence is a necessary
means for smoking out employers who otherwise could not be
caught.233 That justification cannot withstand analysis. First, it
should be clear from the foregoing discussion that although a plaintiff
may "prove" a case with statistical evidence, it is doubtful that there is
much correlation between plaintiff victories that rest on such proof
and defendant culpability. Put another way, while statistics may allow
a plaintiff to win who would otherwise not win, this result cannot
argue in favor of statistical proof unless the plaintiff actually deserved
to win under the applicable substantive law. But that, of course, is a
matter that we can scarcely assume, since the plaintiff was spared the
need to establish such a case. Second, the assumption that an
employer can engage in widespread and systematic discrimination and
leave no sign of it other than gross statistical patterns defies belief.
Since 1965, thousands of successful individual disparate-treatment
actions have been brought, demonstrating that such cases are not fore-
doomed to failure. If discrimination is truly widespread, even the rela-
tively slight rebuttal burden under McDonnell Douglas will assume
massive proportions when the employer is forced to articulate large
numbers of pretextual, yet internally consistent, nondiscriminatory
explanations. It must be remembered that the employer cannot simply
put forward ad hoc explanations for each discriminatory decision; it
must make sure that its justification for one action is not inconsistent
with its justification for another. If the plaintiffs in a pattern-or-prac-
tice case cannot find evidence of large numbers of individual discrimi-
natory acts, it is quite likely because there is no evidence to find.
(holding that anecdotal evidence consisting of the way in which the defendant resolved a
disciplinary matter involving a white officer and "the 'sincere impression of witness after witness'
that the 'disciplinary system deals unequally with the races'" insufficient "given the complete
absence of creditable statistical evidence"); Valentino v. United States Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 56,
69 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("[WMhen the statistical evidence does not adequately account for 'the diverse
and specialized qualifications necessary for [the positions in question],' strong evidence of
individual instances of discrimination becomes vital to the plaintiff's case.") (quoting Wilkins v.
University of Houston, 604 F.2d 388, 410 (5th Cir. 1981)) (alteration in original); Garcia v.
Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Ctr., 660 F.2d 1217, 1225 (7th Cir. 1981) ("we find very
damaging to plaintiffs' position the fact that not only was their statistical evidence insufficient,
but that they failed completely to come forward with any direct or anecdotal evidence of
discriminatory employment practices by defendants. Plaintiffs did not present in evidence even
one specific instance of discrimination."). Cf Rossini, 798 F.2d at 604 (quoting district court for
proposition that "strong statistical proof. . . is critical [in the instant case], since there is no
anecdotal evidence supporting the figures.") (footnote omitted) (alteration in original).
233. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977);
Frazier v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 851 F.2d 1447, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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In order for anecdotal evidence to provide the quantum of logical
support needed to buttress statistical showings-which, as we have
seen, are far less consequential than previously rccognized--courts
should require substantial quantities of such evidence.2 34  In large
class cases, tens of thousands of employment decisions may be at issue.
The fact that plaintiffs can establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that one or two dozen discriminatory employment decisions
were made during the liability period, which in a class action is often
many years, is not strong evidence that the employer has engaged in a
pattern or practice of discrimination.2 35  To establish a pattern or
practice requires more than "the mere occurrence of isolated or 'acci-
dental' or sporadic discriminatory acts., 2 36 As the Supreme Court has
recognized, "a piece of fruit may well be bruised without being rotten
to the core."'237  It is doubtful that those who believe that a few
instances of individual discrimination should be taken to be represen-
tative of the employer's standard operating procedure would accept
the converse proposition that an employer could reb'ut a plaintiff's sta-
tistical evidence by calling a few minority employees to testify that
they had not been discriminated against.238
234. See Chisholm v. United States Postal Serv., 665 F.2d 482,495 (4th Cir. 1981) (upholding
finding of discrimination where anecdotal evidence came from 20 class members).
235. See O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(" '[W]hile anecdotal evidence may suffice to prove individual claims of discrimination, rarely, if
ever, can such evidence show a systemic pattern of discrimination.'... Anecdotal evidence is
most useful as a supplement to strong statistical evidence-which the Council did not produce in
this case.") (citation omitted); see also General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982):
Even though evidence that [plaintiff] was passed over for promotion when several less
deserving whites were advanced may support the conclusion that respondent was denied the
promotion because of his national origin, such evidence would not necessarily justify the
additional inferenc[e] . .. that this discriminatory treatment is typical of petitioner's
promotion practices ....
Id. at 158; Rocha v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 850 F.2d 1095, 1102 (6th Cir. 1988) (Guy, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that anecdotal evidence regarding only five out of defendant's 3,200 employees was
insufficient to establish a pattern or practice of age discrimination).
236. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336; see also King v. General Elec. Co., 960 F.2d 617, 623 (7th
Cir. 1992) ("In order to prove that the employer has engaged in a pattern or practice of
discrimination, then, the plaintiff must show that there is regulai, purposeful, less-favorable
treatment of a protected group.").
237. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 880 (1984).
238. One form of anecdotal evidence that should be strictly barred i3 noncompliance with an
affirmative-action plan. Courts have taken differing approaches to this issue. Compare Gonzales
v. Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 758, 760-61 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court erred in
falling to consider as evidence of pretext in an individual disparate treatment case the employer's
failure to live up to its affirmative-action plan that had been adopted as part of a consent decree)
and Craik v. Minnesota State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 472 (8th Cir. 1984) (Although "[n]either
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, nor the Fourteenth Amendment requires an employer to institute an
affirmative-action program,... evidence that an employer has failed to live up to an affirmative
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In EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,239 the EEOC attempted to turn
the weak probative value of anecdotal evidence to its advantage.
Arguing that its failure to produce anecdotal evidence should not be
deemed to undermine its statistical evidence, the EEOC suggested that
introduction of such evidence would be "'inappropriate' because
'where 47,000 hires and promotions were at issue ... it would have
been impossible to present enough individual demonstrations [sic] of
discrimination to meaningfully reflect on the statistics.' ,,24 In a
sense, of course, the EEOC was right. Even if it presented evidence
that forty of the 47,000 hiring and promotion decisions were probably
action plan is relevant to the question of discriminatory intent.") and Taylor v. Teletype Corp.,
648 F.2d 1129, 1135 n.14 (8th Cir.) (stating that evidence of the defendant's failure to live up to
its affirmative action plan is "relevant to discerning the Company's attitude regarding race"),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 969 (1981) and Morman v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 672 F. Supp.
993, 995 (E.D. Mich. 1987) ("For policy reasons implicit in our antidiscrimination laws, '[a]n
employer cannot be allowed to advertise itself as an affirmative action employer and then wink at
its [affirmative-action plan] when it gets in the way.' ") (quoting Fang-Hui Liao v. Dean, 658 F.
Supp. 1554, 1561 (N.D. Ala. 1987)) (first alteration in original) with Liao v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 867 F.2d 1366, 1369 (11th Cir. 1989) ("[Ihe failure to give a preference under such a
plan cannot be used to support an allegation of discrimination in employment decisions."), cert
denied, 494 U.S. 1078 (1990) and Manoharan v. Columbia Univ., 842 F.2d 590, 594 (2d Cir.
1988) ("Since section [703(j)] of Title VII states that affirmative action in employment practices
is not required by Title VII... an employer's failure to follow its own voluntary affirmative
action program cannot, by itself, constitute an unlawful employment practice .... ") and
Ferguson v. Veterans Admin., 723 F.2d 871, 873 (11th Cir.) ("[To the extent plaintiff's claim is
based on the failure of her employer to follow an affirmative action plan.., she loses as a matter
of law, absent a showing of discriminatory implementation of that plan."), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1072 (1984).
For a whole host of reasons, failure to follow an affirmative action plan should not enhance a
plaintiff's case. Under Title VII, an employer is not obligated to have an affirmative action plan
at all. Section 703(j) provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer.., to
grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race [or] sex
... of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to
the total number or percentage of persons of any race [or] sex ... employed by any employer
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1988). Holding an employer liable because of inadequate affirmative
action, whether inadequacy is measured against the employer's affirmative action plan or a
judge's notion of proper affirmative action efforts, is to hold it liable precisely because of its
alleged failure "to grant preferential treatment.., on account of an imbalance."
The fact that an employer has a voluntary plan that it has failed to follow in all respects-
whether through ineptness or by design-does not logically suggest an invidious intent to dis-
criminate against women and minorities. Moreover, as a policy matter, if voluntary affirmative
action is desirable, treating a failure to comply with a plan as evidence of illegal conduct creates a
substantial incentive for an employer to forego affirmative action altogether or to construct a
plan so vague that it could never be said to have violated it. Thus, penalizing employers for
unsuccessful or unenthusiastic affirmative-action efforts creates perverse incentives.
239. 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
240. Id. at 311 (bracketed material in original) (citation omitted). The trial involved 20,000
pages of transcripts, 49 witnesses, and 2172 exhibits totaling over 22,000 pages. Id. at 307 n.2.
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discriminatory, that proof would relate to less than one-tenth of one
percent of the total. Because these forty cases would have been care-
fully selected by the EEOC and could hardly be conskdered a represen-
tative sample of Sears' employment decisions, their probative value on
the ultimate question-whether discrimination was Sears' standard
operating procedure-would be little more powerful than identifying
forty black criminals and arguing from that sample that blacks have a
propensity toward crime.
The EEOC was correct in its essential position that statistical evi-
dence of discrimination is not made substantially stronger by weak
anecdotal evidence. The important recognition that even "statistically
significant" disparities, standing alone, are very weak evidence of
intentional discrimination would be undermined if a court were per-
suaded to impose class-wide liability on the basis of a few anecdotal
accounts. Although upholding a judgment for the defendant, the Sev-
enth Circuit in Sears appeared to accord more value to small amounts
of anecdotal evidence than is warranted. It suggested that examples of
individual instances of discrimination need not be numerous and that
"[e]ven a few examples would have helped bring 'cold numbers con-
vincingly to life.' "241 The quoted phrase, which comes from the
Supreme Court's Teamsters decision, is commonly invoked, but with-
out much thought about why a few, perhaps isolated, instances of dis-
crimination are to be taken as strong evidence that statistical
disparities are caused by systematic discrimination.
In Segar v. Smith,242 the D.C. Circuit was even less concerned than
the Sears court with anecdotal evidence. In Segar, the plaintiffs had
introduced statistical evidence that was considered to be strong and
anecdotal accounts of specific instances of discrimination that the dis-
trict court had refused to credit.243 Rather than concluding that the
plaintiffs' inability to find any flesh-and-blood victims of discrimina-
tion suggested a weakness in the statistics, the court suggested that
requiring anecdotal evidence "would reflect little more than a supersti-
tious hostility to statistical proof, a preference for the intuitionistic and
individualistic over the scientific and systemic." 2" However, as
Douglas Laycock has noted, the Segar court's "blind faith in statistical
241. Id. at 311-12; cf EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292, 303 (7th Cir.
1991) (suggesting that "[t]he EEOC might have overcome deficiencies in its statistics if it had
presented more compelling anecdotal evidence").
242. 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Meese v. Segar, 471 U.S. 1115
(1985).
243. Id. at 1264 n.10.
244. Id. at 1278.
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evidence without consideration of the assumptions underlying the sta-
tistical techniques reflects a superstitious faith in the pseudoscien-
tific. ''245 If one observes statistical disparities that might suggest
discrimination against blacks but then determines by looking at indi-
vidual cases that what initially appeared discriminatory from the sta-
tistics has a nondiscriminatory explanation, one ought to question
whether one is drawing the correct inference from the statistics.246
In EEOC v. American National Bank,247 the Fourth Circuit elevated
faith in statistics to an even higher level than the Segar court. The
district court had found that the EEOC had established a prima facie
case through static work-force statistics-that is, a comparison of the
composition of the employer's work force to the composition of the
relevant labor market-but it also found that the defendant had rebut-
ted what the court viewed as a relatively weak prima facie case248
through the use of applicant-flow statistics, demonstrating that within
the liability period there had been no significant shortfall in black hir-
ing.249 The district court also considered the EEOC's presentation of
testimony from thirty-one alleged individual victims of discrimination
and concluded that not one of them had been subjected to discrimina-
tion.25 0 Because the EEOC had stipulated that there was a maximum
of fifty-two potential victims of discrimination, 25 1 only twenty-one
other potential victims of discrimination existed. The court found no
evidence that any of these persons had been subjected to discrimina-
245. Douglas Laycock, Statistical Proof and Theories of Discrimination, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1986, at 97, 103 (emphasis added).
246. Cf Catlett v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 828 F.2d 1260, 1266 (8th Cir.
1987) (upholding a finding of class-wide sex discrimination in highway-maintenance positions,
notwithstanding jury verdicts in favor of the defendant on the individual claims of all four class
representatives), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1021 (1988); Boykin v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 706 F.2d
1384, 1393 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that the fact that the district court finds that class
representatives and other testifying employees were not subjected to discrimination does not
invalidate the class claim), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1006 (1984).
247. 652 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 459 U.S. 923 (1982).
248. Disparities were in the one to three standard deviation range.
249. American Nat'l Bank, 652 F.2d at 1181.
250. EEOC v. American Nat'l Bank, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1532, 1584 (E.D. Va.
1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and vacated in part, 652 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 923 (1982).
251. Mda at 1569 (51 potential victims in addition to the original claimant). The EEOC and
the bank had stipulated that "the only [possible] potential discriminatees" were all qualified
black applicants who applied for a position in the six-month period prior to the hiring of a white,
because the bank had an unchallenged policy of considering only applications filed within six
months of the creation of a vacancy. American Nat'! Bank, 652 F.2d at 1213 (Russell, J.,
dissenting.)
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tion.2 52 The district court believed so strongly in the weakness of the
EEOC's case that it concluded that the case was "unreasonable, vexa-
tious, and litigated in bad faith" '253 and awarded attorneys fees to the
defendant.
Notwithstanding the fact that the district court had made specific
findings that none of the "potential discriminatees" 'had been a victim
of discrimination, the court of appeals reversed the district court's
judgment in favor of the defendant and ruled that the EEOC was enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law.254 It reasoned that the statistical
applicant-flow data was not entirely complete and therefore could not
rebut the prima facie case established by the static work-force compar-
ison. The court also ruled, without providing a rationale, that the
individual evidence could not rebut the prima facie case.255 Thus,
even in the face of the district court's specific findings that none of the
potential victims of discrimination had in fact been discriminated
against-findings that the Fourth Circuit did not disturb on appeal-
the court deemed the statistical proof so powerful as to compel a judg-
ment in favor of the EEOC. Such a conclusion is possible only
through suspension of common sense.256
252. American Nat'l Bank 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1592. In ruling on the merits
of the case, the court declined to consider evidence concerning these persons, because the EEOC
stipulated that its case would be limited to those claimants who testified at trial. Id at 1585.
However, in ruling on the defendant's motion for attorneys fees, the court considered whether
there was a possibility that any of the 21 had been discriminated against on the basis of race. Id.
at 1584-85.
253. Id at 1593.
254. American Nat' Bank, 652 F.2d at 1181.
255. id. at 1200; cf Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 52.2 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The
pattern or practice claim may also fail-despite any statistical evidence offered by plaintiffs-if
the defendant articulates a nondiscriminatory, nonpretextual reason for every discharge.");
Paxton v. Union Nat'l Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 567 (8th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1083
(1983). One of the problems faced by defendants in attempting to provile applicant-flow data is
that if records of the race of applicants are maintained, some courts have inferred that the racial
data are being collected for an improper purpose. For example, the district court in EEOC v.
Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292, 304 (7th Cir. 1991), seems to have relied upon
the fact that applications from blacks had the letter "B" written by hand on them as anecdotal
evidence of discrimination: "The court did not specifically find that this was invidious 'race-
coding,' but instead obliquely cited another case in which that conclusion had been made. The
EEOC concedes in its brief that the labeling of the applications 'could have had some legitimate
purpose.'"
256. See American Nat7 Bank 652 F.2d at 1220 (Russell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted):
[S]tatistics, with their inferences, cannot stand against proof that an employer never engaged
in discrimination in a single employment decision in the relevant time period, when
reviewed in the light of the available applicant flow. This positive proof that no employment
decision was tainted is 'the proof of the pudding' in the establishment of no discrimination
and it completely nullifies any inference sought to be drawn from statistical evidence.
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In sum, evidence of actual instances of discrimination should be
required in all cases because statistical evidence by itself proves little.
Moreover, evidence of a substantial number of victims is necessary in
order to ensure that the individual discriminatory actions are repre-
sentative of the employer's regular practices and not merely isolated
instances. Rather than anecdotal evidence being viewed as an adjunct
to statistical evidence, anecdotal evidence should be the core of the
case, demonstrating large numbers of individual instances of discrimi-
nation. The function of statistical evidence should be simply to sup-
port the inference that those many instances are indeed part of a larger
pattern or to attempt some estimate of the total magnitude of the
discrimination.257
B. The Need for "Gross Disparities"
In Teamsters, the Supreme Court stated that "[e]vidence of longlast-
ing and gross disparity between the composition of a work force and
that of the general population" may be evidence of intentional discrim-
ination.25 Similarly, in Hazelwood, the Court stated that "[w]here
gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone may in a proper
case constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimina-
tion." '259 Some subsequent lower-court cases, however, have expressly
See also Barnes v. GenCorp, Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1469 (6th Cir.) (holding where the employer
presents evidence that each plaintiff is less qualified than others occupying comparable positions,
defendant undercuts plaintiffs' statistical proof; unless plaintiffs can demonstrate that explanation
is pretextual, employer entitled to summary judgment), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 211 (1990). But
see Coates, 756 F.2d at 533 ("[IThe class claim does not fail just because the district court finds
that the company has satisfactorily explained the discharges of the named class representatives
and any other testifying employees"; "a defendant's successful rebuttal of each alleged instance
of discrimination weakens, but does not defeat, a plaintiff's class claim."); Boykin v. Georgia-
Pacific Corp., 706 F.2d 1384, 1393 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that the defendants cannot combat a
case of class-wide discrimination with evidence about a few of the promotion decisions), cert
denied, 465 U.S. 1006 (1984).
257. In Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 727 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1984), the court held
that the district court's reliance on a statistical comparison that failed to take into account the
number of minorities qualified to perform the jobs at issue was not reversible error where there
was sufficient nonstatistical evidence of disparate treatment. According to the court, the
statistics "merely demonstrated the consequences of [defendant's] discriminatory hiring
practices." Id at 1436. Because in a proper case a pattern or practice of discrimination can be
established by nonstatistical evidence alone-for example, by introducing a large amount of
anecdotal evidence or by establishing a formal policy of discrimination-the court may have been
correct that reliance on the statistics was not reversible error. However, the Ninth Circuit was
wrong to the extent that it was suggesting that statistical evidence that did not account for
qualifications "demonstrated" anything.
258. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 n.20 (1977)
(emphasis added).
259. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977) (emphasis added).
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denied that a statistical disparity need be "gross," as long as it is statis-
tically significant.260
Allowing a finding of liability to be based upon disparities that are
statistically significant but not "gross" places undue faith in statistical
models and threatens to result in improper findings of liability. No
one doubts that statistical models are merely approxdmations of real-
ity-some variables are omitted, others are represented by proxy.
While there may be arguments about whether a given approximation
is "good enough" to be relevant, no one believes that they present a
perfect picture. Because with large samples even trivial differences in
selection rates may be statistically significant,261 the fact that statisti-
cal models are only approximations of the selection process assumes
greater importance in cases involving large numbers of employment
decisions.
Assume, for example, that for a given entry-level job the interest of
men is slightly greater than women. As a result, for every hundred
employees, 51 will be men and 49 will be women, despite a parity of
representation in the relevant labor pool. If the employer has 100
employees, the underrepresentation of women would be statistically
insignificant; in fact, there is only a one in twelve chance that a 50/50
ratio would be obtained even if the true likelihood of selection for men
and women were identical.262 If, however, the employer had 10,000
employees (5100 men and 4900 women), the undelrepresentation of
women would be statistically significant at the 5-percent level.263
Thus, the incorrect assumption of equal interest has only a trivial
260. See, eg., Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[W]hen a plaintiff's
statistical methodology focuses on the appropriate labor pool and generates evidence of
discrimination at a statistically significant level, no sound policy reason exists for subjecting the
plaintiff to the additional requirement of... showing gross disparities."), cert denied sub nom.
Meese v. Segar, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985); see also Black Shield Police Ass'n v. City of Cleveland, 42
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 270, 275 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (When statistical evidence is "finely
tuned to the relevant labor pool, gross disparities need not be shown to permit an inference of
discrimination.") (quoting Segar, 738 F.2d at 1278).
261. See Kaye, supra note 33, at 1346.
262. The standard deviation would be:
v npT = V'(100)(.5)×(I-.5)= v'=5
The z-score would be:
(observed-expected) (49-50)
s.d. 5
The associated probability of a deviation this great from the expected is approximately 92
percent.
263. The standard deviation would be:
V -p(i-p)= V (10,000)(.5)X×(1 -. 5) = V200 = 50
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effect in a small work force but a possibly outcome-determinative
effect in a large one.2
Because of this large-sample effect, Meier, Sacks and Zabell have
argued that the "4/5ths rule of thumb" employed by the EEOC in
determining whether an employment practice has a substantial dispa-
rate impact should be carried over into pattern-or-practice cases. 265
The rule would have a somewhat different function in pattern-or-prac-
tice cases, however. The 4/5ths rule in disparate-impact cases has a
substantive function: an employment practice that has only a small
disparate impact does not have the "substantial disparate impact" that
establishes a prima facie case; application of the 4/5ths rule ensures
that only substantial impacts will result in liability. In intentional dis-
crimination cases, however, the 4/5ths rule would serve an evidentiary
function. That is, the rule does not authorize intentional discrimina-
tion up to a certain threshold; instead, it simply means that unless the
deviation between observed and expected numbers is of a sufficient
magnitude, we cannot be confident that there is a real difference at
all.
2 6 6
The crudeness of even the most sophisticated model of the employ-
ment process means that extraordinary confidence in statistical models
is not warranted and, if statistical evidence is to play any role in dis-
crimination cases, some method of distinguishing between gross and
nongross disparities must be adopted. Any boundary between the two
types of disparities is necessarily arbitrary, but if one is to be chosen,
the 4/5ths rule may be as good as any, although it would, for reasons
The z-score would be:
(observed-expected) (4900-5000)
s.d. 50
The associated probability of a deviation this great from the expected is less than 5 percent.
264. In a case like that hypothesized, it is difficult to understand how the defendant might
hope to rebut the prima facie statistical case.
265. Meier et al., supra note 50, at 159-61. Under the 4/5ths rule, an employment practice is
deemed to have a disparate impact if the "selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group... is
less than four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate." 29
C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1992).
Some commentators have criticized the 4/5ths rule on the ground that it fails to take into
account whether disparities are also statistically significant. See Boardman & Vining, supra note
49, at 211-17; Braun, supra note 17, at 78-81; Elaine W. Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in
Employment Testing: Statistical Proof Under Title VII 91 HARV. L. RaV. 793, 805-11 (1978).
Meier, Sacks, and Zabell argue that the EEOC's rule, properly understood, does in fact
incorporate a test of statistical significance. Meier et al., supra note 50, at 166-68.
266. See also Smith & Abram, supra note 13, at 53 ("The Court's emphasis in Teamsters and
in Hazelwood on evidence of 'long-lasting and gross disparities' suggests that more is required in
the evaluation of statistical proof of disparate impact than statistically significant disparities.").
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already discussed, be wiser to forswear the use of statistical evidence
except as background data.
C. The Need to Limit Introduction of Evidence Concerning
Probabilities
In the fifteen years since the Supreme Court placed its imprimatur
on statistical proof of discrimination in Title VII cases, courts have
demonstrated themselves to be less than competent in dealing with
statistical evidence. The Statistical Fallacy, embraced on a wholesale
basis by the courts, has caused them consistently to overestimate the
importance of statistically significant disparities in an employer's work
force. In large part because of the "suspect" nature: of these dispari-
ties, courts have inappropriately shifted to the defendant the burden of
justifying them.
The incapacity of courts to deal with this form of evidence has been
recognized in a peculiar back-handed fashion by appellate courts in
the level of deference that they give to lower courts' statistical findings.
For example, the Seventh Circuit has in several cases relied upon a
rule that "especially where statistical evidence is involved, great defer-
ence is due the district court's determination of whether the resultant
numbers are sufficiently probative of the ultimate fact in issue." '267
Although the court has not identified the basis for is rule, it must be
different from the rationale for granting special deference to a trial
court's resolution of credibility because of its ability to observe the
witnesses' demeanor.26 The Fifth Circuit has more candidly revealed
its justification for deference to the district court, stating that "we do
not have the statistical expertise to declare a particular statistical tech-
nique inappropriate where a qualified expert expresses a contrary view
267. Soria v. Ozinga Bros., Inc., 704 F.2d 990, 994-95 n.6 (7th Cir. 1983); see also Mozee v.
American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 940 F.2d 1036, 1045 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoting Soria);
Ottaviani v. State Univ., 875 F.2d 365, 375 (2d Cir. 1989) (adopting Seventh Circuit rule), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1021 (1990); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 310 (7th Cir. 1988)
(quoting Soria).
268. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) (stating that the
"clearly erroneous" standard of Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is applicable
"even when the district court's findings do not rest on credibility determinations, but are based
instead on physical or documentary evidence or inferences from other facts").
In 1985, Rule 52 was amended to make clear that "[findings of fact, whether based upon oral
or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." FED. R. Civ. P. 52
(emphasis added). The Notes of the Advisory Committee point out that although many courts
had given reduced deference to findings not based upon assessments of credibility, interests of
"stability and judicial economy"-not the trial court's superior ability to draw inferences from
documentary evidence-mandate deference to the trier of fact. Id. (Advisory Committee's
Note).
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and the district court credits the testimony." '269 Thus, it is neither the
district court's superior vantage point nor institutional efficiency that
entitles its findings to deference; it is the appellate court's lack of com-
petence to select between the statistical presentations of competing
expert witnesses. But surely the district court's competence is no
greater. If a decision either way can rarely be declared clearly errone-
ous, neither can it be declared clearly correct or even, perhaps, proba-
bly correct.
The increased availability of jury trials under the Civil Rights Act of
1991270 threatens to exacerbate the problem of triers of fact dealing
inappropriately with statistical evidence. Judges who today deal rou-
tinely with statistical evidence in litigation presumably are better able
to evaluate it than jurors for whom a trial may be the first and last
time they ever deal with complex statistical analyses. If judges cannot
competently evaluate such evidence, there is every reason to believe
that juries are even less able.271 Moreover, the difficulty of reviewing a
jury's reasoning makes it more difficult to enforce rigor in the fact-
finding process.
It must be now recognized that a great deal of caution is necessary
in evaluating statistical evidence in discrimination cases. Hypothesis
testing, with its reliance on the assumption that the resultant p-value
represents the probability that the observed distribution was a conse-
quence of chance and its declaration of results as "statistically signifi-
cant," should be abandoned altogether.272 Such evidence is simply
irrelevant to the ultimate question. Evidence of the p-value itself
should also be excluded, although it is admittedly relevant in some
cases. Even though it is not a measure of the probability that a partic-
ular employer's work-force disparity is a product of chance, the p-
value is still relevant because it gives a subjective intuitive impression
269. Rendon v. AT&T Technologies, 883 F.2d 388, 397 (5th Cir. 1989).
270. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 2000e (1988 & 1992
Supp.)).
271. See King v. General Elec. Co., 960 F.2d 617, 624 (7th Cir. 1992) (suggesting that one of
the difficulties of employing Title VII pattern-or-practice analysis in cases brought under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) is that the Title VII case is heard by a judge, while
an ADEA case is heard by a jury).
One empirical study of the effect of statistical evidence on juries suggests that in general juries
may tend to underestimate the value of statistical evidence, but when the probabilities described
are quite small, this tendency decreases. David L. Faigman & A.J. Baglioni, Jr., Bayes' Theorem
in the Trial Process: Instructing Jurors on the Value of Statistical Evidence, 12 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 1, 13-14 (1988).
272. See Kaye, supra note 33, at 1343-45, 1362 (arguing that because adoption of a
particular level of statistical significance is arbitrary, testimony concerning whether results are
significant or not should be supplanted by testimony concerning the size of the p-value).
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of whether chance is a reasonable explanation for the observed dispar-
ity. Thus, although a p-value of .05 is an insufficient basis for conclud-
ing that the distribution probably did not occur by chance, a p-value of
.00000001 may well support such an inference even if it is not an accu-
rate measure of the probability that it was caused by nonchance fac-
tors, let alone caused by discrimination. However, the probative value
in such a case is likely to be relatively slight; where disparities of that
magnitude are present the primary focus of the litigation will probably
be on identification of the systematic nonrandom cause rather than on
whether the cause was random or nonrandom. Courts have repeat-
edly demonstrated the prejudicial effect of evidence of probabilities on
themselves-allowing it inappropriately to skew their view of the case
toward the plaintiff's theory-and that effect is likely to be amplified
in jury trials. Because such evidence is so susceptible to misinterpreta-
tion, its prejudicial effect outweighs its limited probative value and it
should not be admitted.
D. The Need for Proper Allocations of Burdens of Proof
Many courts have improperly allocated proof burdens in statistical
cases, allowing a showing of little probative value to shift the burden
of proof to the defendant. When, as frequently occurs, the evidence
that the defendant is then called upon to produce is unavailable, this
burden shift becomes outcome determinative. Such a result is unac-
ceptable in a regime that places the ultimate burden on the plaintiff to
demonstrate through competent evidence that the defendant has vio-
lated the law. As Brilmayer and Kornhauser have pointed out,
"where opportunities for objective verification are scarce, adoption of
a methodology takes on the characteristics of a value choice."27
Unfortunately, the value choices implicit in methods of statistical
proof are inconsistent with the values of the statutes that they are
designed to enforce.
Statistical evidence should no longer be allowed to serve as a basis
for a finding of liability unless it can satisfy what are admittedly sub-
stantially more rigorous criteria than have heretofore been applied.
This is not to require the "scientific certainty" abjured by the Supreme
Court in Bazemore, but rather to require satisfaction of ordinary prin-
ciples of evidence and proof burdens: a plaintiff must establish by a
preponderance of reliable and relevant evidence that the employer has
discriminated on a proscribed basis. Distracted by a perceived need to
273. Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 39, at 152.
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develop elaborate burden-shifting rules, courts have lost sight of this
forest for the statistical trees.
If statistical proof of discrimination is still to be acceptable at all in
court-which perhaps is doubtful--courts must pay more than lip ser-
vice to the principle that throughout the litigation it is the plaintiff's
burden to demonstrate that impermissible discrimination is "the com-
pany's standard operating procedure-the regular rather than the
unusual practice."274 The fundamental requirement must be that the
plaintiff's statistical analysis actually prove something. The plaintiff
seeking to employ statistical analysis must demonstrate that all or sub-
stantially all of the factors that contribute to productivity-not just
the minimum objective qualifications-are taken into account in the
statistical model. Absent this demonstration, the statistical analysis,
even if admissible under Bazemore, lacks sufficient probative value to
establish a prima facie case.
Because employers do not hire at random from among the mini-
mally qualified and because qualifications are not randomly distrib-
uted throughout the population, a showing that there is a statistical
disparity after controlling for minimum qualifications has no probative
value at all. Furthermore, because most employers do not base
employment decisions purely on quantitative objective factors, and
because there is no reason to believe that subjective qualifications vary
throughout the population any less than objective factors, merely con-
trolling for objective criteria is inadequate. Under a regime of logical
rigor, plaintiffs would no longer be permitted to limit their focus to
minimum qualifications for a job except in the unlikely event that they
can demonstrate that all persons having the minimum qualifications
would be equally qualified. Moreover, plaintiffs' analyses could not be
based upon unfounded (and often counterintuitive) assumptions of
equality of interest and qualifications; the present judicial practice of
accepting such assumptions and labelling defendants' challenges to
them as "speculative" would come to an end. In sum, the crude statis-
tical showings that have to date formed the grist for the litigation mill
should be recognized for what they are-capable of proving very little.
Admittedly, a plaintiff's task would not be an easy one under a
scheme imposing an appropriate measure of rigor; indeed, the burden
would be insurmountable in many cases. That is not a reason, how-
ever, for declining to impose it.27 If shoddy statistics do not prove
274. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977).
275. Brilmayer and Kornhauser, supra note 39, at 152, argue that allowing introduction of
complex statistical analysis systematically favors large defendants, who have more ready access
to experts. If an appropriate amount of rigor were applied to statistical evidence, there might be
555
Washington Law Review
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence, so be it. There is
no justification for lowering the standard simply because plaintiffs may
otherwise not be able to meet it; that is a necessary consequence of
placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff.276 One would have
thought it obvious that if non-quantitative factors are important in the
decision-making process-or if quantitative data are otherwise
unavailable-it must follow that quantitative methods are an inade-
quate mode of analysis. 277 Put another way-and we cannot ignore
what may be a painful truth to some-many cases now treated as sta-
tistical cases are simply not amenable to statistical analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
Statistical proof of discrimination has been converted from what
first appeared to be a common-sense application of a tool of inference
into an elaborate game based upon ill-considered assumptions and pre-
sumptions.278 The primary method of analysis has been to construct a
hypothetical abstract model of the employer's decision-making process
and then to fit the data to the model. If the data and the model do not
fit, it is assumed that the fault lies in the employment process rather
than in the model. The fact that statistical analysis yields a number,
carried out to as many decimal places as one pleases, has given courts
an unjustified faith in the analysis. In the statistical sense, however,
one must distinguish between precision and accuracy. The answer
a modicum of truth to the observation; however, the burden-shifting devices that have been
described in this Article lessen to a large extent the need for plaintiffs to provide extensive
technical presentations. Moreover, the recoverability of expert fees under the Civil Rights Act of
1991 increases the access of plaintiffs to such evidence. In any event, the plaintiff always may
elect not to rely on statistical evidence, in which case disparities in access to statistical experts
would not be an issue.
276. But see Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 505 F. Supp. 224, 358 (N.D. Tex. 1980)
(rejecting the defendant's argument that general labor force comparisons are inappropriate for
low-level clerical positions, reasoning, in part, that such a holding would "set up a standard of
refinement at the prima facie stage... [in]consistent with the availability of statistical data"),
vacated, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1073 (1984).
277. Judge Cudahy, dissenting in EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 365 (7th Cir.
1988), recognized that attempting to quantify the unquantifiable gives at best a crude
approximation of reality. Id. (Cudahy, J., dissenting) ("To say that men are three times as
interested as women in commission selling is a rough attempt to describe a dynamic social
phenomenon; it is hardly a matter susceptible of precise delineation."). Nonetheless, he was
willing to impose the burden of proof on the defendant to disprove the plaintiff's hypothetical
number.
278. Richard Delgado has asserted that "computer-assisted analysis of data has enabled us to
prove inequality more powerfully than ever before." Richard Delgado, On Taking Back Our
Civil Rights Promises: When Equality Doesn't Compute, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 579, 579. As the
foregoing discussion should reveal, the truth of Delgado's statement depends entirely on what he
means by the word "prove."
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provided by statistics may be very precise but it may give a wholly
inaccurate sense of what is going on in the workplace. Answers, for
answers' sake, are not the goal of the litigation process. After all, one
can get an answer from a ouiJa board, and ouija boards are much
cheaper than statistical experts.
Statistical models of an employer's decision-making process are
valid only to the extent that they accurately capture the process.2 79 If
they do not adequately reflect the process, they lack substantial proba-
tive value.2z 0 Where courts have gone amiss in this area is that they
often fail to consider defects in a plaintiff's statistical case to be the
plaintiff's problem; instead, through a variety of devices they have
made those defects the defendant's problem.
At bottom, the statistics relied upon by many courts reveal little
about the probability that the defendant has engaged in a pattern or
practice of discrimination, yet employers are routinely held liable on
the basis of these meaningless statistics. The criticism of the many
court opinions here should not be taken to mean that no courts are
appropriately skeptical of statistical evidence. Some courts are,28 ' but
a proper amount of skepticism in cases where the proof is largely sta-
tistical would result, in virtually all cases, in a judgment for the
defendant. Thus, the elaborate statistical presentations in pattern-or-
279. See Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., 839 F.2d 18, 22 (2d Cir. 1988) ("As with any multiple
regression analysis, the validity of the influence attributed to a particular variable will depend
heavily on how accurately the model mimics the actual factors influencing the dependent
variable .... "), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1105 (1989); Maddox v. Claytor, 764 F.2d 1539, 1552
(I lth Cir. 1985) ("If the tested disparity is based on erroneous assumptions or suffers from flaws
in the underlying data, then standard deviation analysis is foredoomed to yield an equally faulty
result."); CONNOLLY ET AL., supra note 9, § 11.10 (pointing out the need for the statistical
analysis to "reflect the process by which the employer's decisions were made"); Brilmayer &
Korhauser, supra note 39, at 120 ("[P]erfect technical implementation of a model does not
guarantee scientific accuracy, since the most difficult part of quantitative modelling is not
carrying out the computations, but selecting which computations to do"); Campbell, supra note
41, at 1305-12 (criticizing courts for their unquestioning acceptance of statistical models not
shown to be a fair representation of the challenged employment process).
280. As the court stated in Penk v. Oregon State Board of Higher Education, 816 F.2d 458
(9th Cir.), cert denied, 484 U.S. 853 (1987):
We note in passing that it is often acceptable in the social sciences to use a statistical model
for proof of behavior even where, in an absolute sense, that model does not describe the data
well. However, courts are not free to decide legal propositions on hypothetical evidence.
This is especially true where courts are asked to draw inferences as to the existence of
hidden discriminatory motives from statistical evidence.
Id. at 465 n.l. But see Pitre v. Western Elec. Co., 843 F.2d 1262, 1269 (10th Cir. 1988)
("[S]tatistics that are insignificant to the social scientist may well be relevant to a court....
[W]hile social scientists search for certainty, the trier of fact in a Title VII case need only find
that discrimination is more likely than not.")
281. See, eg., EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1991); Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302; Coser v. Moore, 739 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1984).
557
Washington Law Review
practice cases-such as the 20,000 pages of exhibits in the unsuccess-
ful Sears case282 or the "25,000 pages of testimony and rooms full of
exhibits" in the unsuccessful Penk case 28 3 -are colossal wastes of time
and resources. Moreover, the risk of liability based upon statistical
evidence faced by even non-discriminating employers has the unfortu-
nate consequence of pressuring employers to abandon legitimate, but
unquantifiable, qualifications and to engage in hiring and promotion
"by the numbers" to avoid liability under a statistical analysis. It is
time to put an end to this misguided endeavor.
282. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d at 307 n.2.
283. Penk, 816 F.2d at 460.
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